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Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries
HowardA. Shelanskit
J. Gregory Sidaktt
The landmark Microsoft case raises challengingquestions concerning antitrustremedies. In
this Article, we propose a framework for assessing the costs and benefits of different remedies,particularly divestiture, in monopolization cases involving network industries. Our approach can assist a court or enforcement agency not only in analyzing the welfare effects of divestiture,but also
in choosingmore generally among alternativekinds of remedies. The framework would,for example, apply to a court's choice between damages and injunctive remedies or between behavioral injunctions and structuralinjunctions.After developing ourframework, we apply it to the divestiture
proposalsmade by the government and others in the Microsoft case. We arguethat those proposals
leave open important questions that must be answered before divestiture can be shown to be either
the best remedialalternative or to create likely net gains in economic welfare.
INTRODUCTION

The late William E Baxter went to Washington to fight monopolies in 1981. By the time he returned to teaching at Stanford University three years later, the Bell System had been restructured from one
company into eight.' Baxter's handiwork was the most ambitious antitrust divestiture since the government's breakup of Standard Oil in
1911.2 As architect of the AT&T divestiture, Baxter believed that a
theory of antitrust liability should map coherently on to a proposed
remedy. The remedy should end the conduct that is alleged to have

harmed consumer welfare and that forms the basis for a finding of liability. The remedy in a public antitrust action should do no more and
t
tt

Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
F.K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow in Law and Economics, American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research. The views expressed here are solely those of the authors. Mr. Sidak has
been a consultant to the Microsoft Corporation.
1 See United States v American Telephone & Telegraph Co, 552 F Supp 131, 142 n 42
(D DC 1982), affd as Maryland v United States, 460 US 1001 (1983).
2
See generally Standard Oil Co of New Jersey v United States, 221 US 1 (1911).
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no less. Regardless of liability, if "there is no assurance that appropriate relief could be obtained," then the government must question the
value to consumers of prosecuting the antitrust case at issue. Accordingly, on the same day that he announced the AT&T divestiture, Assis-

tant Attorney General Baxter terminated the government's other major monopolization case-the one against America's second titan of
information technologies, IBM. Elegantly simple, Baxter's principle
concerning the efficacy of antitrust remedies deserves the eponym
"Baxter's axiom."' It would serve well as a Hippocratic oath for antitrust enforcers and jurists. In fact, Baxter's insight is really an application of basic principles of welfare economics to the questions of when
to bring antitrust cases and how to resolve them in a socially beneficial manner.
About a year into the Department of Justice's pursuit of AT&T,
Bill Gates and Paul Allen founded the company that became Microsoft Corporation.6 Since that time, Microsoft has grown to a market

capitalization of approximately $340 billion' and today symbolizes
how a "New Economy" has risen from the advent of affordable, ubiquitous personal computing and the phenomenal growth of the Internet. The company is also a post-industrial giant that has been alternately lionized, vilified, and, ultimately, investigated and prosecuted by

the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. It took less
than fifteen years for a startup from the West to replace the centuryold Bell System as the principal target of public antitrust scrutiny. It
remains to be seen whether Microsoft will become the government's

trophy for wise enforcement, like the Bell System perhaps, or its
3 In re InternationalBusiness Machines Corp, 687 F2d 591,594 (2d Cir 1982) (quoting William R Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice). See also Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. and J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities,51 Stan L Rev 1187, 1188-89 (1999) (noting that
Baxter believed that antitrust liability rules and remedies must share a common logic); Richard
L. Schmalensee, Bill Baxter in the Antitrust Arena:An Economist's Appreciation,51 Stan L Rev
1317, 1324-27 (1999) (noting Baxter's refusal to proceed with cases lacking a "plausible and coherent consumer benefit rationale").
4
See Ernest Holsendolph, U.S. Settles Phone Suit, Drops L B.M. Case: A. T & T to Split Up,
Transforming Industry,NY Times Al (Jan 9,1982).
5 Though to our knowledge it has not been denominated as such before now, Baxter's
axiom has long influenced academic writings on antitrust and regulatory policy. See, for example,
J. Gregory Sidak, Note, RethinkingAntitrust Damages,33 Stan L Rev 329,352 (1981) ("By articulating the economic foundation for antitrust damages, the Supreme Court can reconcile the law
of antitrust damages with the law of antitrust liability, thereby producing a unified theory of
competitive rights whose purpose and effect [are] to enhance the wealth of society."); Richard
Schmalensee, The Controlof Natural Monopolies49 (Lexington 1979) ("The mere existence of a
natural monopoly problem that the unaided market cannot solve does not imply the desirability
of imposing an inevitably imperfect control system.").
6 See Richard J. Gilbert, Networks, Standards,and the Use of Market Dominance: Microsoft (1995), in John E. Kwoka, Jr. and Lawrence J. White, eds, The Antitrust Revolution: Economics, Competition and Policy 409,410 (Oxford 3d ed 1999).
7
See <http://biz.yahoo.com/p/m/msft.html> (visited Sept 17,2000) ($337.8 billion).
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haunting nemesis, like IBM. Baxter taught us that the government's
proof of liability does not suffice to predict its success in crafting a
remedy.
On November 5, 1999, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson issued his
findings of fact in the civil antitrust case of United States v Microsoft
8 On November 19, 1999, he appointed as a mediator in
Corporation.
the case Chief Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.9 Following weeks of settlement discussions, Microsoft and the government returned to the courtroom on February
22, 2000, to present closing arguments.' ° Judge Jackson likened Microsoft to the Standard Oil trust, and one state attorney general said that
and far reaching."',
any remedies ordered in the case must be "drastic
Judge Jackson issued his conclusions of law on April 3, 122000, finding
Antitrust Act.
Microsoft liable for violating the Sherman
When Judge Jackson ruled for the government, the task before
the trial court changed from determining liability to identifying a suitable remedy. Following Baxter's axiom, any remedy should address
the conduct for which Microsoft was found liable and advance economic welfare at the lowest possible social cost. The problem is a challenging one. As expressed by Timothy Bresnahan, the Stanford
economist then serving as the Antitrust Division's chief economist, the
government's case against Microsoft can be likened to a dog chasing a
3
fire truck: what is he supposed to do once he catches it?' Well, the dog
caught the truck, and the question of what to do was no longer
hypothetical.
On April 28, 2000, the government offered its answer: separate
Microsoft's operating systems business from its applications business
and, among other things, order a divestiture of the firm into two independent companies. Four distinguished economists-Robert E. Litan
of the Brookings Institution, Roger G. Noll of Stanford University,
William D. Nordhaus of Yale University, and Frederic Scherer of Harvard University-filed an amicus brief the same week which proposed
8 See United States v Microsoft Corp, 84 F Supp 2d 9, 12-112 (D DC 1999) ("Findings of
Fact").
9 See Joel Brinkley, Microsoft Case Gets US. Judge as a Mediator,NY Times Al (Nov 20,
1999). See also Steve Lohr, The Microsoft-U.S. Negotiations: Tough Talk in Chicago, NY Times
C1 (Feb 21, 2000).
10 See Joel Brinkley and Steve Lohr, Microsoft Chided as Antitrust Trial Draws to a Close,
NY Times Al (Feb 23,2000).
11 Id at Al, C14 (quoting Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut).
12 See United States v Microsoft Corp, 87 F Supp 2d 30, 35 (D DC 2000) ("Conclusions of
Law").
13 See Timothy F. Bresnahan, New Modes of Competition:Implicationsfor the Future Structure of the Computer Industry, in Jeffrey A. Eisenach and Thomas M. Lenard, eds, Competition,
Innovation and the Microsoft Monopoly:Antitrust in the DigitalMarketplace 155,206-07 (Kluwer
Academic 1999).
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an alternative divestiture remedy and argued that the government's14
proposed remedy was inadequate and would be hard to administer.
They observed that the Microsoft case presents important and novel
questions in terms of fashioning a remedy:
[T]his Court will establish in the process of setting a remedy in
this matter the contours of relief in monopolization cases where
the defendant's value arises primarily from intangible assets in
the form of intellectual property rather than the tangible capital
assets characteristic of such prior major monopolization cases as
Standard Oil, Alcoa, and AT&T. In essence, this case provides an
important test of how antitrust law and remedies should be applied in the "New Economy," where informational capital is the
scarce and precious asset and physical assets are relatively minor
and hardly unique."
These economists argued that aggressive divestiture remedies are
more justified in markets characterized by intellectual rather than
physical capital. Microsoft predictably responded that a lesser set of
remedies would suffice,16 and other equally eminent economists, including Paul Krugman of MIT, warned of the unintended consequences of a divestiture remedy.'7 On May 17, 2000, the government
stated in reply to Microsoft's filing that divestiture was the only practical remedy." The trial court accepted the government's arguments
and ordered Microsoft broken up into two companies."
The purpose of this Article is to establish principles for answering
the remedial question faced by the court and for assessing Judge Jackson's decision to order a divestiture of Microsoft. In Part I, we explore
differences between forms of economic competition -particularly
network competition and Schumpeterian rivalry -relevant to antitrust
analysis in dynamic industries. Those two concepts of competition are
important to understanding conflicting views of the Microsoft case.
Microsoft's opponents have argued that the existence of "network externalities" creates market conditions that justify antitrust in14
See Remedies Brief of Amici Curiae Robert E. Litan, Roger G. Noll, William D. Nordhaus, and Frederic Scherer, United States v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 98-1232, 46-49
(D DC filed Apr 27,2000) ("Litan Brief').
15 Idat 4.
16
See Microsoft Corporation's Proposed Final Judgment, United States v Microsoft Corp,

Civil Action No 98-1232 (D DC filed May 10, 2000).
17 See Paul Krugman, Microsoft: What Next?, NY Times A21 (Apr 26, 2000); Paul Krugman, Dirty Windows Policy, NY Times sec 4, 19 (Apr 30,2000); Robert W. Hahn, Breaking Up Is
Hard to Do, So Don'tDo It, LA Times M5 (Apr 30,2000).
18 Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment, United States v
Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 98-1232 (D DC filed May 17, 2000). See also Jerry Guidera,
GovernmentAsks Judge to DisregardMicrosoft's Remedy, Wall St J A6 (May 18,2000).
19 US. v Microsoft Corp, 97 F Supp 2d 59 (D DC 2000).
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tervention against aspects of Microsoft's pricing, product introduction,
product integration, and acquisition strategies. A network externality,
or "network effect," exists when the value of a product or service increases with the breadth of demand for that product or service. The
typical example is the telephone system, which becomes more valuable to any given subscriber as other people subscribe and become
available to communicate with the subscriber. As the benefits offered
by one network grow, so too do the costs to consumers of choosing, or
switching to, a rival offering. Competition in network markets can
therefore take on a winner-take-all dynamic with competitive strategies geared towards gaining an early lead in market penetration.
"Schumpeterian rivalry" is a distinct vision of competition that,
though not mutually exclusive of network competition, may have implications for the durability of network monopolies and for antitrust
enforcement in network markets. In this view, which some critics of
the government's case against Microsoft contend is applicable to software markets, firms compete through technological innovation to
achieve market dominance, but dominance that is continually challenged and subject to displacement by subsequent innovations. As
with network competition, this form of rivalry may have an all-ornothing flavor. Winners enjoy a period of dominance, during which
they receive above-cost prices that include the returns necessary to
induce risky investment in product innovation, but are subject to being supplanted by rivals in a later innovation cycle.
In Part II, we draw from principles of antitrust jurisprudence and
microeconomics to propose an approach for choosing appropriate
remedies in monopolization cases involving network industries. We
present a three-step test for assessing the welfare effects of a remedy,
which can also be used to compare the relative costs and benefits of
available remedies. Step one is to evaluate whether the static (shortterm, holding technology constant) efficiency consequences of a proposed remedy will yield a net gain. Do the gains in allocative efficiency (that is, reductions in price and increases in output) exceed the
losses in productive efficiency (that is, ability to reduce production
costs), if any, associated with a particular remedy? If so, then step two
is to compare the static efficiency gains from the first step with any effects that the remedy is likely to have on dynamic (long-term, with
technological change) efficiency. Examples of dynamic efficiency include innovation that reduces production costs or develops new products and services for consumers. If the net gain is positive, then step
three is to evaluate the remedy in terms of its enforcement costs,
broadly defined. The optimal remedy is the one that produces the
greatest overall efficiency gains net of enforcement and administrative
costs.
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In Part III, we describe the government's basic theory of liability
in the Microsoft case. We then examine Judge Jackson's findings of
fact and his conclusions of law.
In Part IV, we use the axiomatic approach developed in Part II to
evaluate the structural remedies proposed to the court in the Microsoft case. We focus our analysis on the vertical and horizontal divestiture remedies requested by the government and by some amici curiae.
We also discuss how the analysis would extend to other structural and
behavioral remedies such as compulsory licensing, line-of-business restrictions, prohibitions on product integration, disclosure of the application programming interfaces ("APIs"), and limitations on contractual terms with customers. We conclude that the divestiture proposals
before the court do not contain the elements necessary to show either
that divestiture is likely to create net social benefits or, even assuming
it would, that it would do so at lower cost than alternative forms of relief.20
In Part V, we examine whether, as has been widely suggested, the
1984 divestiture of AT&T provides the proper blueprint for formulating remedies in the Microsoft case. We conclude that it does not on
multiple grounds.
In Part VI, we pose, but leave for others to answer, two more
general questions concerning the process of selecting a remedy in the
Microsoft case.
I. DYNAMIC COMPETITION: NETWORK EFFECTS AND
SCHUMPETERIAN RIVALRY

As discussed in the Introduction to this Article, two different ways
of understanding market structure and performance have emerged in
the Microsoft case, as well as in numerous other antitrust and regulatory
contexts in recent years: network competition and innovation-based, or
"Schumpeterian," competition. The adoption of one or the other of
those frameworks can be of great practical consequence. High profit
margins might appear to be the benign and necessary recovery of legitimate investment returns in a Schumpeterian framework, but they might
represent exploitation of customer lock-in and monopoly power when
viewed through the lens of network economics. Market dominance in
20
We assume that the effects of a remedy on static and dynamic efficiency are likely to exceed enforcement costs by a substantial amount (perhaps several orders of magnitude). If that is
not the case, then a court should double check its results under our proposed analysis in a manner suggested by the following example. Suppose, ignoring enforcement costs, one remedy would
provide net benefits of ten dollars, while a second remedy would provide net benefits of only
eight dollars. But suppose also that the first remedy would require enforcement costs of five dollars, while the second would require enforcement costs of only one dollar. In this example, the
second would be superior when considered net of enforcement costs.
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the former case is likely to be temporary, but in the latter to become entrenched. The issue is particularly complex because, in network indus-

tries characterized by rapid innovation, both forces may be operating
and can be difficult to isolate. Neither the Schumpeterian nor the net-

work externalities framework justifies anticompetitive behavior, but
each might yield different conclusions about what constitutes evidence

of such behavior and what the likely consequences of such behavior will
be. These factors are, in turn, directly relevant to the choice of an appropriate remedy where antitrust violations have occurred.
A.

Network Effects
The various government complaints against Microsoft have built

an account of antitrust liability upon the theoretical research on network effects. Critical to the government's theory in the Microsoft
cases has been the idea that computer software, like telecommunications, is a good that relies upon an interconnected web of fixed in-

frastructure. The economic properties of such network goods and their
effects on market behavior have been an important part of the justification for antitrust intervention against some of Microsoft's pricing,
product introduction, product integration, and acquisition activities.
1. Network externalities.

For current purposes, the most important result from the literature
on network economics is the creation in some product markets of network externalities." Network externalities are benefits to society that
21 The seminal paper in the literature on network effects is Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, 5 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 16 (1974). For subsequent contributions to the literature, see Stanley M. Besen and Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to
Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization,8 J Econ Persp 117 (1994); Michael L. Katz and
Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J Econ Persp 93 (1994); Joseph Farrell
and Carl Shapiro, Standard Setting in High-Definition Television, 1992 Brookings Papers on Econ
Activity: Microeconomics 1; Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network
Externalities, 40 J Indus Econ 55 (1992); Garth Saloner, Economic Issues in Computer Interface
Standardization,1 Econ Innov New Tech 135 (1990); Stanley M. Besen and Garth Saloner, The
Economics of Telecommunications Standards, in Robert W Crandall and Kenneth Flamm, eds,
Changing the Rules: Technological Change,InternationalCompetition, and Regulation in Communications 177 (Brookings 1989); Janusz A. Ordover and Garth Saloner, Predation,Monopolization,
and Antitrust, in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig, eds, 1 Handbook of IndustrialOrganization 537 (North-Holland 1989); Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,ProductPreannouncements,and Predation,76 Am Econ Rev 940 (1986); Michael L.
Katz and Carl Shapiro, Product Compatibility Choice in a Market with Technological Progress, 38
Oxford Econ Papers 146 (Supp 1986); Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in
the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J Pol Econ 822 (1986); Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner,
Standardization,Compatibility,and Innovation, 16 RAND J Econ 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz and
Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities; Competition, and Compatibility,75 Am Econ Rev 424 (1985).
For differing, nontechnical overviews of this literature, see Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Winners Losers & Microsoft: Competition and Antitrust in High Technology 49-115 (Inde-
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accrue as the size of a network grows: An individual consumer's demand to use (and hence her benefit from) the telephone network, for
example, increases with the number of other users on the network
whom she can call or from whom she can receive calls. Just as one
consumer's demand to use the telephone network increases with the
number of other users on the network, so also the demand for a particular word processing or spreadsheet program increases as it becomes
more commonly used or more compatible with other programs.
If the network characteristic of a good is significant, then consumers will be attracted to the firm with the largest market share. In
the absence of interconnection or compatibility, consumers will receive a larger network benefit from choosing the good or service that
has the largest number of other users. For example, consider the "instant messaging" systems offered by various Internet service providers. There is currently no legal requirement that subscribers to one
provider be allowed to send instant messages to subscribers of another. Any provider can keep its messaging system proprietary. In the
absence of interconnection, it is costly for consumers to subscribe to
multiple services, and if consumers might find it comparatively beneficial to purchase only the service offering the largest instant-messaging
network externality. The history of local telephone service in the first
decades of the twentieth century, during which AT&T refused to connect with independent competitors, illustrates how such a dynamic can
lead to monopoly.
2. Lock-in, path dependence, and barriers to entry.
A second important theme in the literature on network effects
concerns lock-in of customers to a particular network and the related
possibility of technological path dependence.2 The existence of network externalities can confer benefits on the first firm in a market to
gain a significant early lead in market penetration, especially if production exhibits increasing returns to scale. That early lead can have a
decisive effect on the market's structure well into the future because
consumers are attracted to the good or service that offers the largest
network benefit, and that benefit then only becomes larger and more
pendent Institute 1999); Carl Shapiro and Hal R.Varian, Information Rules:A Strategic Guide to the
Network Economy 183-84 (Harvard Business 1999).
22
See, for example, Lester D. Taylor, Telecommunications Demand in Theory and Practice 9
(Kluwer Academic 1994); Bridger M. Mitchell and Ingo Vogelsang, Telecommunications Pricing:
Theory and Practice11 (Cambridge 1991); Jean Tirole, The Theory of IndustrialOrganization 405
(MIT 1988).
23 See W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 Sci Am 92 (Feb 1990); W
Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99
Econ J 116 (1989); Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 Am Econ Rev Papers
and Proc 332 (1985).
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attractive to later consumers. One consequence is that consumers can
become "locked in" to a particular network. In the absence of interconnection or interoperability among competing network goods or
services, switching from the market leader to a rival will entail at least
a short-term loss in network benefit. This lock-in effect, in turn, makes
entry or expansion by rivals more difficult because they cannot attain
a critical mass of customers. The network is thus said to "tip" to the incumbent, which creates a barrier to entry in the costs to rivals of overcoming the network benefits associated with the incumbent's product.
To enter, a firm must have either a sufficiently better product such
that consumers find it worthwhile to incur switching costs (such as loss in
network benefits and retraining costs) or a sufficient cost advantage such
that it can compensate consumers for those switching costs through
lower prices. To avoid being in such a catch-up position, firms will have
the incentive to gear competitive strategies towards capturing an early
lead and to continue innovating to stay ahead of potential rivals who
might "leapfrog" its incumbent lead position. The race to gain and to
maintain dominance in a network market might also, of course, provide
motives to engage in anticompetitive conduct, as the trial court found
Microsoft to have done.
A large network externality can determine the path of technological change in a market in much the same way it can determine
market structure. The market leader will set the technological standard-for example, Microsoft's Windows operating system--even if
other technological standards are superior in some economic or engineering sense. Subsequent innovation in the market, and in markets
for complementary products, might thus follow the path set by the
technology that first takes a meaningful lead even if that path is not,
ex post, seen to be the optimal one. Path dependency and lock-in can,
of course, occur for reasons other than network externalities (for example, the costs of learning to use a competing product). Moreover,
network externalities need not create lock-in. If switching to a new
system is low cost or if it is cheap to use multiple systems, then entry is
feasible and the market may support multiple networks of varying
sizes. Some scholars have also disputed the validity of the empirical
cases used to document the existence of path-dependent outcomes.
The theoretical case for lock-in and path dependency in network markets has nonetheless been an important motivation for the government's antitrust enforcement to constrain Microsoft's dominance in
operating systems and its growth in complementary software applications.
24 The leading critics are Professors Stan Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis. See Liebowitz
and Margolis, Winners, Losers & Microsoft at 117-234 (cited in note 21).
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A consequence of network externalities and lock-in effects is that
antitrust enforcement in network markets becomes complicated. On
one hand, if anticompetitive conduct is not detected and stopped early,
dominant market share may "tip" in favor of the bad actor. The harm
to consumers will at that point be done and might not be able to be
undone without imposition of yet additional costs on consumers. On
the other hand, distinguishing anticompetitive actions from beneficial
competitive conduct can be difficult when firms are competing not
just for market share, but for commercial viability and the market itself. For example, aggressive pricing that looks predatory in a conventional market might constitute a rational competitive strategy in a
market where one's future existence depends on early penetration.
Network dynamics may thus raise the risks of both action and inaction
by antitrust authorities. In the 1994 Tunney Act proceeding concerning
Microsoft, Nobel laureate Kenneth J. Arrow observed:
The analysis of the Department of Justice and the amici curiae
brief agree that the software market is peculiarly characterized
by increasing returns to scale and therefore natural barriers to
entry. Large-scale operation is low-cost operation and also conveys advantages to the buyer. Virtually all the costs of production
are in the design of the software and therefore independent of
the amount sold, so that marginal costs are virtually zero. There
are also fixed costs in the need to risk large amounts of capital
and the costs associated with developing a reputation as a quality
supplier. Further, there are network externalities, in particular,
the importance of an established product with a large installed
base and the related advantage of a product that is compatible
with other complementary applications."
Given this confluence of economic forces, Professor Arrow warned
that "a rule of penalizing market successes that are not the result of
anticompetitive practices will, among other consequences, have the effect of taxing technological improvements and is unlikely to improve
welfare in the long run."26
B.

Schumpeterian Rivalry

An alternative, and sometimes complementary, explanation for
the performance of dynamic markets is that firms compete through
innovation for temporary market dominance, from which they may be
25 Declaration of Kenneth J. Arrow, attached to Memorandum of the United States of
America in Support of Motion to Enter Final Judgment and in Opposition to the Positions of
I.D.E. Corporation and Amici, United States v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 94-1564, 5-6
(D DC filed Jan 18, 1995) (on file with author).
26
Idat 10.
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displaced by the next wave of product advancements.27 The distinguished economist Joseph Schumpeter coined the phrase "creative destruction" to express the idea that the pursuit of market power is a creative and dynamic force that "incessantly revolutionizes the economic
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly
creating a new one."' Hence the labeling of such innovation-based
competition as "Schumpeterian." Though he died decades before the
advent of personal computing, Schumpeter saw such rivalry as "the essential fact about capitalism."29 Creative destruction means that a firm's
acquisition or possession of market power may be fleeting. In the most
famous passage of Schumpeter's classic discussion on creative destruction, he wrote:
[S]ince we are dealing with an organic process, analysis of what
happens in any particular part of it-say, in an individual concern
or industry-may indeed clarify details of mechanism but is inconclusive beyond that. Every piece of business strategy acquires
its true significance only against the background of that process
and within the situation created by it. It must be seen in its role in
the perennial gale of creative destruction; it cannot be understood irrespective of it or, in fact, on the hypothesis that there is a
perennial lull.
But economists who, ex visu of a point in time, look for example
at the behavior of an oligopolistic industry-an industry which
consists of a few big firms-and observe the well-known moves
and countermoves within it that seem to aim at nothing but high
prices and restrictions of output are making precisely that hypothesis. They accept the data of the momentary situation as if
there were no past or future to it and think that they have understood what there is to understand if they interpret the behavior
of those firms by means of the principle of maximizing profits
with reference to those data. The usual theorist's paper and the
usual government commission's report practically never try to
see that behavior, on the one hand, as a result of a piece of past
history and, on the other hand, as an attempt to deal with a situation that is sure to change presently-as an attempt by those
See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism,Socialism and Democracy 81-86 (Harper & Bros
1942). For representative applications of Schumpeterian concepts to the assessment of market
power in software markets, see Richard Schmalensee, Antitrust Issues in Schumpeterian Industries, 90 Am Econ Rev Papers and Proc 192, 193 (2000) (arguing that "[t]raditional tests for monopoly power do not measure ... [the] fragility" of market dominance in the software industry);
David J. Teece and Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis in HighTechnology Industries,43 Antitrust Bull 801,820-22 (1998).
28 Schumpeter, Capitalism,Socialism and Democracy at 83 (cited in note 27).
Id.
29
27

12
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firms to keep on their feet, on ground that is slipping away from
under them. In other words, the problem that is usually being
visualized is how capitalism administers existing structures,
whereas the relevant problem is how it creates and destroys
them.
Unless government imposes artificial barriers to market entry,3' the incumbent will be repeatedly challenged and eventually supplanted by
actual and potential competitors. Schumpeterian competition can thus
be viewed as occurring sequentially over time rather than simultaneously across a market. That version of competition, Schumpeter explained, "commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and . . .
strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing
firms but at their foundations and their very lives."32 Such competition,
moreover, "acts not only when in being but also when it is merely an
ever-present threat. It disciplines before it attacks."33
There are two important implications for antitrust enforcement.
First, in markets characterized by Schumpeterian rivalry, pricing at a
level higher than that found under the theoretically simplistic case of
perfect competition is not only legitimate, but also necessary to induce
investment in developing and deploying new technology. Second, in
such markets periodic dominance by one firm or a few firms may be
symptomatic of healthy, innovation-based competition and may be
subject to displacement, even when goods with network externalities
are at issue. Creative destruction thus implies that antitrust policy based
on static analysis of today's market conditions can be misleading and,
over time, injurious to consumers.
An example of a view of competition that discounts Schumpeterian rivalry is found in Professor Paul Romer's testimony submitted
on the government's behalf in the remedies phase of the Microsoft
case:
Microsoft has harmed the innovative process because it has limited competition, and competitive markets are, on balance, the
best mechanism for guiding technology down a path that benefits
consumers. No system of comprehensive central planning, neither
one controlled by a government, nor one controlled by the managers of a single firm, can hope to be as robust and reliable a
Id at 83-84.
31 State governments traditionally imposed entry barriers by granting monopoly telephone
franchises. The federal government similarly forbade AT&T from entering the computer business. See United States v Western Electric Co, Inc, 1956 Trade Cases (CCH) 1 68,246 at 71,138
(D NJ).
32
Schumpeter, Capitalism,Socialism and Democracy at 84 (cited in note 27).
33 Id at 85.
30
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mechanism as competition among many actual and potential
firms for purchases by final users.
What is most significant about this passage is that Romer considers
actual competition for market share to be essential for innovation. It
may be true, although the empirical literature is highly ambiguous,
that competition is "on balance" beneficial for technological development. But whether that assertion is true and which form of competition it is true for-actual and/or Schumpeterian-depend on the particular industry at issue. And Romer does not make clear how the
form of competition that he advocates -multiple firms operating in
simultaneous rivalry-is applicable to software markets that arguably
contain significant network properties. Romer implicitly rejects the
possibility that competition may take the form of pressure, from fringe
firms and potential entrants, that does not necessarily produce multiple firms that divide market share at any given time. That omission is
all the more conspicuous when one juxtaposes the preceding passage
against the following passage from the same testimony by Romer:
In coming years, portable devices, wireless communications and
voice recognition may obsolete many deeply embedded assumptions about when, where, and how users access digital information. At the same time, improvements in the bandwidth of fiber
optic data communications networks and the extension of these
networks ever closer to the desktop may narrow the gap between
the capacity of the pipe that connects two different computers
and the pipe that connects components located inside the case of
a single computer. Either one of these developments, and especially the two of them together, could lay the foundation for new
software innovations as powerful as the browser and the Web."
These developments would seem to provide the conditions for a
Schumpeterian version of competition. Yet, Romer does not analyze
the costs and benefits of the government's proposed remedies in the
Microsoft case in terms of their effect on such a sequential process.
34 Declaration of Paul M. Romer, United States v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 98-1232
14 (D DC filed Apr 27, 2000) ("Romer Declaration"). Romer, however, then supports this
general statement with the following example from the telecommunications industry: "Before
the breakup of AT&T, engineers described the advantages of having a single firm that produced
all the telephone desksets that connected to the telephone network. Since the breakup, consumers have benefited from the wider range of choice and more rapid innovation in the handsets
that competition made possible." Id. That assessment incorrectly ascribes the deregulation of customer premise equipment ("CPE") to the antitrust divestiture of AT&T, rather than to deregulatory initiatives of the Federal Communications Commission that were wholly independent of the
antitrust case. See, for example, Robert W. Crandall, After the Breakup: US. Telecommunications
in a More Competitive Era 34-35 (Brookings 1991).
35
Romer Declaration at 31 (cited in note 34).
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It would ignore recent economic history to presume that Microsoft is immune from being leapfrogged and displaced from its dominant market position. In hindsight it may seem hard to understand
how the Justice Department could have allowed itself to become a latter. day Captain Ahab, spending thirteen years in pursuit of a whale
named IBM. 6 Though IBM was the undisputed market leader in
mainframe computers in the 1960s, by the time the government
dropped its antitrust case in 1982, the mainframe had already been
harpooned by the personal computer. And in that market, despite its
brand name and experience, IBM emerged as just one of several
strong competitors. In a competitive economy, Schumpeter observed,
businesses will be enticed to compete vigorously for "spectacular
prizes" despite the fact that "they receive in return only modest compensation."" In the analogous context of designing efficient regulatory
regimes (as opposed to efficient remedial regimes under antitrust
law), the "most important" caveat for policymakers is that "static
models cannot be confidently relied on for quantitative guidance in
the real, dynamic world."38
In 1992, William Baxter said of the then-current rumors of a possible government antitrust action against Microsoft, "[t]here are a lot of
companies bellyaching that Microsoft is too effective a competitor.
Let us pray that that is not seen as a bad thing to be." 9 Speaking in
1995, the man who vigorously pursued AT&T but gave up the government's chase of IBM saw "strong parallels between IBM and Microsoft."4 Baxter viewed the success of both IBM and Microsoft in
Schumpeterian terms:
Each of the firms got out in front technologically, each was enormously successful and delivered incredible value to the American
people over a period of years and, as a result, won a very large
market share ....

It's terribly important that companies not be

given a signal that success and capture of large market share will
bring antitrust attack .... The social value of what IBM and
Microsoft delivered is far greater than any harm they could have
done by anticompetitive practices.

36
See Franklin M. Fisher, John J. McGowan, and Joen E. Greenwood, Folded,Spindled, and
Mutilated: EconomicAnalysis and US v. IBM 1 (MIT 1983).
37 Schumpeter, Capitalism,Socialism and Democracy at 73-74 (cited in note 27).
38
Richard Schmalensee, Good Regulatory Regimes, 20 RAND J Econ 417,435 (1989).
39
John Schwartz and Anita Amirrezvani, Does Bill Play Fair,Newsweek 58, 59 (Nov 30,
1992) (quoting William F. Baxter).
40
Jonathan Marshall, Antitrust Punishes Market Winners, San Fran Chron El (July 24,
1995) (quoting William F. Baxter).
41

Id.
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Baxter similarly observed in 1997 that in the New Economy "companies will compete for markets, rather than in markets."2 Speaking specifically of the threat to Microsoft's Windows from Sun Microsystems's Java computing language, Baxter observed that there will be "a
series of companies leapfrogging one another," such that "[t]he worst
frog. 43
thing we can do is weaken the incentives to be the successful
This admonition from the architect of the AT&T divestiture,
though made before the government's evidence against Microsoft was
revealed in court, remains pertinent. It counsels all concerned to ask,
given the defendant's liability, how the remedy phase in Microsoft or
any antitrust case might be resolved in a socially beneficial manner.
II. A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO DESIGNING EFFICIENT
ANTITRUST REMEDIES

In this Part, we address the following question: When is permanent injunctive relief-and divestiture in particular- the appropriate
remedy in an antitrust case? Antitrust remedies can be classified into
two general categories: damages and injunctions. Injunctive remedies
can be further classified into behavioral remedies and structural
remedies. Behavioral injunctions bar a defendant firm from engaging
in particular actions that a court has deemed anticompetitive (or in
the case of a consent decree, actions that the defendant has agreed to
alter even if it has not conceded them to be illegal). In the context of
Microsoft, a behavioral remedy might prevent the firm from conditioning the distribution of Windows on anything other than the ability
of an original equipment manufacturer ("OEM") to pay for the license and promise to respect Microsoft's intellectual property.
Although behavioral remedies alter the actions that the defendant and, as a consequence, competitors in the relevant market may
pursue, they do not directly alter the structure of the relevant market
or the distribution of the assets needed to compete among rival firms.
In contrast, structural remedies affect market structure directly by redistributing competitive assets in the relevant market. The redistribution can be accomplished by breaking the defendant company into
two or more pieces and reorganizing the company's assets (which can
include employees) among the two or more newly created competitors. Alternatively, these assets can be redistributed by requiring the
defendant to sell or otherwise to make available to its competitors
42
Russ Mitchell and Marianne Lavelle, Road Runner v. Coyote: As Microsoft Case Shows,
Markets Move Faster than Justice, US News & World Rep 58,59 (Dec 15, 1997) (quoting William
F. Baxter).
43
Id (quoting William F. Baxter).
44 Professor Baxter passed away November 27, 1998. See Michael M. Weinstein, W. F Baxter, 69, Ex-Antitrust Chief,Is Dead,NY Times B15 (Dec 2, 1998).
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some input, right, or facility that will allow rivals to compete in the
market. Compulsory licensing of intellectual property and mandatory
access to essential facilities are general examples. One structural remedy that has been proposed for Microsoft would require the company
to auction its Windows source code to competitors.5
The remainder of Part I1 is organized as follows. In Part II.A, we
describe a test for evaluating and comparing the economic welfare
consequences of alternative injunctive remedies. In Part II.B, we examine existing antitrust jurisprudence to see how it relates to our efficiency-based test and to see whether the case law establishes additional principles that must be applied. We find existing antitrust law to
offer surprisingly little guidance on remedies and to highlight the need
for an axiomatic approach to the problem.
A. An Economic Welfare Test for Designing Optimal
Injunctive Remedies
From an economic standpoint, the normative goal of law and
public policy should be to increase society's overall wealth. This economic welfare criterion implies that a policy can impose costs so long
as it creates offsetting benefits. A much more stringent standard of
economic welfare, and one that hence provides a much weaker mandate for public policy, is Pareto efficiency, which holds a policy to be
efficient only if it makes some parties better off without making any
party worse off.6 In the absence of compensating side payments from
the winners to the losers, few policies would qualify as Pareto efficient.
A more practical formulation is that a policy can impose costs on
some parties so long as the policy beneficiaries can (at least theoretically) compensate the losers and still be better off. That principle is often referred to in the literature as the Pareto criterion, and is what we
will mean here when we use "Pareto" descriptively. 7 Policymakers in
several branches of economics, from the environment" to international
trade, 9 have employed the Pareto principle as a starting point for pol45
This structural remedy was suggested by Professor Nicholas Economides of New York
University. See Joel Brinkley, A Microsoft Remedy: Antitrust Experts Offer Prescriptions,NY
Times Cl (Nov 15,1999).
46
For a discussion of Pareto efficiency, see Hal R. Varian, MicroeconomicAnalysis 225-26
(Norton 3d ed 1992).
47
See, for example, William J. Baumol, Superfairness:Applications and Theory 7-9 (MIT
1986).
48
See, for example, Kenneth J. Arrow, et al, Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental,
Health, and Safety Regulation:A Statement of Principles5 (AEI 1996) ("A benefit-cost analysis is
a useful way of organizing a comparison of the favorable and unfavorable effects of proposed
policies.").
49
See, for example, Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics:
Theory and Policy? 196-97 (Addison-Wesley 5th ed 2000). Krugman and Obstfeld acknowledge
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icy formulation. It is similarly applicable to the choice of legal remedies.
Much of the literature on optimal remedies concerns designing
awards to the breached-against party of a contract, to a victim of a
tort, or to a victim of a crime. In general, the literature is concerned
with designing a remedy that induces an efficient level of economic
activity or an efficient level of resource use. For example, in contract
law, an optimal damages award is one under which breach will occur
only if the overall gains to the parties are greater from breach than
from performance. ° An optimal penalty in a criminal proceeding
should minimize the social cost of crime, which equals the sum of the
harms it causes and the costs of preventing it." When considering the
tradeoffs between types of criminal punishment, "efficiency requires
exhausting the ability to punish criminals cheaply with fines before resorting to the costly punishment of imprisonment."'2 Achieving efficiency-namely, minimizing the social cost of accidents-is also the
aim in designing remedies for tort victims.3
Similarly, with respect to antitrust law, many commentators have
argued that substantive liability rules should minimize the combined
social cost of three variables: (1) the costs that arise when competitively neutral or efficiency enhancing behavior is deterred or mischaracterized as injurious to consumers; (2) the costs that arise when conduct injurious to consumers is not recognized as such; and (3) the costs
of litigating claims under the rule.' If the probability or social cost of
failing to recognize injurious behavior is small, then antitrust officials
should employ a comparatively tolerant rule that minimizes the combined costs to consumers of false positives, false negatives, and the
significant administrative costs under the Antitrust Division's consent
that a free trade policy results in "winners" and "losers." So long as the winners can compensate
the losers and still be made better off, however, free trade should be pursued.
50 For example, when both parties to a contract are risk neutral, expectation damages can
be shown to be an efficient substitute for explicit contract provisions governing the breach,
whereas reliance damages and restitution damages may lead to an inefficient breach. See A.
Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 29 (Little, Brown 1983). See also
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 130-50 (Aspen 5th ed 1998).
51 In particular, society should invest in deterrence up until the point that the marginal social cost of deterrence equals the marginal benefit of deterrence. See, for example, Robert
Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 400-04 (Addison-Wesley 2d ed 1995).
52
Id at 404.
53
For example, it can be demonstrated that "a negligence rule with perfect compensation
and the legal standard equal to the efficient level of care gives the injurer incentives for efficient
precaution." Id at 277.
54 See J. Gregory Sidak, Debunking PredatoryInnovation, 83 Colum L Rev 1121, 1144-45
(1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, PredatoryStrategies and Counterstrategies,48 U Chi L Rev 263,
318-19 (1981); Paul L. Joskow and Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory
Pricing Policy, 89 Yale L J 213, 223, 240 (1979); Richard Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic
Models in Antitrust. The Realemon Case, 127 U Pa L Rev 994, 1018-19 n 98 (1979).
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decree process. If harms are likely to be great or identification of illegal conduct is difficult, then a more stringent per se rule may be
appropriate.

A similar kind of framework is useful in evaluating possible antitrust remedies. In the first part of this section, we extend the Pareto
criterion to the remedy decision by constructing a three-part frame-

work for evaluating the countervailing gains and losses in economic
efficiency that a particular remedy might cause. We begin by describing three forms of economic efficiency: allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiency. Allocative efficiency is present when goods and services are allocated to the uses in which they have the highest value."

Productive efficiency is present when producers use goods and services in such a manner as to minimize costs, subject to technological
constraints. Dynamic efficiency refers to decisions made over time
and includes efficiencies in investment and technological innovation."
When the government intervenes in markets in the name of increasing
one form of efficiency, such as allocative efficiency, it must take care
that its actions not cause a larger sacrifice in another form of effi-

ciency, such as productive or dynamic efficiency. Recognition of this
tradeoff has been increasingly incorporated in antitrust jurisprudence
since the 1970s."
In step one, the government bears the burden of demonstrating
that, in a static framework, the gain (or recovery of what economists
call the "deadweight loss" that comes from inefficient allocation) associated with an expected decrease in price exceeds any productive ef-

ficiency loss caused by the proposed remedy.9 To compute the gain
from a horizontal divestiture in the current Microsoft case, for example, the government must estimate the extent to which an increased

55

See Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics 264 (McGraw-Hill 15th ed

1995).
56
See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox:A Policy at War with Itself 104-06 (Basic
Books rev ed 1993); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 Am Econ Rev 18,21 (1968).
57
See J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory
Contract: The Competitive Transformation of Network Industries in the United States 522 (Cambridge 1997); Teece and Coleman, 43 Antitrust Bull at 824-25 (cited in note 27).
58
See, for example, ContinentalTV,Inc v GTE Sylvania, Inc, 433 US 36,54 (1977) (recognizing that vertical restraints may allow a manufacturer to achieve efficiencies in distribution).
59 Efficiency requires that the party who can produce the evidence at the lowest cost should
bear the evidentiary burden. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan L Rev 1477, 1503-04 (1999); Richard D. Friedman, Economic Analysis of Evidentiary Law: An Underused Tool, an Underplowed Field, 19 Cardozo L Rev 1531, 1533 (1998);
Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof,72 Ind L J 651, 674-75 (1997); Jason S. Johnston,
Bayesian Fact-Findingand Efficiency: Toward an Economic Theory of Liability under Uncertainty, 61 S Cal L Rev 137, 175-78 (1987); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedureand JudicialAdministration,2 J Legal Stud 399,409-10 (1973).
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number of operating system providers would reduce price.'° It must
then examine whether divestiture, perhaps by changing the cost structure of production, would entail any productive inefficiencies. If the
government cannot demonstrate that the net welfare change of a
structural remedy is positive in a static sense, then that particular remedy should be withdrawn from consideration.
If the gains in allocative efficiency exceed the loss in productive
efficiency in a static sense, then the second step is to demonstrate that
those static net gains in efficiency offset any loss in dynamic efficiency.
Because the loss in dynamic efficiency would occur in the future, it
must be discounted appropriately for comparison with any static net
efficiency gains. If the government cannot demonstrate that the net
welfare change of a structural remedy is positive net of the dynamic
efficiency loss, then that particular remedy should be withdrawn from
consideration. Assuming that the net benefits of several structural
remedies are shown to be positive in a dynamic sense, the decisionmaker should proceed to step three of the framework.
The third step is to rank the set of Pareto-improving remedies according to their welfare impact. Although several structural remedies
might yield social benefits of the same order of magnitude, there
might well be a wide variation in the enforcement costs associated
with each potential remedy. Enforcement costs are the transaction
cost of antitrust remedies and should be broadly conceived to include
administrative costs, monitoring costs, and the misallocation of resources associated with rent-seeking activity. Efficiency requires the
rejection of a remedy if (1) the enforcement costs associated with that
remedy exceed its welfare impact or (2) there exists another remedy
that would yield the same welfare gains but at a lower enforcement
cost. A structural remedy that meets both criteria of our test-namely,
the remedy is Pareto-improving net of enforcement costs and there
does not exist a remedy that achieves the same efficiency gains with
lower enforcement costs-is the optimal remedy. Figure 1 summarizes
the three-step decision framework described above.

60 Some structural proposals, such as the auctioning of source code, may create more than
one competitor in the "market" for Intel-based operating systems.
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FIGURE 1: THREE-STEP TEST FOR DETERMINING THE
OPTIMAL REMEDY

remedy

If remedy is Paretoimproving in a dynamic
sense

If remedy is Paretoimproving net of
enforcement costs and
there does not exist a
lower-cost alternative

If remedy is Paretoimproving in a dynamic
sense

If remedy is Paretoimproving net of
enforcement costs and
there does not exist a
lower-cost alternative
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1. Step one: The injunctive remedy should produce a net gain in
static economic efficiency.
The first step in our test for designing an optimal antitrust injunction is to evaluate a proposed remedy's net effect on static economic
efficiency (before considering the loss in dynamic efficiency and enforcement costs). We explain this analysis first for the case of structural remedies, and then for behavioral remedies.
Antitrust laws in general and merger policies in particular are designed to promote consumer welfare. In the late 1960s, Oliver E. Williamson demonstrated the effects on consumer welfare of a merger
that restricts output (by raising prices) and lowers marginal costs (by
achieving certain productive efficiencies). 6' To defend a merger, according to Williamson, the merging parties must demonstrate that the
cost savings achieved through greater efficiencies exceed the deadweight loss (the amount between the increased market price and the
price that consumers would be willing to pay for the lost output).'
Cost reductions should be considered a social benefit, not just a private benefit to the parties, because the saved resources would be free
to produce outputs elsewhere in the economy. Moreover, even under a
merger to monopoly, a portion of the cost savings would be passed on
to consumers.6 According to Robert Bork, Williamson's insight can be
extended to any antitrust analysis:
[Williamson's framework] can be used to illustrate all antitrust
problems, since it shows the relationship of the only two factors
involved, allocative inefficiency and productive efficiency. The existence of these two elements and their respective amounts are
the real issues in every properly decided antitrust case. They are
what we have to estimate-whether the case is about the dissolution of a monopolistic firm, a conglomerate merger, a requirements contract, or a price-fixing agreement."
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have
come to embrace that test for both vertical6 and horizontal merger
analysis.6

See Williamson, 58 Am Econ Rev at 21-23 (cited in note 56).
Id at 33-34.
63
See, for example, Jerry A. Hausman and Gregory K. Leonard, Efficiencies from the Consumer Viewpoint, 7 Geo Mason L Rev 707,708-09 (1999).
64 Bork, Antitrust Paradoxat 108 (cited in note 56).
65 U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines- 1984 § 4.24 (CCH 1984) ("As in the case
of horizontal mergers, the Department will consider expected efficiencies in determining
whether to challenge a vertical merger.").
66 Department of Justice and FederalTrade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4
(1992) ("Because the antitrust laws, and thus the standards of the Guidelines, are designed to
proscribe only mergers that present a significant danger to competition, they do not present an
61
62
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Observers will note that the test for approving a horizontal
merger can be inverted to provide the test for requiring a horizontal
divestiture. Rather than asking the merging parties to demonstrate the
net benefits of the merger, in the case of a forced divestiture, the government should demonstrate that structural relief increases net social
gains. Because allocative inefficiency and productive efficiency are at
the core of all antitrust problems, the government should bear the
burden of proving the expected effect of a remedy on both.
The test for divestiture is the inverse of the test for mergernamely, a comparison of the efficiency gains and the deadweight loss
imposed by the "anti-merger" caused by the order of divestiture. In
Microsoft's case, it would be possible to calculate the minimum price
decline in the Windows operating system (and ultimately in personal
computers) that must occur for the divestiture to be welfare enhancing. To do so, the court would need to estimate the efficiency gains
that would be jeopardized if a divestiture were imposed. For any given
level of efficiency loss, one could estimate the price decline that would
need to occur conditional on different estimates of the elasticity of
demand for Windows and PCs. The result would be a matrix that
showed a range of price declines.' The larger the range of necessary
price declines over the relevant parameters, the greater would be the
government's burden of proving that its divestiture proposal was
predicated on a credible model that predicted a substantial price decline following divestiture.
A similar analysis should apply to behavioral remedies designed
to restrict an upstream firm from exercising vertical control over a
downstream distributor. Microsoft, for example, can be viewed as an
upstream provider of operating systems, and OEMs, such as PC makers, can be viewed as the downstream distributor of the final product.
The decision rule that should be employed by antitrust authorities regarding vertical control is, again, simple to state: Outlaw only those
vertical restraints that reduce social welfare. The application of that
rule to the specific competitive environment and the specific behavior
in question, however, is likely to prove more difficult.6
obstacle to most mergers. As a consequence, in the majority of cases, the Guidelines will allow
firms to achieve available efficiencies through mergers without interference from the Agency.").
67 For a similar line of analysis, see Bernard J. Reddy, David S.Evans, and Albert L. Nichols, Why Does Microsoft Charge So Little for Windows? (Natl Econ Res Assocs 1999).
68
To clarify, there are three elements in the chain here: manufacturer, operating system,
and applications. Paul Krugman has argued that divestiture might create independently owned
monopolies in the operating systems and applications markets. This would raise the specter of
double marginalization. But no one argues that OEMs have (significant) market power, and thus
there can be no risk of monopoly by the OEMs or double marginalization. There are various
reasons (such as externalities and free-riding) why Microsoft's restrictions on OEMs are procompetitive, but those reasons do not concern double marginalization. Rather, they pertain to
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For example, Jean Tirole demonstrates that under simple models
of vertical control where the downstream firm is assumed to have
market power, "[social] welfare is unambiguously increased by the
elimination of the double marginalization."' Only one firm rather
than two marks up the price of the upstream product, leading to a
lower price and higher output. Other models of vertical control, including a model of downstream moral hazard and a model of input
substitution, are used to demonstrate that "vertical restraints need not
be detrimental to welfare, even when they are meant to increase monopoly profit."7 By contrast, some vertical restraints may be privately
desirable (in the sense that they eliminate the distortions caused by
dual ownership) and at the same time socially undesirable." For example, in some cases when an upstream firm enters into a long-term
contract with the downstream firms, Tirole demonstrates that "private
contracting yields too much foreclosure-i.e., too little competitionfrom a social viewpoint. 72 With respect to policymaking, Tirole issues
the following warning:
At the same time, this conclusion [that vertical restraints can increase or decrease welfare] puts far too heavy a burden on the
antitrust authorities. It seems important for economic theorists to
develop a careful classification and operative criteria to determine in which environments certain vertical restraints are likely
to lower social welfare.73
Until the theory has sufficiently advanced, antitrust enforcement will
be prone to error in classifying vertical arrangements as either benign
or anticompetitive.
The prospect of erroneously proscribing a socially beneficial vertical arrangement through either structural or behavioral injunctions
is grounds for caution. Indeed, the evolution of antitrust jurisprudence
in the last twenty-five years towards fewer per se rules has been
driven in part by the recognition that many vertical agreements previously viewed with hostility may be efficient and beneficial for consumers. Therefore, just as in the case of divestiture, the government
traditional arguments of vertical foreclosure.
69
Tirole, Theory of Industrial Organization at 177 (cited in note 22). For a nontechnical
discussion of double marginalization in the context of the Microsoft case, see Krugman, Microsoft: What Next?, NY Times at A21 (cited in note 17); Krugman, Dirty Windows Policy, NY Times
at sec 4, 19 (cited in note 17).
70
Tirole, Theory of IndustrialOrganizationat 181 (cited in note 22).
71 The Chicago School holds that there are no monopoly reasons for vertical control, and
that observed vertical controls are meant to improve the efficiency of vertical relationships because the monopolist can always exhaust its monopoly power by raising its price. See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 337-40 (cited in note 50).
72 Tirole, Theory of IndustrialOrganizationat 187 (cited in note 22).
73 Id at 186.
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should bear the burden of showing that the particular arrangement at
issue forecloses too much competition from a social viewpoint. The
first step in presenting its case should involve the best attempt to classify the alleged anticompetitive behavior based on the existing industrial organization literature. Next, the government should demonstrate
how related cases, either in theory or through evidence, have resulted
in too much foreclosure. Finally, the government should attempt to
quantify the gains enjoyed by the private parties to the contract. The
mere existence of the voluntary contract is evidence that private gains
were realized. If those gains outweigh the social costs, then the conduct leads to a net increase in efficiency and policy should emphasize
getting the private parties to internalize the costs rather than give up
the gains.
a) Calculatingthe gain in allocative efficiency. To calculate the al-

locative efficiency that would be restored by a divestiture, the government must accurately model the market environment in which the
defendant firm operates. Without such a model, it is impossible to estimate the amount by which prices would decrease after the divestiture. The choice of economic model must be governed by a thorough
understanding of the means by which firms compete in the relevant
market. For example, the assumptions underlying the model must be
justified with real-world data, including estimates of the relevant cost
curves and price elasticities (that is, responses of supply and demand
to changes in the price of a product or in the prices of that product's
substitutes and complements). Richard Posner has argued that estimation of the price elasticity of demand for the relevant product is the
most critical aspect in determining whether a merger would be illegal." In particular, he has explained that "the greater the elasticity of
demand, the smaller the ratio of the monopoly to the competitive
price, and the less monopoly power the firm will have."
Moreover, in certain competitive environments, such as those
with consumption externalities,16 it is not obvious that more competitors would lead to lower prices. For example, in the case of operating
systems, the more consumers use one standard, the more valuable that
standard becomes for other consumers. If operating systems were
competitively supplied, no individual producer would be able to capture the gains from "growing the market." Hence, it is not clear
whether prices in a competitive operating systems market would be
less than prices in a monopolistic operating systems market. Again,

See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 324 (cited in note 50).
75 Id.
With consumption externalities, "the utility of one consumer is directly affected by the
76
actions of another consumer." Varian, MicroeconomicAnalysis at 432 (cited in note 46).
74
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the government should explain with specificity the mechanism of any
predicted price decline in a systematic fashion.
For example, to estimate accurately the change in the price of
Windows due to an injunctive remedy, it is necessary to assess the
"benchmark price" from which prices would fall if a structural remedy
were imposed. As Steven Salop has demonstrated, the competitive
benchmark for analyzing both market effects and market power is the
price "that would prevail in the absence of the alleged anticompetitive
restraint. '""
There are several pitfalls to be avoided when computing the price
decline to be expected from a given remedy. First, one might be
tempted to associate the current price of the defendant's product with
the static monopoly price. If the current price were equal to the static
monopoly price, and demand conditions were such that the monopoly
price were well above cost, then the decline in price caused by a horizontal divestiture would certainly be significant. In a simple static
model, the markup over price charged by a monopolist is the inverse
of the elasticity of demand. Assuming marginal costs greater than
zero, if the divestiture created a more competitive environment, the
price of the product at issue could fall in percentage terms by as much
as the inverse of the demand elasticity."'
With respect to Microsoft, several economists have argued that
the defendant does not currently price at the monopoly level. One
study found that if Microsoft priced according to a static monopoly
model with the kinds of durable entry barriers assumed by the government, the price for Windows would range from nine hundred to
sixteen hundred dollars, well above the retail price of fifty dollars.9
Stated differently, how can a firm charging fifty dollars for a product
be a "monopolist" if a true monopolist would charge roughly twenty
to thirty times that amount? The authors of that paper explain that
Microsoft cannot charge the static monopoly price because "it faces
intense competition from firms that would like their products to displace Windows ' ° and that could enter the market if Microsoft raised
its prices to monopoly levels. Robert Hall has argued that Microsoft
needed to keep its prices sufficiently low so as to make self-supply by
77 Steven C. Salop, The First PrinciplesApproach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the
Millenium, 68 Antitrust L J 187,188 (2000).
78
Letting m be the marginal cost and e the elasticity of demand, the monopoly price is
m / (1-l/e) and the competitive price is m.The percentage decrease in price is equal to 1/e.A caveat is required, however. This relationship holds only if marginal cost is increasing, or if there
are no fixed costs. In the presence of fixed costs (or, equivalently, with declining marginal cost),
the "competitive" price will necessarily exceed marginal cost.
79
See Reddy, Evans, and Nichols, Why Does Microsoft Charge So Little for Windows? at 13
(cited in note 67).
80 Id at 1.
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OEMs "barely unprofitable." ' Absent concerns about competitive entry, Hall calculates that a monopolist would charge over eight hundred

dollars per license for Windows." Hence, for the purpose of structural
analysis, the current price of Windows cannot be assumed to equal the
monopoly price. If it does not, then the price reduction and static welfare gains resulting from divestiture become less certain.
Second, even if one recognizes that the current price does not reflect the monopoly price, it would be incorrect to use the current price
as the benchmark price from which prices would fall in the event of a
divestiture. If a behavioral remedy could prevent Microsoft from engaging in allegedly anticompetitive conduct that elevated the price of
Windows, then it would be incorrect to attribute the entire fall in
prices uniquely to a structural remedy. Some of the price drop would

occur from ending the anticompetitive conduct at issue, without any
further structural change. Incorporating that portion of the fall in
price from the current level to the benchmark price would overstate
the size of the efficiency gain owing specifically to the structural remedy. Thus, when estimating the size of the static efficiency gain from a
structural remedy, the benchmark price should be the price that would

prevail in the relevant market with its existing (that is, pre-divestiture)
structure but without anticompetitive conduct. The price drop used to
calculate the welfare gain from the structural remedy would then be

81 Robert E. Hall, Towards a Quantificationof the Effects of Microsoft's Conduct 4, Hoover
Institution Working Paper (Dec 16, 1999) (on file with authors). A subsequent version of the paper appeared as Chris E. Hall and Robert E. Hall, Toward a Quantification of the Effects of Microsoft's Conduct, 90 Amer Econ Rev Papers and Proc 188 (May 2000).
82
Hall, Towards a Quantification of the Effects of Microsoft's Conduct at 3 (cited in note
81). Hall's use of a Cournot model is questionable in this setting. The Cournot model describes a
"noncooperative" oligopoly, in which each firm maximizes profits by equating its own marginal
cost and marginal revenue on the basis of the observed output of competitor firms. Phillip E.
Areeda, Herbert Hovenkamp, and John L. Solow, 4 Antitrust Law:An Analysis ofAntitrust Principles and Their Application I 925a (Aspen rev ed 1998).
The model makes several untested assumptions before calculating what the fixed cost of entry would have to be for fifty dollars to be the limit price charged by a static monopolist. Setting
aside disagreements about whether those assumptions were reasonable, one must recognize that
Hall's next step was simply to speculate that if Microsoft's actions raised the cost of entry by
some dollar amount, they would raise the limit price for Windows. Hall, Towards a Quantification
of the Effects of Microsoft's Conduct at 5-7 (cited in note 81). Hall's calculation, however, was a
hypothetical example, not a calculation that used actual data. Hall did not actually compute the
extent (if any) to which Microsoft's actions had raised the fixed cost of entry; he simply showed
that a change in that fixed cost would increase the monopolist's limit price for Windows. Id. At
least one court evaluating an antitrust claim has found that a Cournot model may be too conjectural to be useful in the real world. See Concord Boat Corp v Brunswick Corp, 207 F3d 1039,
1057 (8th Cir 2000) (rejecting under Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc, 509 US 579,
592 (1993), testimony of Professor Hall on the ground that it "used the Cournot model to construct a hypothetical market which was not grounded in the economic reality of the [relevant
product] market, for it ignored inconvenient evidence").
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the difference between that benchmark price and the price predicted
under the government's model of competition.
To summarize, the correct benchmark price from which any efficiency calculation is performed for structural remedies must acknowledge two important features. First, when predicting the magnitude of a
post-remedy price drop, it is incorrect to presume the benchmark
price to be that of a short-term monopolist with no threat of entry.
Both entry threats and demand elasticities need to be taken into ac-

count.V Second, a remedy (short of divestiture) that eliminated anticompetitive conduct might itself reduce prices in the relevant market.
Hence, for the purpose of behavioralanalysis, the correct change
in price would equal the difference between the current price and the
price that would prevail in the absence of the alleged anticompetitive
conduct. However, for the purpose of structural analysis, the correct
change in price would equal the difference between the price that
would prevail in the absence of the alleged anticompetitive conduct

and the competitive price (presumably achieved through divestiture).
b) Calculating the loss in productive efficiency. A remedy should

preserve as much as possible any operational efficiency achieved by a
firm's structure or strategies. Several experts who are studying the
government's case against Microsoft have recognized that principle.
For example, Steven Davis has argued that any proposed remedy
should allow Microsoft to bundle Internet browsers with other soft-

ware in its Windows operating system because integrating the two
products has time and cost advantages over separate products.
1

The consumer benefits from bundling and interoperability can be
substantial.8 And when they are, a remedy that prevents bundling be-

cause of its perceived effects on competitors would also eliminate its
benefits for consumers. Courts have thus shied away from preventing
efficient bundling in the name of competition. A key example from
the applicable case law was IBM's decision to integrate memory stor-

age and processing capability into a single machine." IBM's produc83
See Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good, Harvard University Working Paper (June 8, 1999) (on file with authors) (arguing that, when a network good is supplied by a single incumbent, the threat of entry
of an incompatible good is welfare enhancing even though actual entry may lower welfare).
84 See Louis Uchitelle, Economists Debate Solution for Microsoft Case, NY Times C8 (Jan
10,2000).
85
See Steven H. Wildstrom, Why I'm Rooting for Microsoft: A Close Look at Its Browser
Shows It Should Be Linked with the Operating System, Bus Wk 30 (Feb 23, 1998); Microsoft
Internet Explorer,PC Computing 236 (Jan 1998).
86 See California Computer Products;Inc v InternationalBus Machs Corp, 613 F2d 727,744
(9th Cir 1979). See also Berkey Photo, Inc v Eastman Kodak Co, 603 F2d 263, 283 (2d Cir 1979)
(permitting Kodak's integration of camera and film); In re IBM PeripheralEDP Devices Antitrust
Litigation,481 F Supp 965, 1003 (N D Cal 1979) (declining to find product integration per se anticompetitive, but rather examining the effect on consumers), affd and modified on other grounds as
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tion decision clearly hurt competing manufacturers of peripheral
memory storage equipment, but the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that the integration represented a genuine
efficiency and technological advance and therefore was not anticompetitive under the antitrust laws. For a remedy that barred efficient
bundling also to preserve consumer welfare, it would have to lower
the price of the product at issue enough to compensate for the lost
benefit from bundling. More generally, to calculate the productive efficiencies lost as a result of the injunctive remedy, the government
must present a thorough depiction of the relevant cost curves for the
defendant firm. Estimates of economies of scale (for a horizontal divestiture) and economies of scope (for a vertical divestiture) are required to appreciate the magnitude of the cost savings at risk from a
proposed divestiture.
2. Step two: The net gain in static economic efficiency should
offset any potential losses in dynamic efficiency.
The idea that dynamic innovation and allocative efficiency might
differ in their respective responses to market structure was suggested
over fifty years ago. Joseph A. Schumpeter wrote in 1942 that, for purposes of economic welfare, "perfect competition is not only impossible
but inferior, and has no title to being set up as a model of ideal efficiency."' , With that conjecture, he opened to question the very foundation of American antitrust law. The Sherman and Clayton Antitrust
Acts were premised on the idea that competition, not economic concentration, would best allocate society's resources and preserve economic welfare. Schumpeter's argument that most technological innovation would come from large corporations with market power and
organized R&D operations implied that antitrust law's ideal of competition could have substantial social costs over time.

TransamericaComputer Co v InternationalBus Machs Corp, 698 F2d 1377 (9th Cir 1983); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp v InternationalBus Machs Corp,458 F Supp 423,443 (N D Cal 1978) (holding several product integrations to be reasonable responses to competition), affd as Memorex Corp
v InternationalBus Machs Corp,636 F2d 1188 (9th Cir 1980); Telex Corp v InternationalBus Machs
Corp, 367 F Supp 258,346-48 (N D Okla 1973) (permitting bundling in computers on technological
justifications), revd on other grounds, 510 F2d 894 (10th Cir 1975). See also Sidak, 83 Colum L Rev
at 1126-43 (cited in note 54).
87 Schumpeter, Capitalism,Socialism, and Democracy at 106 (cited in note 27).
88 Of course, antitrust's competitive ideal has evolved over time. When Schumpeter was
writing, the ideal was rivalry among small, atomized economic actors. Any cooperation or concentration that deviated from that standard was inherently suspect. The Chicago School revolution did much to improve understanding of why different market structures might result in different contexts and to reduce rigid adherence to the perfectly competitive model. Competition,
because of its benefits for allocative efficiency, nonetheless remained the touchstone of antitrust
policy.
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Antitrust policy in the United States focuses on market power
and on how that power will affect prices and output in the relevant
market. Market share serves as an imperfect but workable proxy for
market power-the ability to raise prices and restrict.output in a non-

transitory manner-and its centrality in U.S. competition policy fits
logically with antitrust's basic premise that economic performance
improves with competition. With a few specific exceptions, such as
natural monopolies, economic theory and antitrust policy have long
favored more competition over less for the purposes of lowering
prices, expanding output, and making consumers better off.

The presumption that increased benefits come from increased
competition may become less universal, however, when one takes into
account not only lower prices for a given set of goods produced under
a fixed set of technologies, but also efficient innovative activity by

firms over time. Theoretical and empirical research has shown that,
depending on various conditions, either monopoly power or competition may increase total innovation.8'
The debate over the relationship between market structure and

innovation is an important
however, the important fact
sensus that the relationship
industry-specific factors. For

and difficult one. For current purposes,
is that such a debate exists, as does conis likely to depend heavily on firm- and
that reason, a remedy cannot be assumed

to have dynamic benefits, or not to have dynamic costs, simply because

it has static efficiency benefits.
It is therefore necessary to ask how, in a specific case, a particular
remedy might affect dynamic innovation. Will a remedy in a monopolization case eliminate monopoly rent, or merely appropriate the le-

gitimate and efficient returns needed to induce risky investment in the
first place? This question has, by analogy, been considered in the eco-

nomic theory of utility regulation." "In the absence of a detailed long89
See, for example, FM. Scherer, Schumpeter and Plausible Capitalism,30 J Econ Literature 1416, 1421-24 (1992).
90 See Victor P Goldberg, Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts, 23 Am
Beh Scientist 337, 340 (1980), reprinted in Victor P Goldberg, ed, Readings in Contract Law 16,18
(Cambridge 1989). See also Victor P Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts,7 Bell J
Econ 426, 432-36 (1976) (noting that market participants seek some assurance regarding the longterm availability of the market before investing). For subsequent analyses that analogize utility
regulation to the cost recovery aspects of contracting, see Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole,
Competition in Telecommunications 137-61 (MIT 2000); Sidak and Spulber, DeregulatoryTakings at
101-13 (cited in note 57); Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation 53-127 (MIT 1993); Glenn Blackmon and Richard Zeckhauser, FragileCommitments and the Regulatory Process,9 Yale J Reg 73, 76-78 (1992); Daniel F Spulber, Regulation
and Markets 610-17 (MIT 1989); Dennis L. Weisman, Default CapacityTariffs: Smoothing the TransitionalRegulatoryAsymmetries in the TelecommunicationsMarket, 5 Yale J Reg 149,157-61 (1988);
Paul L. Joskow and Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities,4 Yale J Reg 1,
8-12 (1986).
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term contract," Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole observe, "the
regulated firm may refrain from investing in the fear that once the investment is in place, the regulator would pay only for variable cost and
would not allow the firm to recoup its sunk cost."91 One can make a
similar point with respect to antitrust enforcement that misdiagnoses
market power or that misclassifies conduct as anticompetitive.
Antitrust litigation that seeks to lower the firm's price and targets
monopoly rents for eradication will not threaten dynamic efficiency, as
firms will continue to face efficient incentives to invest. Only the inefficient monopoly rent, not the risk-adjusted competitive return on investment, will be reduced. But if antitrust litigation appropriates (intentionally or unintentionally) the quasi-rents with which the firm
would recover its sunk costs in specialized investments, dynamic efficiency suffers." It then has an effect similar to the effects of contractual opportunism"3 or regulatory holdup." If the decrease in price
caused by the antitrust remedy represents an ex post reduction of the
legitimate return to investment, the defendant firm would not have
faced a positive expected value ex ante when deciding whether to
make its original investment. Hence, the defendant firm would not
have invested in the project that gave rise to the antitrust intervention.
Once a case is brought that mistakes legitimate quasi-rents for illegally achieved monopoly returns, the precedent will become a risk factor that truncates the expected returns to investment-and hence in91 Laffont and Tirole, A Theory of Incentives at 54 (cited in note 90).
92 The relationship between economic rent, quasi-rent, and investment can be explained as
follows:
Suppose that to carry out production a firm must invest k dollars. Suppose that the investment k is irreversible, so that k represents sunk costs. The firm has operating costs c and expects to earn revenues R. The firm's economic rent is defined as revenues net of operating
cost and investment cost, R - c - k. Economic rent provides the incentive for entry. The
firm's economic quasi-rent is defined as net revenue, R - c. The quasi-rent provides incentives to stay in the industry after entry costs have been sunk. Having sunk k, the firm decides whether or not to produce on the basis of its comparison of R and c only. It would
manifest the fallacy of sunk costs for the firm to base the production decision on the magnitude of k. Thus, after k is sunk, only quasi-rents-not economic rents-affect the firm's decision whether or not to produce the good.
That condition does not mean that pricing should not take into account sunk costs k. The
fallacy of forward-looking costs ignores the expectations of the investor when the decision
to invest k is made. Thus, the fallacy of forward-looking costs would be to base the investment decision on quasi-rents alone, ignoring the magnitude of k. Before the firm has sunk k,
it is economic rents that count, not quasi-rents.
Sidak and Spulber, DeregulatoryTakings at 423-24 (cited in note 57).
93 See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J L & Econ 233, 234 (1979); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A.
Alchian, Vertical Integration,AppropriableRents, and the Competitive ContractingProcess,21 J L
& Econ 297, 297-98 (1978). See also Benjamin Klein and Keith Leffler, The Role of Market
Forces in Assuring ContractualPerformance,89 J Pol Econ 615,617-18 (1981).
94 See Sidak and Spulber, Deregulatory Takings at 107 (cited in note 57).
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centives to invest-for all firms in the industry. The result is a decrease
in dynamic efficiency.
The foregoing principle counsels not only that enforcement agencies exercise care in how they categorize conduct or price-cost margins, but also that they do not go so far in remedying anticompetitive
conduct that they also deter beneficial activity. Thus, antitrust authorities should bear the burden of demonstrating that the price decrease
associated with a proposed remedy would not go so far as to expropriate legitimate, risk-adjusted returns on investment. And, if such remedial precision is not feasible, then the government should be able to
show that the likely gain in static efficiency exceeds the present discounted value of any probable loss in dynamic efficiency.
3.

Step three: Taking enforcement costs into account.

A complete analysis of the gains from a remedy must take account of expected enforcement costs. This is not to say that such costs
cannot be worthwhile. High enforcement costs may be an essential
part of a highly beneficial remedy. But if another remedy could
achieve the same level of benefits at a lesser social cost, then the
original remedy would fail the Pareto test. The Pareto criterion might
also not be met if a remedy exists that achieves lower benefits but entails lower enforcement costs that compensate for the forgone gain.
Thus, just as a court or agency should not impose a remedy that bars
efficient or procompetitive behavior, nor should it ignore a remedy's
administrative costs. Indeed, an antitrust remedy "should not induce
resource misallocation in a manner irreconcilable with the very maximization of consumer welfare that animates antitrust doctrine."'" It
can, of course, be difficult to quantify remedial costs. They might be
quite diffuse, falling on court systems, government agencies, private
enterprises, and, in the form of resource misallocation, the general
public. In this section we discuss several factors that may affect the social costs of administering a given antitrust remedy.
The importance of taking enforcement costs into account is
enormous, though often underemphasized. Consider some of the arguments in Microsoft. Paul Romer submitted testimony on the costs
and benefits of the government's proposed divestiture of Microsoft,
yet that testimony contained scant analysis of the transaction costs of
such a remedy. He conceded that "[t]here is genuine uncertainty about
the exact magnitudes of the benefits and any costs" associated with
the government's proposed remedies, but concluded that "any reasonable calculation shows that the expected benefits overwhelm the

95

Lipsky and Sidak, 51 Stan L Rev at 1239 (cited in note 3).
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costs."" Similarly, Rebecca Henderson, another of the government's
economic witnesses on remedies, asserted that divesting Microsoft's
operating systems business from the company's applications business
is the appropriate remedy because "[a] regulatory alternative capable
of achieving the same ends would necessarily have to be highly' intrusive and would almost certainly be significantly less effective.""
Absent from each witness's analysis was rigorous discussion of
the monitoring and oversight costs of the government's proposed
remedy, including the costs associated with strategic litigation over interpretation of the government's proposed final judgment. Given the
experience of litigation under the AT&T divestiture decree and the
corresponding provisions that superseded it in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which we discuss in greater detail in Part V, Romer's
and Henderson's assessments of the likely costs of the government's
proposed remedy in the Microsoft case, and of how those costs compare with the costs of other remedies, is incomplete.
One can easily imagine, to take only one example, that the meaning of "middleware" would be thoroughly litigated by interested parties, just as the meaning of "information services" was thoroughly litigated under the Modification of Final Judgment ("MFJ").8 The experience of the AT&T divestiture suggests it may be overly sanguine
to assume, as Romer does, that legal fees would be "one-time costs"
that would be "very small compared to the value to society of the increased innovation that can reasonably be expected to follow from the
reorganization" of Microsoft." Similarly, with respect to the conduct
provisions of the government's proposed remedy, the history of the
MFJ teaches that Romer is making a strong assumption in saying that,
as long as "Microsoft and the successor companies intend to comply
with the law, these prohibitions should not impose undue costs on
their legitimate business activities.''O
Pure conduct remedies would clearly involve enforcement costs
like those mentioned above, so it is unclear why a structural remedy
that also entails conduct restrictions would not also have such costs.
Any complete analysis of enforcement costs needs systematically to
compare the litigation, monitoring, and other administrative costs of
remedies under consideration. A discussion of some of the factors that
affect such costs follows.
96

Romer Declaration at

71 (cited in note 34).

97 Declaration of Rebecca Henderson, UnitedStates v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 98-

1232,36 111 (D DC filed Apr 28,2000) ("Henderson Declaration").
98 United States v American Telegraph and Telephone Co,552 F Supp 131, 226-34 (D DC
1982) ("Modification of Final Judgment").
99 Romer Declaration at 64 (cited in note 34).
100 Id at T 66.
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a) The connection between the remedy and the anticompetitive act.
In the law of antitrust damages, it is a fundamental principle, most directly associated with the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Brunswick
Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc,' ' that damages are available only for
"antitrust injury," which is "injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants'
acts unlawful."' Writing in 1979, William Baxter predicted that
Brunswick "will force the federal courts, at least at the damages stage,
to articulate with precision those respects in which the defendant's
conduct is anticompetitive.... 3 In cases where damages may not be sufficient or available, injunctive remedies should embody the same principle: they should correspond closely to the behavior that produced
antitrust liability and be no broader than is necessary to rectify the antitrust injury.
Stated differently, when searching for the optimal remedy, it is
potentially costly to devise a solution that addresses any actions outside the scope of the particular case at hand. A remedy need not address any conduct that either (1) has been alleged, but not established,
to be anticompetitive or (2) could be anticompetitive but is of a kind
that has yet to occur. Applying this principle to the government's case
against Microsoft, Nicholas Economides has argued that the optimal
remedy would correct the specific allegations that are raised in the
government's case but would have little effect on future behavior of
other kinds."' Injunctive relief may of course proscribe future conduct
of the kind that gave rise to antitrust liability in the first place. But for
the remedy more broadly to bar an action whose anticompetitive nature neither has been adjudicated in the particular case nor is determinable per se would run a greater risk of reducing consumer welfare.
b) The optimal remedy should minimize administrative costs.
Clearly, among the set of remedies that achieve the same goal, the
preferable remedy would be the one that imposes the smallest administrative and monitoring costs. For example, even something so apparently discrete as auctioning assets or intellectual property rights would
entail some social costs, such as designing the optimal auction, admin101 429 US 477 (1977).
102 Id at 489 (emphasis added). See also Atlantic Richfield Co v USA Petroleum Co, 495 US
328, 338-39 (1990); Cargill,Inc v Monfort of Colorado, Inc, 479 US 104, 116-17 (1986); Associated General Contractorsof Cal,Inc v California State Council of Carpenters,459 US 519,539-40
(1983); Blue Shield of Virginia v McCready,457 US 465,483 n 19 (1982); J. Truett Payne Co, Inc v
Chrysler Motors Corp, 451 US 557,562 (1981); Brown Shoe Co, Inc v United States, 370 US 294,
320 (1962) (holding that antitrust injury is to consumers, not competitors).
103 William F. Baxter, Placing the Burger Court in Historical Perspective, 47 Antitrust L J
803,816 (1979).
104 See Brinkley, A Microsoft Remedy, NY Times at Cl (cited in note 45) (interviewing
Nicholas Economides).
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istering the auction, and ensuring that the defendant complies with the
rules of the auction. While in some cases such costs will be trivial in
comparison with the remedial gains, in other cases they will not and
might substantially undermine the remedial goals.
Indeed, the question of whether an antitrust remedy is practical
to administer is critical in shaping any remedy. Ideally, a remedy
should be "self-executing" in the sense that it should not require significant oversight or intervention from the courts or a government enforcement agency. But as a practical matter, few injunctive remedies
are truly self-executing, and the effectiveness of most remedial solutions will therefore depend in part on how easily they can be administered or enforced.
One factor in administrability will be the number of terms or
definitions subject to legal dispute. Consider a consent decree administered by a court. Judges have limited resources. The more complex
an injunction, the more motions a judge will have to decide concerning the order or decree, and the more information she will have to collect and process just to keep up with the markets at issue. Masses of
conflicting information may be brought forward by parties disputing
interpretation of the order, requesting to modify the order, or claiming
that the order has been violated.
Another signpost of a decree's practicability is the extent to
which it involves the court in the day-to-day administration of a business. This measure partly reflects a concern about judicial resources.
But it also points to an implicit understanding that courts' expertise
lies in answering legal questions, not making business decisions about
questions such as pricing, product introduction, and investment in
risky ventures. The business judgment rule in corporate law is founded
on the same understanding. Delaware corporate law, for example,
grants a "presumption that in making a business decision the directors
of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
5 Robert
company.""'
Clark has explained that the business judgment
rule provides "that the business judgment of the directors will not be
challenged or overturned by courts ... even for judgments that appear
to have been clear mistakes."'t6 The same concerns over institutional
competence that motivate the business judgment rule counsel that a
court not devise an injunctive remedy that it is unlikely to have the
expertise and resources to execute.

Aronson v Lewis, 473 A2d 805, 812 (Del 1984). See also Cede & Co v Technicolor, Inc,
634 A2d 345,361 (Del 1993).
106 Robert C. Clark, CorporateLaw 123-24 (Little, Brown 1986).
105
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This concern that courts by nature are unsuited to entangle themselves in running a business arises again today in the debate about
whether antitrust law has become a system of regulation. '° Of remedies in essential facilities cases, the late Phillip Areeda wrote: "No
court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably supervise. The problem should be deemed irremedial by antitrust law when compulsory access requires the court
to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory
agency."' ' Areeda's point about preserving the boundary between
antitrust enforcement and industrial regulation applies generally to injunctive remedies. The ability of an enjoined firm's rivals to counter
legitimate competitive actions with litigation rather than with competitive advances of their own reduces consumer welfare and raises
administrative costs. And any mechanism or requirement for prior approval in the consent decree process destroys the element of surprise
as a tool of competitive rivalry. A consent decree makes a competitive
industry resemble a regulated industry in which a commission must issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity before an allegedly dominant firm may offer a new service or enter the market.'m
The question of practicality is often whether a given remedy is
more or less practical than another remedy, not whether it is practical
in an absolute sense. For example, behavioral injunctions are often
considered less practical to administer than structural divestiture. The
breakup of AT&T's telephone monopoly in 1984 arose partly because
divestiture was viewed as an alternative to increased regulation of
AT&T and the Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs"). In
the course of the decree negotiations, AT&T and the Department of
Justice considered alternatives that would not have split up the Bell
System but that would have entailed detailed injunctive prescriptions
for pricing, interconnection, equipment sales, and manufacture. The
Department of Justice and perhaps AT&T concluded that divestiture
would be better than a detailed system of behavioral constraints.
AT&T asked a top network engineer to consider the impact of some

For a general discussion, see Michael L. Weiner, Antitrust and the Rise of the Regulatory
Consent Decree, 10 Antitrust 4, 8 (Fall 1995) (discussing the shift from judicial to administrative
regulation); A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust: The New Regulation, 10 Antitrust 13, 13-15 (Fall
1995) (arguing that transformation of antitrust law into regulation is partly a result of increased
use of consent decrees);Thomas E. Kauper, The Justice Department and the Antitrust Laws: Law
Enforcer or Regulator?,35 Antitrust Bull 83 (1990) (discussing the changing role of the Department of Justice in antitrust enforcement).
108 Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities:An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles,58 Antitrust L J 841,853 (1990).
109See David Bank, Is Microsoft a New 'Public Utility'?,Wall St J B1 (May 19,1998) ("The
U.S. government's long-range strategy against Microsoft Corp. is finally coming into view, and it
is audacious: Treat the software giant like a regulated utility.").
107
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of the Department's proposed injunctions on its network. He concluded: "I think at this point the warning must be raised that we may
be heading into a massive straightjacket that will make the network
almost inoperable in the future and weigh this against the penalties to
the public and to ourselves of some degree of divestiture. 1 .The theory of divestiture was to avoid such dire outcomes by creating a resolution under which there would be no need for injunctions because
the activities whose integration would have been enjoined would now
be the province of separate firms. Experience ultimately showed that
the structural alternative to behavioral injunctions was hardly selfexecuting. The MFJ, the consent decree which governed the pieces of
the former Bell System after the AT&T divestiture, required the
RBOCs to secure the Antitrust Division's permission whenever they
sought to enter new markets or offer new services. The district court
ultimately received over nine hundred waiver petitions that required
it to rule on the meaning and scope of the decree's theoretically crisp
line-of-business restrictions."' There is a good case to be made that
Judge Greene handled this burden wisely under the circumstances." 2
But whether one thinks well or ill of the net effects of the AT&T
divestiture-and on this there is hearty debate-it cannot be denied
that the relief was costly to administer. And the greater the administrative requirements of a remedy, the greater the risk that antitrust enforcement converts into expensive and inefficient industrial policy.
One further implication of the above discussion is that showing
one remedy to be more practicable than another does not end the
analysis. One also should ask whether any remedy is sufficiently practicable to yield net benefits, for that question bears on the issue of
whether an action ought to be brought at all, or whether an existing
case should be terminated.
c) The remedy should adapt to technological change. The techno-

logical environment of an industry may have important effects on the
costs of antitrust enforcement in that industry. On one hand, technological uncertainty might counsel a conservative approach and modest
scope for proposed remedies. On the other hand, Assistant Attorney
General Joel Klein argued that rapid technological innovation, in
combination with increasing returns to scale and network externalities, means that high technology markets are particularly susceptible
110 Peter Temin and Joseph Weber, The Modification of Final Judgment: Its Logic and Errors, 8 U Fla J L & Pub Pol 201,207 (1997) (quoting network engineer Joseph Weber).
il See Michael K. Kellogg, John Thorne, and Peter W. Huber, Federal Telecommunications
Law §§ 7.1-7.9 (Little, Brown 1992).
112 See Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications
Act:
Regulation of Telecommunications, 50 Hastings L J 1395, 1459-71 (1999) (commending Judge
Greene's adherence to the MFJ's structural approach).
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to monopolization."3 He therefore advocated more vigorous antitrust
enforcement in such markets."' There is little question that the risks of
enforcement and nonenforcement alike rise in markets that change
quickly and that are subject to lock-in effects. Where both paths are
risky, the hard task is to choose the one with the greater margin between expected benefits and possible error costs.
In advocating "a remedy that puts in place a market structure
conducive to competition and innovation" for Microsoft, Carl Shapiro
has posited that "the goal of enabling, but not compelling, competition
to Windows in the market for operating systems" makes it "important
to identify, as best we can, the likely sources of such competition in the
foreseeable future.'". Shapiro asserts that, to the extent that those
predictions are difficult to make with accuracy, such uncertainty
strengthens the case for choosing divestiture as a remedy:
One promising entry path into the market for operating systems
is via cross-platform middleware. If such middleware becomes
widely used, more and more applications may be written to that
middleware, making it far easier for new operating systems to run
many popular applications. I do not believe it is possible to identify today with any confidence the specific middleware that will
play this role in the next several years. Therefore, the remedy
chosen by the Court should broadly prevent Microsoft from
blocking the emergence or widespread distribution of middleware.
Shapiro emphasizes that "[t]he fact that we cannot confidently predict
today the most significant modes of entry in the future supports the
structural relief proposed by the plaintiffs...... Similarly, Professor
Daniel Rubinfeld of the University of California, Berkeley (who was
chief economist of the Antitrust Division during the Microsoft case)
and Professor Franklin Fisher of MIT have argued that high technology industries demand greater antitrust intervention, not less."' In particular, they argue that because the likelihood for locking in a large

113 See Joel Klein and Preeta Bansal, InternationalAntitrust Enforcement in the Computer
Industry,41 Vill L Rev 173,176-77 (1996).
114 See id at 173.
115 Declaration of Carl Shapiro, United States v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 98-1232,2,
3 (D DC filed Apr 28,2000) ("Shapiro Declaration").
116 Id at 4.
117 Idat4n3.
118 Franklin M. Fisher and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, U.S. v Microsoft-An Economic Analysis, in
David S. Evans, et al, eds, Did Microsoft Hurt Consumers: Two Opposing Views 1, 7 (AEIBrookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 2000). See also Franklin M. Fisher, The IBM and
Microsoft Cases:What's the Difference?, 90 Amer Econ Rev Papers and Proc 180 (May 2000).
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customer base is greater for high technology industries, antitrust agencies should intervene more aggressively."9
The same factors, however, cut in the opposite direction as well:
Rapid technological change and the need for standards may encourage firms in computer markets to grow to a scale that threatens competition, but those same forces also create the risk that antitrust enforcers may do more harm than good in designing remedies.
The rapid obsolescence of computer software and hardware implies a frequent replacement of the "infrastructure," which makes the
software industry far more susceptible to Schumpeterian competition
and entry than the traditionally regulated network industries. Therefore, contrary to the prediction that consumers will be compelled by
network effects to use overpriced or technically inferior products, the
PC software industry might contain precisely the conditions for a sequential process of creative destruction. Serious inquiry is warranted
before one can determine that it serves the interests of consumers to
exclude any firm from, or handicap any firm in, such competition for
the market.
d) The remedy should not encourage rent seeking. Some scholars

in law and economics have questioned whether antitrust law, despite
its goal of public economic welfare maximization, truly can avoid falling prey to the pursuit of private "rents" by self-serving actors. Indeed, there seems no reason to believe that an injunction or consent
decree in an antitrust case would be immune from rent-seeking behavior by rivals seeking to protect themselves from competition
through litigation or other gamesmanship. A remedy intended to
benefit the public could turn into one that benefits private actors at
the expense of the public.
In the 1960s and 1970s, legal and economic scholars at the University of Chicago challenged the public interest theory of regulation,
which posited that regulation served the interests of consumers. 20According to Stigler, Becker, Peltzman, Posner, and other Chicagoans,
regulation serves the private interests of regulated firms by effecting a
form of government-sponsored cartelization. The effect of regulation
is to create economic rents (supracompetitive returns) that could not
be earned in the absence of government-imposed restrictions on market entry. "Rent seeking behavior" connotes the various activities that

119 See id.
120 See, for example, George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation,2 Bell J Econ &
Mgmt Sci 3 (1971). See also Gary S. Becker, A Theory of CompetitionAmong Pressure Groups
for PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q J Econ 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of
Regulation, 19 J L & Econ 211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5
Bell J Econ 335 (1974).
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interest groups undertake to receive such income transfers through
the legislative or regulatory process.1
Antitrust is not immune to certain kinds of rent-seeking behavior.'M If a remedy creates opportunities for competitors or others to
seek private gain at public expense through litigation and related activities, the transaction costs of administering the remedy and the costs
of erroneous decisions in enforcing the remedy could dissipate the expected value of the relief granted.
In summary, a consumer welfare test for antitrust remedies requires analysis of more than just static efficiency and the behavior of
short-run market prices. Rather, before a court or enforcement agency
can conclude that a remedy is efficient, a case must be made that expected price reductions will offset any production cost increases or
losses in consumer-side network externalities; that the net gain from
such price reductions will not entail offsetting costs in the form of inefficiently reduced innovation incentives; and that the remaining net
gains can then not be achieved at a lower cost through an alternative
remedial plan.
Reconciling the Economic Welfare Test with Existing Law
The corpus of antitrust law is surprisingly unhelpful in articulating a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for issuing an injunctive remedy, whether the injunction is formally styled as a court order
or as a consent decree. The Sherman Act empowers the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to seek injunctive relief for antitrust violations. The Clayton Act similarly authorizes
the government, as well as private parties, to seek injunctive relief. The
judicial authority to issue injunctions and the executive authority to
enter into consent decrees give courts, the Department, and the FTC
broad flexibility in designing remedies such as divestitures, rescissions,
spin-offs,121 compulsory licensing of intellectual property, ' recordkeepB.

121 For classic discussions of rent-seeking behavior, see Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice H
229-46 (Cambridge 1989); Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and
the Theory of Groups 141-48 (Harvard 1965); James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundationsof Constitutional Democracy 284-86 (Michigan 1962).
122 See Fred S. McChesney, Be True to Your School: Chicago's ContradictoryViews of Antitrust and Regulation, in Fred S. McChesney and William F. Shugart II, eds, The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public-ChoicePerspective 323,328-31 (Chicago 1995). McChesney is
also responsible for a substantial body of work on "rent extraction" -the extortion by politicians
of monetary contributions from private groups. See Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians,Rent Extraction,and PoliticalExtortion (Harvard 1997); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean Model of Regulation, 20 J Legal Stud 73
(1991); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J Legal Stud 101 (1987).
123 A spin-off distributes the shares of an acquired company to the stockholders of the acquiring firm. The acquired firm is set up as a separate entity. See, for example, In re Procter &
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ing and reporting, price regulation, and so on. Even if the tradition of

equity did not empower antitrust authorities to request, and courts to
order, a broad range of remedies, the role that consent decrees play in
antitrust litigation offers them a similarly wide breadth of options. Because of the prevalence of consent decrees, we will begin by analyzing
principles from the applicable law on decrees. We will then briefly examine the principles found in other antitrust case law.
1. Limited lessons from Tunney Act jurisprudence.
Most antitrust suits are resolved by a consent decree, an agreement negotiated between the Department of Justice and the antitrust
defendant.' A consent decree is an agreement between the parties entered as an order of the court. ' As a negotiated agreement, some

courts see the consent decree more as a contract, while others liken it

more to a judicial order. ' The Supreme Court explained in United
States v Armour & Co' that in a consent decree the parties

Gamble Co, 63 FTC 1465 (1963) (ordering divestment of acquired liquid bleach company and
restoration as a "going concern"), enforced by FTC v Procter & Gamble Co, 386 US 568 (1967).
124 See, for example, United States v National Lead Co, 332 US 319 (1947) (upholding compulsory licensing of patents for titanium pigments but rejecting the Department of Justice's request for royalty-free licensing); Hartford-Empire Co v United States, 323 US 386 (1945) (subjecting pool of eight hundred glass-blowing patents to compulsory licensing for reasonable royalty); American Cyanamid Co v FTC, 363 F2d 757,772 (6th Cir 1966) (holding that patents may
be subject to compulsory license if patent holder receives a reasonable royalty).
125 From 1955 to 1973, about 80 percent of the Department of Justice's civil antitrust actions
were settled by decrees. Between 1973 and 1983,92 percent of such actions ended in consent decrees. See Janet L. McDavid, et al, Antitrust Consent Decrees:Ten Years of Experience Under the
Tunney Act, 52 Antitrust L J 883,883 nn 2-3 (1983).
126 One scholar has described the distinguishing characteristics of the consent decree in the
following terms:
The "consent decree" category is a subset of the "settlement" category. In a "settlement,"
the parties agree to terminate a lawsuit. In a "consent decree," the parties agree to terminate a lawsuit and the court enters the agreement as an order of the court. One difference
... is that if a party breaches an ordinary settlement agreement, the other party must file a
new lawsuit to enforce their private settlement contract; by contrast, if a party breaches a
consent decree, then that contract can be enforced as a continuation of the original lawsuit,
and the breaching party can be held in contempt. A second difference ... is that third parties cannot be bound unless the court is involved; that is, a consent decree must be used.
Sanford I. Weisburst, JudicialReview of Settlements and Consent Decrees:An Economic Analysis,
28 J Legal Stud 55,58 n 13 (1999).
127 See Lorain NAACP v Lorain Board of Education, 979 F2d 1141, 1148 (6th Cir 1992)
(noting that a consent decree was declared by one court to be "a voluntary settlement agreement
which could be fully effective without judicial intervention" and by another court to be "a final
judicial order . .. plac[ing] the power and prestige of the court behind the compromise struck by
the parties") (quotations omitted). See also Jed Goldfarb, Note, Keeping Rufo in Its Cell: The
Modification of Antitrust Consent Decrees After Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 72 NYU
L Rev 625,630 (1997).
128 402 US 673 (1971).
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waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and
thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a
compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination
of risk, the parties each give up something they might have won
had they proceeded with the litigation.'29
Moreover, because the consent decree is not an admission of liability,
it does not serve as prima facie evidence of liability in later antitrust
suits against the defendant by private parties or others.'" In practical
effect, the Department of Justice or the FTC can obtain in a consent
decree anything to which the parties will agree, including divestiture,
compulsory licensing, or other concessions.
a) Criteriafor approval of an antitrust consent decree. The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, better known as the Tunney Act,131 establishes substantive and procedural standards for the
approval of a consent decree and thus provides the administrative underpinnings for the resolution of most actual cases. Congress passed
the Tunney Act in response to concerns that the Department of Justice
had negotiated several consent decrees in the late 1960s and early
1970s without adequate public or judicial scrutiny.132 The statute therefore establishes procedures to ensure public comment on proposed
decrees and to minimize secrecy."' It also requires courts to scrutinize
decrees to ensure that they are "in the public interest" before entering
them as orders of the court." But the view that the Tunney Act was
needed to prevent a widespread practice among judges of rubberstamping consent decrees is exaggerated. Long before the Tunney Act
was passed, the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that a consent decree was a court order as well as a contract,' and some review of the
decree was necessary under general equitable principles. The Court
emphasized that considerable deference was owed to the Attorney
General's discretion, and later courts followed in this tradition. 6 But
courts sometimes asked for modifications of proposed decrees to protect the rights of third parties, or they examined whether the decree

Id at 681.
See Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 USC § 16(a) (1994) (exempting consent decrees from rule
that final judgments are prima facie evidence of liability for purposes of collateral estoppel).
131 Pub L No 93-528, 88 Stat 1706 (1974), codified as amended at 15 USC § 16(b)-(h)
(1994).
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 Id at § 16(e).
135 See Sam Fox Publishing Co v United States, 366 US 683,689 (1961); United States v Swift
& Co, 286 US 106,114-15 (1932).
136 See McDavid, et al, 52 Antitrust L J at 887 (cited in note 125).
129

130
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was consistent with the complaint. " ' Congress intended the Tunney

Act to continue this scrutiny, not to alter it radically."
The Tunney Act's public interest standard has remained amorphous."' It more closely resembles a laundry list of factors than a
test. ' Thus, the Act itself does not provide particular guidance as to
which remedy a court should prefer. Rather, it establishes procedures
to prevent the appearance of a decree's being corrupted by politics or
collusion. And its public interest standard affirms that courts, as well
as the Department of Justice, have some role in using substantive
analysis, as described below, to shape an antitrust remedy.
There are ultimately limits to this judicial discretion. Early in
1995, Judge Stanley Sporkin, presiding over an earlier suit by the Department of Justice against Microsoft, refused to approve the consent

decree"' proposed in that case.' 2 Under the consent decree, Microsoft
promised not to use per-processor licenses.'43
The decree moreover barred Microsoft from conditioning the licensing of one covered product on the purchase of another.'" Judge
Sporkin's concern was that the court did not have enough information
to assess the decree, and that the decree, as well as the Department of
Justice's complaint, failed to address alleged anticompetitive practices
by Microsoft, such as the promotion of "vaporware."' 4' The U.S. Court
137 See, for example, United States v Standard Oil Co, 1973-2 Trade Cases (CCH)
95,067 (N D Ohio).
138 See McDavid, et al, 52 Antitrust L J at 892 (cited in note 125).
139 One commentator has observed that the court:

74,692 at

[M]ay consider the competitive impact of the decree, including termination of the alleged
antitrust violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration of the relief
sought, and the anticipated effects of alternative remedies considered. In addition, it may
consider anything else that bears on the adequacy of the decree, including the impact on the
general public in addition to individuals alleging specific injury from the antitrust violation.
One of the public benefits explicitly allowed to be considered is the benefit of carrying the
case through to trial.
Paula J. Blizzard, Consent Decree Standard of Review: United States v. Microsoft Corporation, 13
Berkeley Tech L J 355, 358-59 (1998).
140 See Weisburst, 28 J Legal Stud at 98 (cited in note 126). Weisburst adds that
the public
interest factors alone "do not indicate to the parties what the court expects from the proposed
consent decree." Id.
141 See United States v Microsoft Corp, 1995-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 71,096 (D DC
1995).
142 See United States v Microsoft Corp, 159 FRD 318 (D DC 1995).
143 See Microsoft Corp, 1995-2 Trade Cases (CCH)
71,096 at 75,244. The per-processor license was an option available to an OEM, which could get a small discount if it promised to pay
a royalty for each computer it shipped with CPU models that it specified in the license agreement. So an OEM might agree to pay a royalty for every Intel 80486 computer; but it would not
owe royalties on computers with Intel 80686 chips or AMD chips or Cyrix chips unless it actually
shipped a Microsoft operating system with those computers. OEMs could and did ship different
computers with different chips, and not all OEMs used the per-processor licenses. Many units
were shipped with per-system or per-copy licenses.
144 See id.
145 Microsoft Corp, 159 FRD at 326, 334-36 ("Vaporware" is the practice of releasing
mis-

20011

Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries

of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, however, held that the lower court had
overreached its authority and reassigned the case to another judge on
remand.'4' The court held that the Tunney Act does not give a judge
the power to review practices that are outside the scope of the complaint "' and that a judge may reject a consent decree only if it
"make[s] a mockery of judicial power...... Few strong principles are
likely to emerge from such a framework of review.
b) Generalprinciples for modifying or vacating a consent decree.
Another source of potential guidance is jurisprudence on altering consent decrees. The court with which a consent decree is entered generally retains the right to modify or vacate the decree. Writing for the
Supreme Court in United States v Swift & Co' 9 in 1932, Justice Benjamin Cardozo acknowledged "the power of a court of equity to modify
an injunction in adaptation to changed conditions though it was entered by consent...... Similarly, Judge Henry Friendly wrote for the
Second Circuit in 1983 that "[t]he power of a court of equity to modify
a decree of injunctive relief is long-established, broad, and flexible.'.'.
The standards for modifying or vacating antitrust consent decrees remain linked to the more general jurisprudence of consent decrees and
injunctive remedies. Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a judgment may be vacated or modified if "it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.""'S

In Swift, decided before the adoption of Rule 60(b)(5), the Supreme Court reversed a modification of a consent decree entered
against major meat packers for anticompetitive behavior. 3 Noting
that the meat packers "are not suffering hardship so extreme and unleading information about upcoming software products.). See also Lloyd C. Anderson, United
States v. Microsoft, Antitrust Consent Decrees, and the Need for a Proper Scope of Judicial Review, 65 Antitrust L J 1, 2 (1996) (noting Judge Sporkin's concern that the decree did not address
vaporware and other allegedly anticompetitive practices).
146 United States v Microsoft Corp, 56 F3d 1448 (DC Cir 1995).
147 See id at 1459. Compare United States v BNS, 858 F2d 456, 462 (9th Cir 1988) (noting
that "a court may consider matters not discussed in the complaint").
148 Id at 1462.
149 286 US 106 (1932).
150 Id at 114.
151 New York State Assn for Retarded Children,Inc v Carey, 706 F2d 956,967 (2d Cir 1983).
152 FRCP 60(b)(5). See also Rufo v Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,502 US 367, 379 (1992)
(finding that there is a "flexible standard for the modification of consent decrees"). The rule in
the D.C. Circuit is that the Supreme Court's flexible standard for modification of consent decrees also applies to antitrust consent decrees. United States v Western Electric Co, Inc, 46 F3d
1198, 1203-04 (DC Cir 1995); United States v Motorola Inc, 1999-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 72,517
(D DC 1999).
153 See 286 US at 118-20. Justice Cardozo's opinion was joined by only three justices. Justices Butler and Van Devanter dissented. Chief Justice Hughes, Justice Sutherland, and Justice
Stone did not participate in the case.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[68:1

expected as to justify us in saying they are the victims of oppression,""
the Court held that "[n]othing less than a clear showing of grievous
wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions"", was necessary to
warrant the alteration of a consent decree. The "grievous wrong"
standard was widely adopted as the general approach to modifying
consent decrees. 156
In United States v United Shoe Machinery Corp,"7 the Court held

that the Swift standard did not apply where the government is the
party who seeks to modify the terms of the decree to accomplish its
purposes. ' In United Shoe Machinery, the government had sought to
have the consent decree governing United Shoe modified so as to require the company to be split into two competing businesses. '9 The
district court refused to modify the decree, relying on Swift. 4 In reversing, the Court distinguished the government's proposed modification of the decree from Swift, where the defendants against whom the
decree was entered were seeking to "escape [the] impact" of the decree.
In Rufo v Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,'6a the Supreme Court

held in 1992 that the Swift standard was not codified by Rule
60(b)(5). '- Stating that the "grievous wrong" language of Swift "was
not intended to take on a talismanic quality, warding off virtually all
efforts to modify consent decrees," the Court adopted "a less stringent, more flexible standard."'' 6 Under Rufo, a consent decree may be
modified "when changed factual conditions make compliance with the
decree substantially more onerous[,] . .. when a decree proves to be
unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles[,] .. . or when enforce-

ment of the decree without modification would be detrimental to the
public interest."' 6 The party seeking the modification bears the burden
of establishing these conditions. 6 The Court refused to require that
154

Id at 119.

Id.
See, for example, Roberts v St. Regis Paper Co, 653 F2d 166,174 (5th Cir 1981); De Filippis v United States, 567 F2d 341,344 (7th Cir 1977); Humble Oil & Refining Co v American Oil
Co, 405 F2d 803, 813 (8th Cir 1969). Several courts did adopt a relaxed standard for modification
of consent decrees in the institutional reform setting. See, for example, Heath v De Courcy, 888
F2d 1105, 1109 (6th Cir 1989); Plyler v Evat, 846 F2d 208,211-12 (4th Cir 1988); New York State
Assn for Retarded Children,706 F2d at 970.
157 391 US 244 (1968).
158 See id at 248-49.
159 See id at 247.
160 See id.
161 Id at 249.
162 502 US 367 (1992).
163 See id at 378-79.
164 Id at 380.
165 Id at 384.
166 See id at 383.
155
156
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7
the change in factual conditions be "unforeseen or unforeseeable."'
However, where a change in facts or conditions was anticipated, "[a]
party would have to satisfy a heavy burden" in asking a court to modify the decree.'6
Rufo involved institutional reform-a consent decree requiring
Suffolk County, Massachusetts, to construct a new jail. Since Rufo, the
lower courts have split on the application of Rufo outside the context
of institutional reform litigation. Some circuits have held that Rufo
applies regardless of the context.'6 Others have limited Rufo to the institutional reform setting. ° Still other courts have found that neither
Swift's grievous-wrong standard nor Rufo's more flexible approach
applies in every case.' Despite this difference of opinion among the
circuits, there is little doubt that Rufo applies to antitrust decrees, as
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 1995 found Rufo apthat effected the
plicable to a motion
7 2 to modify the antitrust decree
AT&T divestiture.

2. Lessons from Sherman Act jurisprudence on the optimal
design of antitrust remedies.
The jurisprudence of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts
does not enunciate grand principles for the design of optimal remedies. One can observe recurrent themes, but they must be teased out
of the disparate cases. In this section, we identify and discuss those
themes.

167

Id at 385.

168 Id.
169 See Bellevue Manor Associates v United States, 165 F3d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir 1999); Western Electric, 46 F3d at 1203 (holding that Rufo applies in the context of antitrust consent decrees); In re Hendrix,986 F2d 195,198 (7th Cir 1993) (holding that Rufo was the "coup de grace"
for the Swift standard). The Second Circuit held that the flexible standard of Rufo "is not limited
to cases in which institutional reform is achieved in litigation brought directly against a governmental entity." Patterson v Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union of New York, 13 F3d 33,38 (2d
Cir 1993). Instead, the flexible standard is appropriate whenever "a decree seeks pervasive
change in long-established practices affecting a large number of people, and the changes are
sought to vindicate significant rights of a public nature." Id.
170 See Epp v Kerrey, 964 F2d 754, 756 (8th Cir 1992) ("[T]he Supreme Court has recently
relaxed application of Swift's grievous wrong standard in 'institutional reform litigation."'); WL.
Gore & Associates, Inc v CR. Bard, Inc,977 F2d 558, 562 (Fed Cir 1992); Lorain NAACP, 979
F2d at 1149.
171 See Building & Construction Trades Council v NLRB, 64 F3d 880, 888 (3rd Cir 1995)
("It would be a mistake to view either Rufo or Swift as encapsulating a universal formula for deciding when [a consent decree should be modified]."); Alexis Lichine & Cie v Sacha A. Lichine
Estate Selections, Ltd, 45 F3d 582, 586 (1st Cir 1995) ("In our view, Rule 60(b)(5) sets forth the
umbrella concept of 'equitable' that both Swift and Rufo apply to particular, widely disparate
fact situations.").
172 See Western Electric,46 F3d at 1203.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[68:1

The long debate about whether the Sherman Act is intended to
protect consumer welfare and to advance economic efficiency or to
serve more populist goals is well beyond the scope of this Article. But
in brief, we note that the view that consumer welfare should be a
paramount goal of the Act is supported by two main arguments. First,
the language of the Act itself refers to monopoly and competition, primarily economic concepts, and not to the more populist idea that the
antitrust laws are intended to stop any commercial power from
becoming "too big." Second, while some legislators may not have realized this, it is not always possible for the antitrust laws to serve both
consumer welfare and the goal of breaking up anything "too big"these goals may well contradict each other.
Alternative theoretical bases for antitrust law cannot justify
adopting remedies that cause a net harm to consumers. This principle
is at the heart of Baxter's axiom. In choosing a behavioral or structural remedy, courts must avoid remedies that would harm the public
and remain alert to the unintended consequences of a remedy, both at
the time the decree is entered and as the decree is implemented over
time.
a) Conditions for adopting injunctive remedies. One threshold
principle that emerges from Anglo-American traditions of law and
equity is that injunctions are available when damages are an insufficient remedy."' Thus, injunctive remedies should not be considered
unless damages are either insufficient to address the harm or unavailable for legal or practical reasons. The initial presumption in the
remedies phase, in other words, should be that economic harm is compensable through payment of monetary damages. From an economic
perspective, damages that are correctly calculated will force the defendant to internalize the social cost of his harmful behavior and thus
desist from continuing it." And, of course, the payment of damages is
administratively tidier, for both courts and litigants, than the continued oversight and interpretation of an injunctive remedy. In addition,
a damage remedy runs less of a risk than an injunction does of mistakenly curtailing activities or preventing firm structures that achieve
operational efficiencies. It bears emphasis that Microsoft is subject to
(1) a remedy from the district court; (2) private lawsuits (including potential ones that might be brought by Netscape, OEMs, and Sun); and
(3) indirect purchaser cases in multiple jurisdictions. Thus, if Microsoft
ultimately loses in the government's case, it will face Judge Jackson's
remedy (including any potential modifications by appellate courts),
173 See, for example, Beacon Theatres, Inc v Westover, 359 US 500,506-07 (1959) ("The basis
for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.").
174 See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 342-46 (cited in note 50).
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plus treble damages in the direct purchaser cases, plus treble damages
in the indirect purchaser cases.

Identifying when a damage remedy is sufficient, and therefore
preclusive of injunctive relief, can be difficult in some cases. As Dennis
Carlton and Jeffrey Perloff have noted, the economic theory of damages "starts from the proposition that the purpose of damages is to de-

ter inefficient activity but not to be so burdensome as to deter efficient activity. 17 . Hence, an optimal damage award is one that balances
the costs and benefits of deterrence. Calculation of the optimal damage award thus requires an appreciation of the ex ante payoff calcula-

tions of the firm. A profit-maximizing firm has an incentive to violate
antitrust laws if the expected punishment is less than the expected
gain.7 If the probability of detection is less than one, an ex post damage award equal to the actual damages incurred may not discourage

that activity in the future. This is part of the reason the federal antitrust laws allow an injured party to recover treble damages."' Given
this background, necessary conditions for the execution of a damage

remedy are (1) a proper estimation of damages that were incurred because of the anticompetitive behavior and (2) a proper estimation of
the probability of detection and prosecution at the time the anticompetitive behavior was performed. Where such calculations cannot reasonably be made, injunctive relief should be considered.
Injunctive relief also comes into play where damages are not
available as a remedy. Unlike states that have the power to request
monetary damages on behalf of their citizens, the Department of Jus-

tice can only sue for actual damages that the U.S. government has itself incurred. 8 In addition, the Department of Justice can sue for
monetary fines up to ten million dollars.

9

But where such fines nei-

ther compensate for nor adequately deter the harm done, injunction
need to be considered.

Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes "any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
175 Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern IndustrialOrganization800 (HarperCollins 2d ed 1994). See also Michael K. Block, Frederick C. Nold, and J. Gregory Sidak, The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 J Pol Econ 429 (1981); Kenneth G. Elzinga and William Breit, The Antitrust Penalties:A Study in Law and Economics (Yale 1976). This economic
analysis of antitrust penalties flows directly from the economic analysis of deterrence, the seminal work on which includes papers by two Nobel laureates. See George J. Stigler, The Optimum
Enforcement of Laws, 78 J Pol Econ 526 (1970); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J Pol Econ 169 (1968).
176 See Carlton and Perloff, Modern IndustrialOrganizationat 795 n 2 (cited in note 175).
177 See Clayton Act § 4(a), 15 USC § 15(a) (1994). Of course, if the plaintiff's possibility of
winning an unmeritorious antitrust suit is greater than zero, then treble damages simply exacerbate the incentive for rent-seeking parties to file excessive numbers of suits.
178 Clayton Act § 4(a), (c), 15 USC § 15(a), (c) (1994).
179 See 15 USC § 2 (1994).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[68:1

the antitrust laws" to sue for treble damages.'.8 A "person" for this
purpose generally includes private persons and corporations, but it includes the U.S. government only when the government sues under
Section 4A in its capacity as a consumer of goods (for example, in a
suit against a federal contractor). 8 ' Under Section 4C of the Clayton
Act, the attorney general of a state may bring a parens patriae civil
suit to recover damages for natural persons residing in the state. Section 16 of the Clayton Act authorizes private plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief, including divestiture. ' Permanent or temporary injunctive
relief may not be obtained, however, if the private plaintiff has an
adequate damage remedy. The question of the sufficiency of a damage remedy (or, alternately, the necessity of injunctive relief) therefore
generally arises when a private plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in addition, or as an alternative, to damages. '8"
A damage remedy is used to address monetary harms suffered by
the antitrust defendant's competitors and customers. Higher costs of
doing business are generally compensable by money damages. For example, a shoe manufacturer that paid more to lease shoe machines
when it was prevented by antitrust violations from buying them from
the defendant was entitled to recover the difference in cost from the
defendant shoe machinery manufacturer. ' In cases of price fixing or
tying, the difference between the defendant's price and the market
price paid by a consumer of the good is redressed by monetary damages. '8' Profits lost when a monopolist drives a competitor out of business are recoverable by money damages," and the measure of damages includes lost future profits.", Loss of the business's value as a go180

15 USC § 15(a).

See United States v Cooper Corp, 312 US 600 (1941) (holding that the United States is
generally not a person entitled to maintain a suit for treble damages for violations of the
Sherman Act). See also William E. Kovacic, IllegalAgreements with Competitors,57 Antitrust L J
517, 524 (1988) (discussing collusive conduct among rivals for government contracts); Hawaii v
Standard Oil Co of California,405 US 251 (1972) (holding that a state could not claim damages
on behalf of its citizens); Georgia v Evans, 316 US 159 (1942) (allowing the state of Georgia to
recover treble damages recompensing it as buyer of products from antitrust defendant supplier
of commodities).
182 See 15 USC § 15(c).
183 See 15 USC § 26 (1994 & Supp 1998).
184 See, for example, Oakland Tribune, Inc v Chronicle Publishing Co,Inc, 762 F2d 1374 (9th
Cir 1985) (holding that plaintiff newspaper cannot obtain preliminary injunction for prospective
loss of circulation and revenue due to defendant's actions, as this is purely monetary harm for
which damages are adequate).
185 See, for example, J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust PreliminaryInjunctions in Hostile Tender
Offers, 30 U Kan L Rev 491,494-95 (1982).
186 See Hanover Shoe, Inc v United Shoe Machinery Corp, 392 US 481 (1968).
187 See Pogue v InternationalIndustries, Inc, 524 F2d 342 (6th Cir 1975); Commonwealth
Edison Co v Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co, 315 F2d 564 (7th Cir 1963).
188 See, for example, Bigelow v RKO Radio Pictures,Inc, 327 US 251 (1946).
189 See Lehrman v Gulf Oil Corp, 464 F2d 26,47 (5th Cir 1972).
181
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ing concern is also compensable by monetary damages as an alternative to future profits."o

By contrast, injunctive relief is available in a narrower range of
situations. Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides that injunctive relief
shall be granted "[w]hen and under the same conditions and principles
as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or
damage is granted by courts of equity.'''9' The statute does not expressly call for an inquiry into the adequacy of damages, but the tradition of equity plainly supplies it. In that tradition, an injunction may
be obtained only when irreparable harm is threatened without it.' *
Damages are generally considered adequate when the harm is purely
monetary, the figure is calculable, and the defendant can pay. Examples of harms that are adequately redressed by monetary damages include the failure to place advertisements for a business in the Yellow
Pages" 3 and a newspaper's lost circulation revenues.19
Thus, an injunctive remedy is available when anticompetitive
conduct threatens to drive a business from the market. When the existence of a plaintiff's business is threatened, the court is likely to presume that an irreparable harm is threatened, without undertaking an
elaborate inquiry into whether such harm in some way could be compensated by money damages.' 9' Sometimes, threatened loss of market
share, customers, or goodwill will entitle a plaintiff to an injunction.196
An impending loss of corporate control that threatens to reveal confi190 See Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc v Crown Life InsuranceCo, 734 F2d 133,148 (3d Cir
1984).
191 15 USC § 26.
192 See, for example, Concord Boat Corp v Brunswick Corp, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 14571, *2
(E D Ark) ("No injunction should issue absent a showing that the allegedly unlawful conduct is
likely to cause irreparable harm."); Paint Products Co v Dutch Boy, Inc, 1980-2 Trade Cases
(CCH) 63,497 at 76,658 (D Conn 1980) (The standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction
includes "a finding of possible immediate and irreparable injury.").
193 See Triebwasser& Katz v American Tel & Tel Co, 535 F2d 1356, 1359-60 (2d Cir 1976).
194 Oakland Tribune, 762 F2d at 1376.
195 In Foremost InternationalTours, Inc v Quantas Airways, Ltd, 379 F Supp 88 (D Hawaii
1974), affd 525 F2d 281 (9th Cir 1975), the court explained:
The danger that Foremost will suffer irreparable injury before the CAB has investigated
the charges of deceptive practices and unfair methods of competition is very real. Foremost
has established that the existence of its business life as a competitor in the freewheeling
tour market is threatened. This is a sufficient showing of irreparable injury to warrant a preliminary injunction even though the amount of direct financial harm might be ascertainable.
Courts should be particularly concerned with threats to the existence of a moving party's
business in the area of antitrust. An award of only money damages in lieu of preserving a
competitor disserves the public interest.
379 F Supp at 97 (citations omitted). See Semmes Motors, Inc v FordMotor Co, 429 F2d 1197,
1205 (2d Cir 1970); Bowman v National Football League, 402 F Supp 754 (D Minn 1975).
196 See, for example, John B. Hull, Inc v Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc, 588 F2d 24, 28
(2d Cir 1978); Erewhon, Inc v Northeast Health Food Merchants, 428 F Supp 551, 554 (D Mass
1977).
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dential information may also persuade the court to grant an injunction. " Injunctions are commonly available to stop an anticompetitive
merger or acquisition from going forward.
Courts have found a threat of irreparable harm when the antitrust defendant threatens to repeat its behavior. In Zenith Radio Corp
v Hazeltine Research, Inc, " the Supreme Court upheld an injunction

against Hazeltine, a corporation that licensed U.S. patents in radio and
television technology and that had participated in several patent
pools, the most troublesome one being in Canada.'" Zenith, a wouldbe competitor, had been awarded money damages suffered when it
was excluded from the Canadian market over a four-year period.
Given evidence that the Canadian pool would not retreat, the Court
upheld an injunction against Hazeltine that would prevent it from asserting its claims through the Canadian pool. Writing for the majority,
Justice White noted: "Neither the relative quiescence of the pool during the litigation nor claims that objectionable conduct would cease
with the judgment negated the threat to Zenith's foreign trade. That
threat was too clear for argument, and injunctive relief.., was wholly
proper."'2 By contrast, when an antitrust defendant can convince the
court that its behavior will not be repeated, money damages for past
conduct are adequate.20 '
The Court in Zenith Radio did not expressly ask whether money
damages would be inadequate if and when the conduct was repeated.
Some later courts found it enough that money damages would not be
adequate at the time of the suits then before them. Money damages
could be obtained only after the harm was sustained and its amount
could be proven. Therefore money damages are viewed as inadequate
whenever there is a nonspeculative threat of future harm. In a case enjoining a producer of gasoline from terminating or refusing to renew
distributors' leases in retaliation for the antitrust suit, one court stated,
"A future injury of uncertain date and incalculable magnitude is irreparable harm, and protection from such an injury is a legitimate end
of injunctive relief." 22 But at least one court has concluded that dam197
198

See Crane Co v Briggs Manufacturing Co, 280 F2d 747,750 (6th Cir 1960).
395 US 100 (1969).

199 See id at 131-33.
Id at 131-32.
See, for example, SCM Corp v Xerox Corp,507 F2d 358, 362 (2d Cir 1974) (holding that
amid promises not to bring patent infringement claims against plaintiff for period of suit, disclosure of patented material would be an "irrevocable step, because once the plans are revealed,
their secrecy cannot later be restored," such that injunction of suit was inappropriate).
202 Phillips v Crown CentralPetroleum Corp,602 F2d 616,630 (4th Cir 1979). Compare Cia.
Petrolera Caribe,Inc v Arco Caribbean,Inc, 754 F2d 404, 407-08 (1st Cir 1985) (noting that the
injury requirement under Section 16 is less demanding than under Section 4, as Section 16 only
requires a showing of a "threat of antitrust injury," rather than an actual injury).
200
201

2001]

Antitrust Divestiturein Network Industries

ages for future lost profits adequately compensate a plaintiff company
against the future danger, and that a plaintiff can have either an injunction or future damages, but not both.'°
Symmetry thus exists between the sufficient conditions for damages and the necessary conditions for injunctive relief. Damages are
deemed sufficient under the law when (1) the harm is purely monetary, (2) the figure is calculable, and (3) the defendant does not
threaten to repeat its behavior. Injunctive relief is necessary when the
harm to a competitor is irreparable. Conveniently, the courts have defined irreparable harm to mean (1) the harm would entail the loss of a
competitor's business, (2) the figure is incalculable, and (3) there is a
nonspeculative threat of future harm.
With respect to the government's antitrust case against Microsoft,
the application of the above analysis would proceed as follows if damages were available: First, did Microsoft's competitors incur harm beyond purely monetary damages, such as loss of business, due to Microsoft's anticompetitive behavior? Second, if not, are the damages that
were incurred calculable? Stated differently, is there an economic
model that can be used to estimate the amount of the damages incurred by consumers or competitors? Third, conditional upon a properly calibrated damage figure that was paid by Microsoft-that is, a
figure that accounted for the likelihood of detection and prosecution- is there a nonspeculative threat of future harm that could not be
curbed by the threat of similar damages?
b) Choosing among injunctive remedies. The Clayton Act and the

Sherman Act give the federal courts jurisdiction to use injunctive
remedies to prevent and restrain antitrust violations. ' In cases
brought by the Department of Justice, the alternatives before the
court at the remedies stage are either behavioral (conduct) remedies,
or structural remedies. Behavioral remedies include orders for a company to abstain from acquiring new businesses of a certain type, to refrain from offering certain goods or services, to sell to all buyers on
the same terms (nondiscrimination) or on regulated terms, to modify
203 In International Wood Processors v Power Dry, Inc, 593 F Supp 710 (D SC 1984), affd
792 F2d 416 (4th Cir 1986), the court explained:
[P]laintiff is not entitled to equitable relief because its remedy at law is adequate. As part of
its theory of damages at trial, plaintiff asserted that defendants' unlawful conduct deprived
it of future profits on sales of RFV kilns.... Thus, plaintiff requested and received prospective damages.... [I]t can suffer no further future harm once it has been compensated for
the profits from the sales it claims it would have made absent defendant's unlawful conduct.
Its remedy at law is therefore adequate. Injunctive relief would afford a double
recovery ....

593 F Supp at 737.
204 See Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, 2 Antitrust Law § 345 at 162 (Little,
Brown rev ed 1995).
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or to cancel the defendant's existing contracts. MThe principal structural remedies are divestiture and dissolution.
i) Behavioral versus structuralremedies. In choosing among
behavioral and structural remedies, courts enjoy wide discretion. It is
important to note that any structural remedy contains implicit behavioral restrictions. For example, a divestiture of Microsoft's Internet
browser software would implicitly require that Microsoft refrain from
giving preferential treatment to the spin-off over other Internet
browser providers. Structural remedies may carry with them all or
many of the administrative costs necessary to enforce purely behavioral restrictions. Thus, when considering structural and behavioral
remedies, one cannot presume that the long-term administrative costs
will be lower for the former than for the latter.
If a behavioral remedy more modest than divestiture would effectively remove the danger to existing competition, it may be sufficient even when taking enforcement costs into account.' In United
Shoe Machinery Corp v United States,"°7 for example, the 1953 trial
court chose three simple behavioral constraints instead of divestiture.
The first required United to sell every machine it leased; the second
required nondiscriminatory lease terms, with repair unbundled from
rates for use; and the third required compulsory licensing of patents
on a reasonable royalty basis. In rejecting more restrictive provisions,
the court noted that "it would be undesirable, at least until milder
remedies have been tried," to bar United Shoe from leasing its machines altogether.i'O
Structural remedies intended to alter incentives are more likely
to be used when the court perceives a monopolist as being particularly
durable or likely to repeat its anticompetitive conduct. Intent is one
indication of this. In affirming the dissolution of the Standard Oil
combination, the Supreme Court found that the evidence showed
Standard Oil's intent to eliminate competitors to be "so certain as
practically to cause the subject not to be within the domain of reasonable contention. '

See id at 163.
See United States v Aluminum Co of America, 91 F Supp 333, 418-19 (S D NY 1950)
(limiting the divestiture of Alcoa to a simple requirement that Alcoa and Aluminum Limited of
Canada have no common stockholders, so that the danger to effective future competition would
be removed and the opportunities for a new potential competition increased). See also United
States v Aluminum Co of America, 153 F Supp 132, 171 (S D NY 1957) (finding that failure of a
new competitor to emerge does not render a remedy ineffective so long as older competitors
remain strong).
207 110 F Supp 295 (D Mass 1953), affd 347 US 521 (1954) (per curiam).
208 11OFSuppat349.
209 Standard Oil Co of New Jersey v United States, 221 US 1, 77 (1911).
205

206
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Another indicator of durability is the fact that other remedies
have been tried before and failed, generally over a period of decades.
Divestiture of single-firm monopolists in the twentieth century was
rarely, if ever, attempted without alternatives having first been exhausted. For example, the Department of Justice had pursued United
Shoe Machinery since 1912,"0 but did not satisfy the courts that divestiture was required until 1969. 211
Extra caution is due where a single firm with unified management and product development is being divested. The theatres divested in United States v ParamountPictures,Inc,21- for example, could
be segregated into separate enterprises without unduly affecting the
management of the producer's core business. Standard Oil was really
a combination, not a single firm. United Shoe divested a single firm
with unified management, but the shoe machinery industry was not
especially "convergent" or networked: there were no dynamic pushing
machines to be integrated with shoe manufacture. As AT&T operates
in a fast-moving industry offering consumers the benefit of network
effects, its divestiture is probably most analogous to Microsoft's. But
the divestiture of AT&T quickly became a long-running administrative obligation for the court and the parties subject to the decree.
Indeed, the cases mentioned above show that practicability has
traditionally been a significant factor in deciding to elect a conduct or
a structural remedy. This issue is related to the level of intrusiveness
into the day-to-day operation of the business that the remedy would
require of the court or other antitrust enforcer. This partly reflects the
concern that it would take too much time for the court to do this. But
it also points to an implicit understanding that courts' expertise lies in
answering legal questions, not making business decisions about questions such as pricing.
For example, in considering a proposed remedy in the antitrust
suit against the major motion picture studios, later resulting in the
Paramountdecrees, the lower court proposed to allow the exhibitors
of movies to obtain them through competitive bidding, rejecting divestiture."' Reversing, the Supreme Court offered as one reason for rejecting competitive bidding that it would not do anything to decrease

United Shoe Machinery, 110 F Supp at 298.
See United States v United Shoe Machinery Corp, 1969 Trade Cases (CCH)
72,688 at
86,445-46 (ordering divestiture).
212 See 66 F Supp 323 (S D NY 1946), affd in part and revd in part, United States v Paramount Pictures,334 US 131 (1948).
213 See 66 F Supp at 323; United States v ParamountPictures, nc, 70 F Supp 53 (S D NY
1947), affd in part and revd in part, 334 US 131 (1948), on remand 85 F Supp 881 (S D NY 1949),
affd 339 US 984 (1950). For an economic analysis of the case, see Arthur De Vany and Ross D.
Eckert, Motion Picture Antitrust: The Paramount Cases Revisited, 14 Research in L & Econ 51
(1991).
210

211
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the studios' market power; vertically integrated theater/studios would
still be guaranteed access to their own pictures and thus have an ad214
vantage over independents. The Court also explained that the "highest bid" for a picture could not be determined simply by comparing
the money amount offered for the picture-one would also have to
consider nonmonetary considerations, such as the size and location of
a theatre, whether rental would be paid by a share of gross receipts, or
other terms. The Court protested that the decree "involves the judiciary so deeply in the daily operation of this nationwide business and
promises such dubious benefits that it should not be undertaken. 2 .
On remand, the lower court opted for divestiture instead."'
Some have argued that, as a general rule, divestiture remedies are
actually less disruptive, intrusive, and costly to administer than conduct remedies. " This was reportedly the reason that AT&T opted for
divestiture in 1984. Note, however, that the administrative realities of
the AT&T case refute the proposition that structural remedies are
necessarily more practicable than conduct remedies. As we will discuss
more extensively in Part V, courts were continually faced with monitoring the behavior of the units into which AT&T was broken up.
Indeed, the AT&T case illustrates the fact that ambitious structural remedies that incorporate supervisory and behavioral elements
might require as much, or even more, continued judicial scrutiny as
behavioral remedies require. AT&T may not have felt the brunt of the
implicit behavioral requirements, but the Bell Companies split off
from AT&T certainly did, as many injunctions were deployed to maintain the segregation between markets created by the decree.
The MFJ provided a waiver process by which the RBOCs could
request the court's permission to enter new markets. Under Section
VIII(C) of the decree, the RBOCs were entitled to have a particular
line-of-business restriction lifted if they could show that "there [was]
no substantial possibility" that a BOC could use its monopoly power
to impede competition in the market that it proposed to enter. 8 But
the waiver process worked much less smoothly in practice than it had
been expected to in theory. In 1993, the average waiver request had
been pending for thirty-six months even though the Department of

See Paramount,334 US at 162-63.
Id at 162.
216 See United States v ParamountPictures,Inc, 85 F Supp 881 (S D NY 1949), affd 339 US
984 (1950).
217 See, for example, Thomas D. Morgan, Cases and Materialson Modern Antitrust Law and
Its Origins 100 (West 1994) (Divestiture is a "relatively easy" remedy to implement when "the
defendant has been composed of several formerly separate firms and has retained multiple production facilities.").
218 Modification of Final Judgment § VIII(C), 552 F Supp at 231.
214
215
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Justice opposed relief in only 4 of the 266 requests."9 By 1994, the
backlog period had grown to 54.7 months, although the court approved 96 percent of the waiver requests on which it had ruled.2° By
that point, the ostensibly straightforward consent decree had become
a new layer of regulation for the telecommunications industry.'
Concern about unforeseen implementation costs and economic
consequences was a significant reason the trial court refused in 1953
to order divestiture in United Shoe; the government had apparently
not given divestiture much thought until the remedies phase of the
trial arrived. The court found the plan to break the single firm up into
three "unrealistic," given that United Shoe's operations were all centered in a single plant and used common tools, a common lab, and a
common managerial force.222 The court noted that:
A petition for dissolution should reflect greater attention to practical problems and should involve supporting economic data and
prophesies such as are presented in corporate reorganization and
public utility dissolution cases. Moreover, the petition should involve a more formal commitment by the Attorney General, than
is involved in the divergent proposals that his assistants have
made in briefs and in oral arguments addressed to the Court.'
The case can thus be read for the proposition that any far-reaching relief proposal must at least take thorough and coherent account of
practical details and their possible consequences.
ii) Divestiture versus compulsory licensing. A quasistructural, and more common, alternative to divestiture is the compulsory licensing of copyrights or patents for a reasonable fee. A patent
or copyright owner subject to compulsory licensing must license the

219 See Paul H. Rubin and Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Costs of Delay and Rent-Seeking Under
the Modification of FinalJudgment, 16 Managerial & Decision Econ 385,385-87 (1995), cited in
Jerry A. Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of TelecommunicationsNetworks, 109 Yale L J 417,428 (1999).
220 See Rubin and Dezhbakhsh at 387-89 (cited in note 219).
221 See Sidak and Spulber, DeregulatoryTakings'at 56 (cited in note 57); Temin and Weber, 8
U Fla J L & Pub Pol at 209-10 (cited in note 110); Paul W. MacAvoy, The Failure of Antitrust and
Regulation to Establish Competition in Long-Distance Telephone Services (MIT & AEI 1996);
Glen 0. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the ChangingWorld of Telecommunications, 5 Yale J Reg 517,537 (1988).
222 United Shoe Machinery, 110 F Supp at 348.
223 Id.
224 See, for example, United States v Glaxo Group Ltd, 410 US 52, 60-64 (1973); United
States v National Lead Co, 332 US 319, 348 (1947); United States v United Techs Corp, 1980-1
Trade Cases (CCH) T 63,792 (N D NY 1981) (partial divestiture); InternationalTel & Tel Corp v
GeneralTel & Elec Corp, 351 F Supp 1153 (D Hawaii 1973) (judgment, not consent decree), affd
in part and revd in part, 518 F2d 913 (9th Cir 1975). As of 1980, compulsory licensing had been
used as a remedy in more than 125 cases. See also Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationalityof the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 Cal L Rev 1599, 1608 n 63 (1990).
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intellectual property to all comers, losing his right of refusal. In deciding whether to order compulsory licensing with a fee, or the harsher
remedy of royalty-free licensing, one commentator reports that
"[m]ost courts stress current economic considerations when deciding
whether to order compulsory licensing;.., the emphasis of many other
courts which have favored dedication or royalty-free licensing has
been on past conduct instead." When compulsory licensing for a fee
is ordered, it will usually be for the practical reason that the intellectual property involved is the source of the perceived anticompetitive
26

effect.
In choosing between a compulsory licensing remedy and divestiture, courts will consider whether the anticompetitive conduct at issue
closely involves the patent or copyright. If so, a remedy that focuses
on the licenses might be more effective than a divestiture of assets.2'
William Kovacic reports that economists have not generally found
228
compulsory licensing remedies effective in deconcentrating markets;
on the other hand, he finds as much or more criticism of divestiture

remedies. 9
The case law on remedies does not, in the end, provide a set of
axioms that can be applied systematically to the choice among antitrust remedies. It does, however, provide broad guidance on several
points. Notably, it suggests that less intrusive remedies like damages
should be considered first, and that more stringent relief like divestiture must not be entered into blindly or without careful consideration
of possible practical consequences. To the extent that the applicable
225

Lawrence Schlam, Compulsory Royalty-Free Licensing as an AntitrustRemedy for Patent

Fraud:Law, Policy and the Patent-Antitrust Interface Revisited, 7 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 467, 513
(1998).
226 When a reasonable fee is ordered, the court must set the rate to be paid for the license
on the theory that if it does not the "compulsory" nature of the license would be meaningless.
The results of these judicial ventures into rate-making are as problematic as other regulatory exercises in price setting, and are not generally considered successful. One proposal to solve the
pricing problem with the compulsory license is to auction the license to the highest bidder. This
will yield a market price. This type of auction would produce only one licensee, the highest bidder. The auction can also be modified to yield a number of licensees. One might, for example, select a number of licensees in advance, take a number of bids equal to the number of licensees,
and require each licensee to pay the highest bid.
227 See United States v Spectra-Physics,Inc, 1981-2 Trade Cases (CCH) $ 64,290, 1981 US
Dist LEXIS 15030 (N D Cal) (holding that consent decree required compulsory licensing for a
fee rather than divestiture when merger of two companies lessened competition in the development of certain laser-based products).
228 See William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations:The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of
the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration,74 Iowa L Rev 1105, 1106-07 n 9 (1989) ("Most
commentators have concluded that compulsory licensing decrees generally have contributed little to the accomplishment of deconcentration objectives."), citing F.M. Scherer, Innovation and
Growth: Schumpeterian Perspectives 207, 220 (MIT 1984). But see Kovacic, 74 Iowa L Rev at
1111 n 30 (linking compulsory licensing of Xerox patent to greater innovation).
229 See Kovacic, 74 Iowa L Rev at 1108 n 19 (cited in note 228).
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precedent bears on the question at all, it is consistent with the economic welfare approach we have described. We next apply our
framework for evaluating antitrust remedies to the particular case of
Microsoft.
III.

THE THEORY AND FINDINGS OF MICROSOFT

On May 18, 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice and, separately,
a group of twenty states and the District of Columbia (which we collectively call "the states") filed civil lawsuits against Microsoft asserting violations of federal antitrust laws and, in the states' actions, additional violations of the states' respective antitrust laws." The complaints were the culmination of an extensive investigation jointly pursued by the Department of Justice and the states.2"' Shortly after the
complaints were filed Judge Jackson concluded, upon Microsoft's motion,' 32 that the cases were substantially similar and ordered them consolidated..3
In Part III.A, we explain the government's theory of liability in
the 1998 lawsuit against Microsoft. In Part III.B, we summarize Judge
Jackson's 1999 findings of fact. In Part III.C, we summarize Judge
Jackson's 2000 conclusions of law.
A. The Government's Theory of Liability in the 1998
Lawsuit against Microsoft
In their 1998 lawsuit against Microsoft, the Justice Department
and the states alleged that over the course of several years Microsoft
purposefully engaged in a series of actions -involving competitors,
distributors of Internet browsers, and computer manufacturersdesigned to preserve Microsoft's dominance in the personal computer
230 Complaint, United States v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 98-1232 (D DC filed May 18,
1998) ("DOJ Microsoft Complaint"); Complaint, New York v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No
98-1233 (D DC filed May 18, 1998). The states submitted a revised complaint on July 17, 1998.
Revised Complaint, New York v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 98-1233 (D DC filed July 17,
1998) ("State Microsoft Complaint"). The states participating in the July 17, 1998, complaint
were: California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The District of Columbia also participated. On December 7, 1998, South Carolina withdrew from the states' case.
231 See Ted Bridis, Feds, 18 States to File Antitrust Suits Against Microsoft, Denver Post C3
(May 14,1998).
232 See Motion of Defendant Microsoft Corporation to Consolidate, United States v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 98-1232 (D DC filed May 21,1998).
233 See United States v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 98-1232, slip op at 1 (D DC May 22,
1998). In a subsequent order denying in the main Microsoft's motion for summary judgment,
Judge Jackson explained that "[t]he complaints allege essentially the same antitrust violations"
and "seek virtually the same relief." United States v Microsoft Corp, 1998-2 Trade Cases (CCH)
72,261 at 82,668 (D DC 1998).
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operating systems market and to extend that monopoly to the Internet browser market. I More specifically, the Department and the
states argued that Microsoft committed two violations of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act by entering into certain exclusive dealing and tying
arrangements that served to restrain competition in the Internet
browser and PC operating systems markets. ' The government also argued that through the same exclusive dealing and tying arrangements,
as well as other behavior, Microsoft illegally maintained its alleged
monopoly power in the PC operating systems market and attempted
to monopolize the Internet browser market-"- actions which constituted two violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. "
The cornerstone of the government's case against Microsoft was
its contention that Microsoft wielded monopoly power in the market
for operating systems for Intel-based PCs. 2" An operating system, as
the government explained, coordinates the interactions between a
PC's central processing functions and both its hardware components
and software applications. In this regard, an operating system is often
called a "platform" for software applications.

Software applications

communicate with the operating system through the system's application programming interfaces ("APIs"). 2' The APIs in turn allow software applications to use "the operating system's underlying software
routines in order to perform various functions, such as displaying a
character on a monitor. '4 ' The Department of Justice observed that

234 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at
1-38, 53-123 (cited in note 230); State Microsoft Complaint at 11 9-78 (cited in note 230); Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law, United States
v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 98-1232, 1-2, 2-54, 66-70 (D DC filed Dec 6, 1999) ("Plaintiffs' Proposed Conclusions of Law").
235 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at 91 130-37 (cited in note 230); State Microsoft Complaint
at
93-97 (cited in note 230); Plaintiffs' Proposed Conclusions of Law at 1-2, 54-66 (cited in
note 234).
236 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at 91 138-41 (cited in note 230); State Microsoft Complaint
at %85-90 (cited in note 230); Plaintiffs' Proposed Conclusions of Law at 1-54 (cited in note
234).
237 In addition to the four Sherman Act claims described above, the states asserted a fifth
claim under the Sherman Act arguing that Microsoft violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by
engaging in monopoly leveraging. That claim was not included in the federal complaint and was
disposed of by the court on summary judgment. State Microsoft Complaint at 1 85-90 (cited in
note 230).
238 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at 9191
1-6, 57-60 (cited in note 230); State Microsoft Complaint at 1 17, 22-27 (cited in note 230). According to the Department of Justice's complaint,
Intel-based PCs were the most widely used PCs in the United States. DOJ Microsoft Complaint
at 1 2 (cited in note 230).
239 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at 91954, 66 (cited in note 230). See also State Microsoft
Complaint at 91 9-10 (cited in note 230) (asserting that software applications "run on top of'
operating systems).
240 State Microsoft Complaint at 1 10 (cited in note 230).
241 Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Findings of Fact, United States v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action
No 98-1232 1 8.2 (D DC filed Aug 10, 1999) ("Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact").
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Microsoft's Windows product was the operating system in use in over
80 percent of Intel-based PCs and was being installed in over 90 percent of new PCs.2"2
The government argued that Microsoft retained monopoly power
in the operating systems market because OEMs had no commercially
practical alternative to Microsoft's Windows. They lacked a suitable alternative, the government contended, because the operating systems
market is characterized by economies of scale in software production
and network effects that create high barriers to successful entry. The
Department of Justice explained that, for an operating system to be
used widely, it must support numerous software applications desired

by consumers. In turn, software writers will create new applications to
run on operating systems that are widely used to make such applica-

tions attractive to the greatest number of potential consumers. The
more widely used an operating system is, therefore, the more likely it
is to become further embraced by consumers. ' Judge Jackson subsequently used the phrase "applications barrier to entry" to describe this
burden to would-be competitors of Microsoft. 2

This entry cost rendition of the applications barrier to entry, however, requires closer scrutiny. Viewed slightly differently, the applications barrier to entry results not from sunk costs, but from the
chicken-and-egg problem created by path dependence: Consumers
want to use an operating system with many applications. Applications
writers want to write for an operating system with many consumers.
So once an operating system becomes successful, consumers will not
buy a different one, and applications writers will not write for a different one.
Although the government argued that Microsoft faced no meaningful actual competition from alternate operating systems, it nonetheless contended that software products existed that were potential

competitive threats to Microsoft's operating system monopoly. These
products included Internet browsers-most notably, Netscape's Navi2 (cited in note 230). The Department of Justice con242 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at
tended that Microsoft, which manufactured a number of operating systems, enjoyed in excess of
57-58. The states aran 80 percent share of the PC operating systems market overall. Id at 91T
gued in their complaint that Microsoft controlled over 90 percent of this overall market. State
Microsoft Complaint at 9117 (cited in note 230).
243 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at $ 2-3, 57-60, 66-68 (cited in note 230); State Microsoft
Complaint at 1 15-21 (cited in note 230); Plaintiffs' Proposed Conclusions of Law at 9-12 (cited
in note 234). In prior proceedings between the Department of Justice and Microsoft, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recognized that the software industry is characterized by
"increasing returns to scale and network externalities." United States v Microsoft, 147 F3d 935,
939 (DC Cir 1998). See also United States v Microsoft, 56 F3d 1448, 1452 (DC Cir 1995) ("It is
undisputed that the software market is characterized by 'increasing returns,' resulting in natural
barriers to entry.").
244 Findingsof Fact, 84 F Supp 2d 9, 1 30-31 (D DC 1999).
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gator browser, the first browser to gain widespread use by the public-and the Java technologies, a new programming language produced by Sun Microsystems. ' The Department of Justice explained
that Internet browsers allow computer users to "conveniently ...lo-

cate, access, display, and manipulate content and applications located"
on the World Wide Web, ' and Java "is designed in part to permit applications written in it to be run on different operating systems."'2 7
Internet browsers and the Java technologies, the government argued, have two characteristics that make them potential competitive
threats to Microsoft's Windows operating system. First, they are crossplatform technologies, meaning that they are designed to run on a
number of existing operating systems, including Windows. Second, in
addition to other functions that they perform, because they expose
their own APIs,2' they have the potential to serve as platforms for the
software applications that currently run on Windows.1' To the extent
that Internet browsers and the Java technologies can support numerous software applications and can run on operating systems other than
Windows, they could, according to the government's theory, break
down the applications barrier to entry into the PC operating systems
market and thereby diminish Microsoft's alleged monopoly power.
The government's complaint argued that, as early as 1995, Microsoft recognized the threat that these new technologies posed to the
applications barrier to entry and, therefore, to Microsoft's operating
system monopoly. In response, Microsoft introduced in mid-1995 its
own competing Internet browser product-the Internet Explorer
("IE"). The government argued that Microsoft moreover sought to
prevent competing Internet browsers and the Java technologies from
gaining widespread use among consumers so that those technologies
would not become economically attractive to significant numbers of
software writers as alternate platforms for software applications.
245 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at $ 4-9, 61-68 (cited in note 230); State Microsoft Complaint at
32-37 (cited in note 230); Plaintiffs' Proposed Conclusions of Law at 14-15, 21-24
(cited in note 234).
246 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at 1 6, 56, 63 (cited in note 230). See also State Microsoft
Complaint at 28 (cited in note 230).
247 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at 1$ 7, 63 (cited in note 230). See also State Microsoft Complaint at 36 (cited in note 230).
248 Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact at 1[ 53.2-53.3, 58.1.1-58.2 (cited in note 241).
249 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at
7-9 (cited in note 230); State Microsoft Complaint at
1[ 32-37 (cited in note 230).
250 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at
4-9, 66-68 (cited in note 230); State Microsoft Complaint at 1 32-37 (cited in note 230). In prior proceedings between the Department of Justice
and Microsoft, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit said: "Widespread
use of multi-platform browsers as user interfaces has some potential to reduce any monopolyincreasing effects of network externalities in the operating systems market." Microsoft, 147 F3d
at 939.
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The Department of Justice contended that, as the first step in its
alleged campaign, Microsoft sought the agreement of Netscape to divide the Internet browser market between browsers compatible with
Windows (Microsoft's share) and browsers that can run on platforms
other than Windows (Netscape's share)."1 Upon Netscape's refusal,
the government alleged, Microsoft sought to foreclose Netscape's distribution to consumers by entering into agreements with OEMs,
Internet service providers ("ISPs"), online service providers
("OLSs"), and Internet content providers ("ICPs") that required
them to distribute, promote, purchase, or use IE and that significantly
limited their ability to distribute or promote competing Internet
browsers- including Netscape's Navigator."'
The government further contended that Microsoft, besides limiting the distribution of Navigator, which in itself was an important distribution vehicle for Java, took a number of steps specifically to limit
the distribution of cross-platform Java. The government argued that
Microsoft offered developers Java tools that, when used to write software applications, produced applications that would run properly only
on Windows and were difficult to port to other operating systems. According to the government, Microsoft failed to warn developers that
these tools would negate the cross-platform nature of Java applications. The government also argued that Microsoft threatened to withhold information regarding Windows from software developers using
cross-platform technologies. Microsoft's actions significantly impaired
"the ability of Java to develop into a truly robust" software platform
and, thereby, to erode the applications barrier to entry.:'
In assessing Microsoft's legal liability, the government characterized the agreements into which Microsoft had entered with ISPs, ICPs,
OLSs, and OEMs as exclusionary and argued that because these
agreements inhibited competition in the Internet browser market, and
concomitantly in the PC operating systems market, without serving a

DOJ Microsoft Complaint at 11 14, 70-74 (cited in note 230). See also Plaintiffs' Proposed Conclusions of Law at 24-25 (cited in note 234). The states contended that Microsoft had
recognized the threat that Internet browsers posed to its operating system monopoly as early as
October 1994. They argued that Microsoft first sought to combat this threat by seeking to acquire the rights to Netscape's Navigator. Upon Netscape's refusal, according to the states, Microsoft then sought to divide the browser market with Netscape. State Microsoft Complaint at IT
40-45 (cited in note 230).
252 The Department of Justice and the states conceded that Microsoft had modified some of
these agreements. They argued, however, that the modifications were too limited to remove all
anticompetitive aspects of the agreements, did not ameliorate past anticompetitive effects, and
could be withdrawn at any time. DOJ Microsoft Complaint at T1 10-15,17-22,26-34, 61-64,75103 (cited in note 230); State Microsoft Complaint at 1 45-55, 57, 62-78 (cited in note 230);
Plaintiffs' Proposed Conclusions of Law at 26-38 (cited in note 234).
253 Plaintiffs' Proposed Conclusions of Law at 47 (cited in note 234).
251
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procompetitive purpose, they violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.Y
In addition, the government argued that 1E and Windows are separate

products under antitrust tying law,25 and that Microsoft's integration
of these two products served to restrain competition in the Internet
browser market and thus constituted an illegal tie in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 6
The government further argued that to the extent Microsoft's il-

legal tie-ins, illegal exclusionary contracts, and other behaviors promoting IE served significantly to limit competition in the Internet
browser market, Microsoft was guilty of attempted monopolization of
this market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 217 Finally, the
DOJ Microsoft Complaint at IT 130-33 (cited in note 230); State Microsoft Complaint
at IT 78, 97 (cited in note 230); Plaintiffs' Proposed Conclusions of Law at 63-66 (cited in note
234). To demonstrate that a defendant has violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by entering
into exclusionary agreements a plaintiff must show, in general, that the agreements restricted
competition by foreclosing a significant amount of supply or outlet capacity, and that they served
no procompetitive purpose. Tampa Electric Co v Nashville Coal Co, 365 US 320,327-35 (1961)
(holding an exclusive dealing agreement not in violation of Section 1 because it did not foreclose
competition).
255 The government concluded that IE and Windows are separate products under antitrust
tying law by applying the consumer separate demand test articulated by the Supreme Court in
Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services, Inc, 504 US 451,462 (1992) (conducting separate
inquiries into market power in the two tied markets), and Jefferson ParishHospital Dist No 2 v
Hyde, 466 US 2, 19-23 (1984) (examining the character of the demand for individual items in an
allged tying arrangement). Plaintiffs Proposed Conclusions of Law at 54-61 (cited in note 234).
Under this test, a court would conclude that two products are separate if there is sufficient consumer demand for the products on a separate basis, and, thus, vendors find it efficient to provide
the two products separately. Eastman Kodak, 504 US at 462; Jefferson Parish,466 US at 21-22.
The government reached the same conclusion, however, by applying a standard that the D.C.
Circuit articulated in Microsoft, 147 F3d at 935. In this case the D.C. Circuit developed a standard to determine whether Windows and IE are "integrated" or separate products under the
terms of the Justice Department's and Microsoft's 1995 consent decree. In general, under the
D.C. Circuit's standard, two items that are technologically commingled are a single, "integrated"
product if the commingled product offers benefits beyond that which a consumer might obtain if
the consumer separately purchased and then combined the two items or functionalities herself.
Id at 948-53. See generally J. Gregory Sidak, An Antitrust Role for Software Integration,18 Yale J
Reg (forthcoming 2001).
256 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at 1 134-37 (cited in note 230); State Microsoft Complaint
at IT 28-31,93-95 (cited in note 230); Plaintiffs' Proposed Conclusions of Law at 54-63 (cited in
note 234). To demonstrate under a per se rule that a defendant has illegally tied one product to
another in violation of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must show that (1) the tying and the tied
products are really two separate products; (2) the defendant conditioned the sale of the tying
product on the purchase of the tied product; (3) the defendant had sufficient economic power in
the market for the tying product to restrain competition in the market for the tied product; and
(4) a not insubstantial amount of commerce in the interstate market for the tied product was affected. Eastman Kodak, 504 US at 461-62. See Multistate Legal Studies, Inc v HarcourtBraceJovanovich Legal & ProfessionalPub, Inc, 63 F3d 1540, 1546 (10th Cir 1995) (applying the Kodak
test to the market for bar review courses).
257 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at 91 140-41 (cited in note 230); State Microsoft Complaint
at 9 88-92 (cited in note 230); Plaintiffs' Proposed Conclusions of Law at 66-70 (cited in note
234). To prove that a defendant has attempted to monopolize a market, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct with the specific intent of monopo254
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government alleged most forcefully that these same actions served to
erode potential competitive threats to Microsoft's operating systems
monopoly, and that Microsoft thereby illegally maintained its monopoly in the PC operating systems market in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.
B.

Judge Jackson's 1999 Findings of Fact

On November 5, 1999, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson issued his
findings of fact in the Microsoft case overwhelmingly supporting the
factual allegations made by the government. 9 In short, Judge Jackson
found that Intel-compatible PC operating systems constitute the relevant product market'6' and that Microsoft holds monopoly power16 in
that market. He also agreed with the bulk of the government's con-

tentions regarding Microsoft's actions over the past decade. Most significantly for assessing Microsoft's legal liability, he concluded that
these actions "could only have been advantageous if they operated to

reinforce monopoly power, ''16' and that while they bestowed some
benefits on consumers, in the main they harmed them by inhibiting
competition and innovation in the computer industry. ' We discuss
these findings in greater detail below.

lizing the market and that there was a dangerous probability that the defendant would in fact
monopolize the market. Spectrum Sports, Inc v McQuillan,506 US 447,456 (1993).
258 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at $$ 138-39 (cited in note 230); State Microsoft Complaint
at $$ 85-87 (cited in note 230); Plaintiffs Proposed Conclusions of Law at 2-3,21-23,44-47,5254 (cited in note 234). To demonstrate that a defendant is guilty of the offense of illegally maintaining monopoly power, a plaintiff must show that the defendant retains monopoly power in the
market and that it deliberately maintained that power through means other than the development "of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." United States v Grinnell
Corp, 384 US 563,570-71 (1966).
259 Judge Jackson said of his findings: "Virtually everything I did may be vulnerable on appeal .. " Peter Spiegel, Microsoft Judge Defends Himself Against Charges of Misconduct. Software GiantAppeals Judge's Breakup Judgment, Fin Times 4 (Oct 7,2000).
260 In antitrust analysis the term "relevant market" refers to the market in which the defendant's alleged monopoly power or anticompetitive behavior is to be assessed. The relevant market has two dimensions, the product market and the geographic market. The former identifies
"the producers or sellers of products that compete to some substantial degree with the product
in which the seller opin question," and the latter identifies the "area of effective competition ...
erates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies." ABA Section of Antitrust
Law, 1 Antitrust Law Developments 233,449,532-33 (4th ed 1997) (citations omitted).
261 In antitrust law, monopoly power is "the power to control prices or exclude competition." United States v E.J. du Pont de Nemours & Co, 351 US 377,391 (1956).
262 Findingsof Fact, 84 F Supp 2d 9, 1[ 18-66 (D DC 1999).
263 Id at $ 67.
408-12.
264 Id at
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1. The relevant market.

Judge Jackson affirmed the government's contention that the
relevant market for purposes of evaluating whether Microsoft wields
monopoly power is the worldwide market for Intel-compatible PC
operating systems."' For the majority of consumers, Judge Jackson
stated, currently and in all likelihood in the near future, there are no
substitutes for Intel-compatible PC operating systems that would not
engender significant costs.2 6
On the demand side, Judge Jackson concluded that consumers do
not perceive Intel-compatible server operating systems, non-Intelcompatible PC operating systems (including Apple's Mac OS operating system),267 network computers, server-based computing through
browsers, other information appliances 26 such as smart wireless
phones and hand-held computers, or middleware, to be substitutes for
an Intel-compatible PC operating system."' Middleware, Judge Jack-

son explained, refers to software programs, such as Internet browsers
and Sun's Java class libraries, that expose their own APIs to software
application developers while relying on the APIs of the underlying

operating system to run.
Judge Jackson also rejected the possibility of supply-side substitution. He agreed with the government's contention that there is an applications barrier to entry into the Intel-compatible PC operating systems market." Judge Jackson explained that while a firm could de265 Id at T 18. Judge Jackson rejected Microsoft's contention that a relevant market defined
to include only Intel-compatible PC operating systems is too narrow for purposes of addressing
the factual question of whether Microsoft wields monopoly power. Microsoft had argued that to
assess this question, Judge Jackson should not employ a structural approach that determines "the
geographic and product boundaries for an identifiable market," and then analyzes the market
shares of the firms within that market. Defendant Microsoft Corporation's Revised Proposed
Findings of Fact, United States v Microsoft Corp, Civ Action No 98-1232 132 (D DC filed Sept
10, 1999) ("Microsoft's Proposed Findings of Fact"). Rather, Judge Jackson should employ a behavioral approach that requires a court to identify whether there are any limits on an alleged
monopolist's ability to raise prices or exclude entry, and on whether the alleged monopolist's behavior is consistent with the retention of monopoly power. Microsoft argued that this latter approach more accurately assesses the dynamics of the marketplace, and that under this approach
Judge Jackson should consider "the impact of competition between Windows and all other platform software." Id at 155.
266 Findingsof Fact, 84 F Supp 2d at
21.
267 Judge Jackson noted, however, that inclusion of the Mac OS in the relevant market
would not change his conclusion regarding the degree of Microsoft's market power. Id.
268 Judge Jackson noted that within the next few years it is possible that information appliances, alone or in combination, might be substitutable for Intel-compatible PC operating systems
for what Judge Jackson determined is a small percentage of consumers who do not use all of the
features of their PC. Id at 23.
269 Id at
19-29. Microsoft had argued that all of these products compete with Windows
in its function as a software applications platform and thereby serve to constrain Microsoft's
pricing ability. Microsoft's Proposed Findings of Fact at 199-239 (cited in note 265).
270 Findingsof Fact,84 F Supp 2d at 11 30-31. See also id at 1$ 36-44.
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velop a new operating system, and some firms have, it would take
years before such a system could support the breadth of applications
that currently run on Windows and thus offer consumers a meaningful
alternative.27 He found similar hurdles to impede supply-side substitution by middleware developers or server-based systems, noting that it
would take years before they offered consumers a realistic alternative
to Windows because of the applications barrier to entry."'
2. Microsoft's power in the relevant market.
In antitrust analysis, monopoly power is defined as "the power to
2
control market prices or exclude competition. . Judge Jackson concluded that Microsoft wields monopoly power in the market for Intelcompatible PC operating systems because it could charge more for
Windows than it could have in a competitive market, and that it could
do so for a sustained period of time without losing a significant number of customers. ' We discuss more fully below Judge Jackson's conclusions regarding Microsoft's market power.
a) Market share and barriers to entry. To reach his conclusion
that Microsoft had market power, Judge Jackson evaluated the firm's
market share, often viewed by courts as the most significant indicia of
market power,"' or at a minimum, as the starting point in any monopoly power analysis. 6 Judge Jackson concluded that Microsoft retains a
"dominant, persistent and increasing share" worldwide in the market
for Intel-compatible PC operating systems. Over the last few years, he
found, this share has stood at 95 percent. 7
The court found Windows's dominant position to be insulated
from competition because of the large number of software applications that Windows supports. Judge Jackson concluded that it would
be prohibitively expensive for a new operating system vendor to recreate the seventy thousand plus applications that currently run on
Windows and that software vendors will not write for a new system

Id at 11 30-31.
Id at 32.
273 United States v E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co,351 US 377,391 (1956).
33 (D DC 1999).
274 Findingsof Fact, 84 F Supp 2d 9 at
275 See Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services, Inc, 504 US 451,464 (1992) ("The
existence of [market] power ordinarily is inferred from the seller's possession of a predominant
share of the market.").
276 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 1 Antitrust Law Developments at 234-42 (cited in note
260).
277 Judge Jackson determined that even if he included Apple's Mac OS in the relevant market, Microsoft's market share would still register over 80 percent. Findingsof Fact, 84 F Supp 2d
271
272

at

35.
278

Id at 1 36-44.
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until they are confident that it will be well established."" Microsoft
never faced the same entry barriers that a new entrant must confront,
Judge Jackson found, because it never confronted a "highly penetrated
market dominated by a single competitor......
b) Price restraints on Microsoft and Microsoft's pricing behavior.

Although Judge Jackson acknowledged that the evidence available at
trial did not allow him to determine with confidence the monopoly
price for Windows, he nevertheless cited certain factors as indicative
of Microsoft's power over price. These factors include: Microsoft's
failure to consider competitors' prices, Microsoft's decision to price
Windows 95 at the same price as Windows 98,2' an internal document
showing that Microsoft had wide latitude in the price it could charge
for Windows 98, and the fact that Microsoft price discriminates in the
licensing fees for Windows.m Judge Jackson concluded that even if Microsoft charges less than the full monopoly price, this does not mean
that it does not have monopoly power. Microsoft, Judge Jackson declared, uses a substantial part of its monopoly power to impose "burdensome restrictions on its customers" designed to increase and maintain its market dominance.
Judge Jackson dismissed Microsoft's contention that it could not
wield monopoly power because it invests large sums in research and
development, noting that even monopolists have incentives to innovate. He similarly rejected Microsoft's arguments that its monopoly
power was constrained by its installed base, piracy, and long-term
threats from alternative technologies.
3. Middleware threats to Microsoft's
operating system monopoly.
Judge Jackson concluded that, beginning in the spring of 1995,
Microsoft perceived the emergence of cross-platform middleware,
such as Netscape's Navigator browser and Sun's Java class libraries, as
threats to its monopoly power.8 Judge Jackson explained that Micro279

Id at 1140-41.

280 Id at$ 43.

281 Judge Jackson explained that in a competitive market one would expect the price of an
older version of a product to "stay the same or decrease." Id at 1 62.
282 Id at 11 62-66. See Coal ExportersAssn of the United States v United States, 745 F2d 76,
91 (D DC 1984) ("[T]he ability of a firm to price discriminate is an indicator of significant
monopoly power."). Because Judge Jackson's findings of fact contained no citations or footnotes
explaining this list, it is not obvious to which internal document the judge was referring. Microsoft did introduce evidence concerning prices of forty-nine to eighty-nine dollars for upgrades,
which counted for a small percentage of sales and had different characteristics from OEM sales.
283 Findings of Fact, 84 F Supp 2d at 91
66.
284 Id at 11 68-77. Judge Jackson noted that Microsoft recognized Java as a threat to its
monopoly power in the spring of 1996. Id at $ 75.
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soft feared these technologies because they were well positioned to
serve as platforms for "network-centric applications that run in association with Web pages,' they could run on multiple operating systems (hence called "cross-platform"), and they exposed their own
APIs upon which software developers could rely in lieu of the APIs in
the underlying operating system. Microsoft recognized, Judge Jackson
concluded, that if middleware programs became widely used, and at
the same time exposed sufficient numbers of APIs to support the advanced, full-featured applications that run on Windows, then large
numbers of software developers would have sufficient incentive to
write applications that relied entirely on middleware APIs, and developers and consumers alike would no longer be reliant on Windows as
an applications platform. In this manner, middleware could potentially
"dissipate" the positive feedback loop that supports the applications
barrier to entry and, in the parlance of Microsoft's worst fears, turn
Windows into a commodity.6
Although Judge Jackson concluded that the threat to Microsoft's
operating system monopoly posed by middleware technologies was
not imminent because these technologies exposed significantly fewer
APIs than Windows, and thus could not support the full-featured applications that Windows supports,'s he found that Microsoft nevertheless feared these technologies because of the potential threat that they
posed." We discuss Judge Jackson's conclusions regarding Microsoft's
response to these potential threats in the following two sections.
a) Microsoft's response to the browser threat. Based on the evidence at trial, Judge Jackson concluded that Microsoft first sought to
contain the threat posed by Navigator by seeking Netscape's agreement, in mid-1995, to divide the browser market.8 Judge Jackson
found that Microsoft hoped to induce Netscape not to expose the
APIs in the Windows version of its browser so that Navigator would
not compete as a platform-level browser able to support software applications. In exchange, Microsoft would cede the non-Windows
browser market to Netscape, provide Netscape with technical assistance to develop browser applications that relied on Microsoft's
Internet technologies, and provide Netscape with preferential access
to technical information that Netscape needed to create a Windows

285
286
287
288

Id at 169.
Id at 172.
Id at 177.
Id.

289 Id at 1$ 79-86. Judge Jackson observed that at the time of Microsoft's proposal, Navigator was the only browser that enjoyed enough market share to potentially erode the applications
barrier to entry. Id at 89.
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version of its browser. 290When Netscape refused Microsoft's proposal,
Microsoft delayed the provision of Windows technical information to
Netscape. The court found that the delay prevented Netscape from re-

leasing the Windows 95 version of its browser until several months after Microsoft's retail release of Windows 95 and IE,291 thereby maxi'2
mizing IE's market share at "Navigator's expense.

Judge Jackson found, however, that Microsoft also competed on
quality and price. Specifically, from 1995 onwards Microsoft spent
more than one hundred million dollars annually in efforts to improve
the quality of IE to the point where industry reviewers were split over
whether IE or Navigator was the superior product."' Microsoft also
spent thirty million dollars annually promoting IE.294Judge Jackson
further found that Microsoft bundled IE with Windows 95, later technically integrated IE with Windows 98, and offered IE for free. Microsoft did this despite its large monetary investment in the product and
the potential to obtain significant revenues from its sale. Judge Jackson conceded that Microsoft might have given IE away for free to respond to competition rather than to preserve the applications barrier
to entry.9 He concluded, however, that the determination to preserve
that barrier "was the main force driving its decision to price the product at zero. 2, 96 Accordingly, the court agreed with the government's
evidence that Microsoft acted to foreclose to Navigator the two
browser distribution channels that "lead most efficiently to browser
usage": the OEM and Internet Access Provider ("IAP") channels!,
Judge Jackson also concluded that browsers and operating systems are two separate products because consumers seek to purchase
them separately, and there is general agreement within the software
industry that the functionalities that these two products provide are
distinct.2 8 Noting Microsoft's argument that other vendors bundle
browsers with their operating systems, Judge Jackson concluded that
Microsoft is the only vendor that does not give OEMs and consumers
the choice either not to install the browser or to uninstall it.Y Given
Id at 91[ 90-92.
Id at 1 90-92.
292 Id at IT 133-36.
293 Id at 19134-36.
294 Id at 1140.
295 Id.
296 Id at 136.
297 Id at 1 143-48.
298 Id at 91 150-54. In support of his conclusion Judge Jackson observed that
some consumers do not want a browser with their operating system, and corporate consumers using multiple
operating systems seek to purchase a browser independently of the operating system to ensure
the maintenance of uniform browser software across different operating system platforms used
within the company. Id at 919151-52.
299 Id at 1 153.
290

291

2001]

Antitrust Divestiturein Network Industries

the government's demonstration at trial that IE can be removed without negatively affecting the functionality of Windows, Judge Jackson
concluded that there is no technical reason to prohibit consumers
from removing IE from Windows.He further found that the integration of IE and Windows reduced
the speed of a PC for consumers, a clear downside for consumers who
did not want a browser.i°' Finally, Judge Jackson concluded that Microsoft integrated IE into Windows not for any procompetitive purpose,
but purely to restrict Navigator's distribution and to stop "Navigator
from weakening the applications barrier to entry."'
b) Microsoft's response to the threat posed by Sun Microsystems's implementation of Java. Sun Microsystems designed the Java programming language to allow applications written in Java to run on any operating system. Java allowed developers to write software with advanced functionality by relying on some of the APIs in the underlying
operating system. Judge Jackson found that, in response, Microsoft
took actions that made it difficult to take Java-based applications that
relied on Windows APIs and port them into non-Windows environments."3
Microsoft, Judge Jackson found, also refused to include new Java
libraries in IE that expanded the ability of Java to support fullfeatured applications because this would make applications more easily portable." ' Microsoft also attempted to thwart the development of
additional Java class libraries by threatening to withhold Windows operating systems support from Intel's microprocessors and other
threats to induce Intel to stop helping Sun develop Java class libraries.
Judge Jackson found that Intel acquiesced."5 Judge Jackson concluded
that Microsoft would not have acted to make it more difficult to port
absent its commitment to preserve the applications
Java applications
3
0
entry.
to
barrier

Id at 1 175-85.
Id at 173.
155.
302 Id at
303 Id at 1 387-89.
386-94.
304 Id at
393-406.
305 Id at
407 ("It is not clear whether, absent Microsoft's interference, Sun's Java efforts
306 Id at
would by now have facilitated porting between Windows and other platforms enough to weaken
the applications barrier to entry. What is clear, however, is that Microsoft has succeeded in
greatly impeding Java's progress to that end with a series of actions whose sole purpose and effect were to do precisely that.").
300

301
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C. Judge Jackson's 2000 Conclusions of Law
On April 3, 2000, Judge Jackson issued his conclusions of law.
He concluded that "Microsoft maintained its monopoly power by
anticompetitive means and attempted to monopolize the Web browser
market, both in violation of § 2," and that "Microsoft also violated § 1
of the Sherman Act by unlawfully tying its Web browser to its operating system...3. Judge Jackson, however, found in Microsoft's favor on
the claim that its "marketing arrangements with other companies constituted unlawful exclusive dealing under criteria established by leading decisions under § L
1. '" Conceptually, Judge Jackson divided his
discussion into three sections: claims based on Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, claims based on Section 1, and claims based on state
law. We summarize here his findings only with respect to the first two
categories.
1. Claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Judge Jackson reiterated that "there are currently no productsand that there are not likely to be any in the near future-that a significant percentage of computer users worldwide could substitute for
Intel-compatible PC operating systems without incurring substantial
costs..3.0 Those facts created a presumption that Microsoft had monopoly power, " which Microsoft failed to rebut."2 Judge Jackson
added that
over the past several years, Microsoft has comported itself in a
way that could only be consistent with rational behavior for a
profit-maximizing firm if the firm knew that it possessed monopoly power, and if it was motivated by a desire to preserve the barrier to entry protecting that power.313
Judge Jackson then considered whether Microsoft maintained its
monopoly power by anticompetitive means. He noted that "[i]f the
evidence reveals a significant exclusionary impact in the relevant
market," then "liability will attach-unless the defendant comes for-

Conclusions of Law, 87 F Supp 2d 30 (D DC 2000).
Id at 35.
309 Id. On the claims for which he found Microsoft liable under federal antitrust law,
Judge
Jackson also found Microsoft liable under analogous state antitrust statutes. Id.
310 Id at 36.
311 Id at 36-37, citing United States v AT&T Co, 524 F Supp 1336, 1347-48 (D DC
1981),
affd as Maryland v United States, 460 US 1001 (1983).
312 Conclusionsof Law, 87 F Supp 2d 30,36-37 (D DC 2000).
313 Id at 37 (emphasis added).
307
308
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ward with specific, procompetitive business motivations that explain
the full extent of its exclusionary conduct. 3..
Judge Jackson then considered in greater detail Microsoft's conduct with respect to Netscape's Navigator and its conduct with respect
to Sun's Java technology. Judge Jackson accepted all of the government's arguments that Microsoft's conduct with respect to Netscape's
Navigator or Sun's Java technology was anticompetitive. He concluded, among other things, that Microsoft lacked any legitimate business justification for its decision not to offer a "browserless" version of
Windows 98 to consumers and OEMs."' Judge Jackson stated that
"Microsoft's decision to tie Internet Explorer to Windows cannot truly
be explained as an attempt to benefit consumers and improve the efficiency of the software market generally, but rather as part of a larger
campaign to quash innovation that threatened its monopoly position. 3.6 With respect to Java, Judge Jackson found in the government's
favor that, "[a]s part of its grand strategy to protect the applications
barrier, Microsoft employed an array of tactics designed to maximize
the difficulty with which applications written in Java could be ported
from Windows to other platforms, and vice versaY."..
Judge Jackson emphasized, however, that Microsoft's actions
should be viewed in totality to appreciate their significance for purposes of determining liability under Section 2:
Microsoft's campaign to protect the applications barrier from
erosion by network-centric middleware can be broken down into
discrete categories of activity. But only when the separate categories of conduct are viewed, as they should be, as a single, wellcoordinated course of action does the full extent of the violence
that Microsoft has done to the competitive process reveal itself.
In essence, Microsoft mounted a deliberate assault upon entrepreneurial efforts that, left to rise or fall on their own merits,
could well have enabled the introduction of competition into the
market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems."8
Judge Jackson also concluded that the totality of the facts reinforced
the conclusion that Microsoft was, in his words, "predacious..3.' For
these reasons, Judge Jackson found Microsoft liable for monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
314 Id at 38, citing Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services, Inc, 504 US 451, 483
(1992), and Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, 472 US 585,605 n 32 (1985).
315 Conclusions of Law, 87 F Supp 2d at 40.
316 Id.
317 Id at 43.
318 Id at 44, citing Continental Ore Co v Union Carbide & Carbon Corp, 370 US 690, 699

(1962).
319

Conclusionsof Law, 87 F Supp 2d at 45-46.
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In addition to finding that Microsoft's conduct toward Netscape
constituted actual monopolization of the market for Intel-compatible
PC operating systems, Judge Jackson found that the same evidence
supported a finding that Microsoft had engaged in attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers.O He therefore
found Microsoft liable under Section 2 for attempting to obtain monopoly power in a second market by anticompetitive means.
2. Claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Judge Jackson found that Microsoft violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Act through tying arrangements, but that Microsoft did not
so violate the law through its exclusive dealing arrangements.
With respect to tying, Judge Jackson agreed with the government
that "Microsoft's combination of Windows and Internet Explorer by
contractual and technological artifices constitutes unlawful tying to
the extent that those actions forced Microsoft's customers and consumers to take Internet Explorer as a condition of obtaining Windows."3' 2' In reaching that conclusion, Judge Jackson ruled that the applicable precedent for evaluating Microsoft's product bundling was
not the D.C. Circuit's 1998 decision in United States v Microsoft,1 but
rather the Supreme Court's decisions in Eastman Kodak Co v Image
Technical Services, Inc 23 and Jefferson Parish Hospital DistrictNo 2 v
Hyde,"' neither of which specifically concerned product integration in
the computer software industry.2 Judge Jackson stated: "The fact that
Microsoft ostensibly priced Internet Explorer at zero does not detract
from the conclusion that consumers were forced to pay, one way or
another, for the browser along with Windows.' ' .6
Judge Jackson found that Microsoft had not violated Section 1 by
imposing exclusive dealing arrangements in contracts with "some
OLSs, ICPs, ISVs, Compaq and Apple" that required those firms "to
promote and distribute Internet Explorer to the partial or complete
exclusion of Navigator. '3 27 He observed:
Notwithstanding the extent to which these "exclusive" distribution agreements preempted the most efficient channels for Navigator to achieve browser usage share, . . . Microsoft's multiple
agreements with distributors did not ultimately deprive Netscape
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327

Id.
Id at 47.
147 F3d 935 (DC Cir 1998).
504 US 451 (1992).
466 US 2 (1984).
Conclusions of Law, 87 F Supp 2d 30,48 (D DC 2000).
Id at 50.
Id at 51.
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of the ability to have access to every PC user worldwide ....[11n

1998 alone, for example, Netscape was able to distribute 160 million copies of Navigator, contributing to an increase in its installed base from 15 million in 1996 to 33 million in December
1998. As such, the evidence does not support a finding that these
agreements completely excluded Netscape from any constituent

portion of 328the worldwide browser market, the relevant line of
commerce.

Nonetheless, Judge Jackson emphasized that "[t]he fact that Microsoft's arrangements with various firms did not foreclose enough of the

relevant market to constitute a § 1 violation in no way detracts from
the Court's assignment of liability for the same arrangements under
§ 2."329
IV. ECONOMIC WELFARE AND DIVESTITURE IN MICROSOFT

Shortly after the Justice Department and the states filed their
complaints against Microsoft in 1998, Judge Jackson bifurcated the
case into a liability phase and a remedies phase. " ' Once the liability
phase was completed with the findings of fact and conclusions of law
discussed above, the district court turned to the question of the appropriate remedy.
Before, during, and after the liability phase of the trial, a number

of scholars and former government officials in law and economics
proposed remedies to cure the competitive problems alleged by the

government or subsequently identified in Judge Jackson's findings of
fact. 3' Some of these commentators disputed the need for any remedy
328

Id at 53.

Id.
Steve Lohr, If Microsoft Loses Case, Remedies are Thorny, NY Times C1 (Dec 14, 1998).
331 The academics included Timothy F. Bresnahan of Stanford University (and subsequently
Deputy Assistant Attorney General (Chief Economist) of the Antitrust Division); Ronald A.
Cass, Dean of Boston University's law school; Nicholas Economides of New York University;
Robert E. Hall of Stanford University; Herbert Hovenkamp of the University of Iowa; Paul
Rothstein of Georgetown University; and Steven Salop of Georgetown University. See Joel
Brinkley, US. and State Officials Weigh Microsoft Remedies, NY Times C1 (Nov 17,1999); Brinkley, A Microsoft Remedy, NY Times at Cl (cited in note 104). Other commentators included
former antitrust officials, such as William J. Baer, former Director of the Bureau of Competition
at the FTC; Charles F "Rick" Rule, former Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division
of the Justice Department during the Reagan Administration; and Robert Litan, Director of
Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution and former Deputy Assistant Attorney General
of the Antitrust Division during the Clinton Administration. See John M. Broder and Joel Brinkley, How Microsoft Sought Friends in Washington, NY Times 1 (Nov 7, 1999).
In addition, when Judge Jackson issued his findings of fact during the liability phase of the
trial, he asked Professor Lawrence Lessig, then of Harvard Law School, to submit an amicus curiae brief. See Steve Lohr, Internet Law Expert Returns to Antitrust Case, NY Times C5 (Nov 29,
1999); Denise Caruso, Settlement Talks in the Microsoft Case Hinge on a Question:Are the Laws
of Government or Software Supreme?, NY Times C5 (Dec 6, 1999).
329
330
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(on the rationale that Microsoft's conduct did not violate the antitrust
laws), while others advocated the whole range of possible remedies.
Robert Hall proposed a framework for calculating damages that
would be imposed on Microsoft:" Others proposed behavioral remedies that included (1) explicit and implicit line-of-business restrictions;
(2) compulsory licensing of the source code for Windows; and (3)
mandatory access to the Windows platform. Proposed structural
remedies included (1) a vertical divestiture of Microsoft into distinct
companies along lines of business (that is, operating systems ("OS")
software, applications programs, and Internet services, sites, and products); (2) a horizontal divestiture of multiple, vertically integrated
firms; and (3) a vertical separation along lines of business (OS software, applications, and Internet) and then a further horizontal
breakup of the OS division into multiple, equal parts.3" In the end, the
government asked for a structural injunction requiring vertical divestiture of Microsoft into two separate companies, one engaged in the operating systems business and the other in the applications business. '
As noted in the Introduction, a group of distinguished amici consisting
of Robert Litan, Roger Noll, William Nordhaus, and Frederic Scherer
asked for a more far-reaching divestiture that, in addition to vertically
separating the operating systems and applications businesses, also
horizontally divides the operating systems business into three competing firms.3 ' Microsoft itself countered with a proposal for behavioral
restrictions.3 7
After a short hearing and rapid briefing cycle, in which the court
declined to hear testimony or to take further evidence on the remedies question, Judge Jackson adopted the government's divestiture
proposal and ordered Microsoft to submit a plan of "reorganization"
dividing the company vertically into two distinct firms.3 At the time of

this writing, the district court's decision is pending en banc appellate
review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
In the following sections, we apply the economic welfare framework set out in Part II of this Article to the court's divestiture order.
Robert E. Hall, Toward a Quantification of the Effects of Microsoft's Conduct at 2-7
(cited in note 81).
333 See the discussion of various behavioral remedies in Litan Brief at 29-30
(cited in note
14).
334 For a discussion of various structural remedies, see id at 24.
335 Plaintiff's Revised Proposed Final Judgment, United States v Microsoft Corp,
Civil Action No 98-1232,2 (D DC filed May 26,2000).
336 Litan Brief at 46--67 (cited in note 14).
337 Microsoft Corporation's Proposed Final Judgment, United States v Microsoft Corp,
Civil
Action No 98-1232 (D DC filed May 10,2000).
338 United States v Microsoft Corp, 97 F Supp 2d 59,63 (D DC 2000).
332
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We find that the record supporting the remedy is insufficient to show
either that the remedy is reasonably likely to provide net economic
benefits or to provide greater benefits than alternative remedies.
Moreover, we show why even the theoretical arguments in favor of
vertical divestiture leave unaddressed important questions that cast
doubt on the optimality of divestiture. Part IV.A.2 then applies the
welfare analysis to the most prominent proposal for an alternative
structural remedy, the amicus filing by Litan et al, and finds that it, too,
leaves open basic questions that must at least be explored before that
remedy's absolute or comparative benefits can reasonably be judged.
We cannot, from our analysis, determine what kind of remedy is
best for resolving the Microsoft case. The data and analysis to support
such a calculation mirror the very information that we argue is necessary (and missing) in the arguments supporting divestiture. But we do
conclude that neither the government nor the amici have met the burden of showing their respective remedies to be the best available from
the standpoint of economic welfare. In the sections that follow, we will
explain where we think the divestiture proposals contain gaps in their
analyses that preclude reasonable assessment of their individual or
comparative effects on economic welfare.
A.

Structural Injunctions and Microsoft

The fundamental case for divestiture is well summarized by Herbert Hovenkamp, a distinguished antitrust scholar and an adviser to
the states in the Microsoft litigation. He has argued that divestiture is
the only remedy that would end Microsoft's alleged monopoly and
339
produce competition in the operating systems market. He stated: "If
the findings show significant abuse of monopoly power, then the appropriate remedy is to break up the monopoly-not to hobble the
''. Divestiture is thus presented as the
company or try to regulate it.
only way to remove both Microsoft's incentive and ability to engage in
anticompetitive conduct, and to avoid continuing government oversight. Indeed, advocates of a Microsoft divestiture along lines of "relevant markets" have attempted to establish in a principled way that
(1) any optimal remedy must address Microsoft's power in the operating systems market, because otherwise the company still has a monopoly that it has incentives to preserve; and (2) any behavioral remedy would be more intrusive than any structural remedy. On the first
point, for example, Eliot L. Spitzer, the Attorney General of New
York and the lead plaintiff of the states in the case, argued that Judge
339 Brinkley, A Microsoft Remedy, NY Times at C1 (cited in note 104) (quoting Herbert
Hovenkamp).
340 Id.
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Jackson's findings of fact focused the real problem on the operating
system: "It's an overwhelming opinion now that [the remedy] has to
address their monopoly in operating systems..' And on the second
point, Steven Salop among others has argued that a conduct remedy,
such as forcing the company to rewrite contracts or to modify its behavior, would be "too intrusive and regulatory." 2
Behavioral remedies-such as those suggested by Hal Varian of
the University of California, Berkeley, Robert Hall of Stanford University, or Nicholas Economides of New York University-more modestly seek to address Microsoft's ability to engage in anticompetitive
behavior. Stated differently, behavioral remedies concede that Microsoft's incentive to maintain market power in the operating systems
market would remain intact. Rather than "breaking up the monopoly,"
behavioral remedies would seek to curb Microsoft's ability to maintain its monopoly. Once it is decided that not only the ability, but also
the incentive, to engage in anticompetitive activities must be eliminated, then behavior modifications cannot even be considered. As we
will discuss below, however, it does not follow that all structural remedies eliminate the incentives to engage in anticompetitive activities.
By apparently convincing Judge Jackson that Microsoft's underlying incentives must be curbed, the government and supporting amici
were able to point the remedial process in one direction-namely, restoring competition in operating systems though divestiture. In the following sections we analyze first the vertical divestiture urged by the
government and ordered by the district court. We then examine the
more complete divestiture proposal filed by the amicus brief of Litan
and others.
1. The court-ordered vertical divestiture.
Under the district court's order, Microsoft is required to restructure itself from a vertically integrated firm into two, nonrival companies engaged in distinct yet complementary lines of business. One
company would produce operating systems software,(3 and the second
341 Joel Brinkley, ProsecutorsSeeking to Break the Grip of Windows
System, NY Times Al
(Nov 10, 1999).
342 Id.
343 An operating system is best defined by Judge Jackson in his findings of fact:

An "operating system" is a software program that controls the allocation and use of computer resources (such as central processing unit time, main memory space, disk space, and
input/output channels). The operating system also supports the functions of software programs, called "applications," that perform specific user-oriented tasks. The operating system
supports the functions of applications by exposing interfaces, called "application programming interfaces," or "APIs." These are synapses at which the developer of an application can
connect to invoke pre-fabricated blocks of code in the operating system. These blocks of
code in turn perform crucial tasks, such as displaying text on the computer screen. Because
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would produce application programs. " Implicit in this divestiture
remedy is the notion that each company would be prohibited from
engaging in the other's principal lines of business to prevent any overlap or re-integration that divestiture was designed to eliminate. Accordingly, this proposed remedy is not purely structural but also includes behavioral constraints. As a starting point for our critique, it is
important to note that the vertical divestiture ordered by the court
would not directly alter Microsoft's position in the operating systems
market. Accordingly, it would leave in place the very monopoly power
that the court found to create incentives for Microsoft to engage in
anticompetitive actions. The remedy would instead remove Microsoft's ability to act on its incentives in the particular manner that the
government alleged. And it would, in the government's view, spur
competition over time in the operating systems market because the
newly independent applications company would now have the incentive to maximize its markets by writing programs that would run
"cross platform" on operating systems other than Windows or other
Microsoft products."
a) Static efficiency gains. The first relevant point for the welfare

analysis of vertical divestiture in this case pertains to the expected
static gains for consumers. Would this form of vertical divestiture create better products or lower prices for consumers? The argument is
that the independent applications company will have the incentive to
make its products capable of running across multiple platforms and,
indeed, to encourage the proliferation of such competing platforms.
As Carl Shapiro argued on the government's behalf, the supplier of an
application benefits if the complementary operating systems on which
it runs become less expensive. -4' This divested applications company,
then, would theoretically act to erode the applications barrier for potential new entrants into the operating systems market. Consumers
would, in turn, benefit from competition between Windows and these
new entrants.

it supports applications while interacting more closely with the PC system's hardware, the
operating system is said to serve as a "platform."
Findingsof Fact, 84 F Supp 26 1 2 (D DC 1999).
344 The application programs market is sometimes also referred to as the "software for
computation" market, as it generally encompasses word processors, spreadsheets, presentation
aids, and personal productivity tools. See Chris E. Hall and Robert E. Hall, National Policy on
Microsoft:A Neutral Perspective,Version 2.0 1-2, available online at <http://www.NetEcon.com>
(visited Nov 28, 2000). Microsoft is best known for the applications programs that it sells in its
Microsoft Office suite, namely Word (a word processing program), Excel (a spreadsheet program), PowerPoint (a presentation aids program), Access (a database program), and Outlook (a
contact manager, email-fax handler, and address book program). Id.
345 See Romer Declaration at 91 5-9 (cited in note 34).
346 Shapiro Declaration at 10 (cited in note 115).
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But there are reasons to be less than sanguine that such competition will develop through the efforts of an application company born
of a vertically cleaved Microsoft. Making an application portable to
non-Windows operating systems has costs. Only some applications
may thus be ported, because the fixed costs of developing portability
will initially have to be recouped from the comparatively thin base of
users of the alternative operating system. Profitable opportunities for
porting may thus be limited. It is unclear, then, that these limited incentives to encourage complementary product development will cause
applications developers to stimulate substantial or meaningful competition among operating systems.
Moreover, the applications company will have a choice between
investing in porting an existing application beyond the dominant operating system or investing those same resources to develop a new application for the dominant platform. Depending on the relative costs,
it could be more sensible for the applications company to develop
something new that runs on Windows rather than making an existing
application portable to Linux. In the event that the firm's supply of
necessary programming talent is limited-for example, by the current
shortage of such skilled labor in the United States-even otherwise
profitable investments in porting may be foregone in the near term. It
is also unclear whether there are economies of scale in creating compatibility or portability. So, it is uncertain that many new applications
would be written to run across platforms, and, even if they are so written, it must at least be considered that the additional development
costs imposed by such portability would decrease the pace of applications innovation as compared with development of applications for a
single platform.
Therefore, before the government's theory that the applications
layer will stimulate competition at the operating system layer of the
market can be accepted, some clearer idea is needed of the relative
costs and benefits of portability versus new development for the
dominant platform. And, the reduction in operating system prices that
the applications company would expect from competition in that market must be included as part of that calculation. There has been substantial debate about the extent to which Microsoft engaged in monopoly pricing of Windows. If the price of Windows has been close to
the competitive level, the direct benefits to consumers will be less and
applications providers will be less likely to gain from writing for new
platforms or spurring competition among operating systems. Until the
potential static price gains from competition (or the threat thereof)
are determined, the incentives of the applications providers are unclear in the government's model. The implications are twofold: First,
the key comparative benefit of structural relief-that it will eliminate
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underlying anticompetitive incentives-might well not materialize.
And second, even if those incentives are eliminated, the static gains to
consumers are hard to gauge. The predicted reductions in price, increased choice of operating systems, and increased production of applications software may either not appear or even run in the wrong direction, especially if there were cost efficiencies to pre-divestiture integration or if the combined price of operating systems and applications increases because of double marginalization, described above in
Section II. These risks may or may not be large, but they cannot be ignored in making the case for divestiture.
b) Dynamic efficiency. There is also an unexamined question in
the district court's remedy with regard to dynamic efficiencies. The
linchpin of the vertical divestiture is the incentive the applications
company will have to invite and create cross-platform portability and
compatibility. Part of the benefit that the government argues will ensue is the static gain to consumers of lower prices for operating systems. But the other part of the predicted benefit involves innovation
that will occur because a reduced applications barrier to entry will
give entrepreneurs incentives to create new middleware and operating
systems. As Paul Romer states in his declaration for the government,
one of the key benefits sought by the government's remedy is, through
competition, to increase the rate of innovation in the software industry.34 7 For reasons already discussed above, it is unclear from the government's model what the incentives of applications providers will be
upon vertical divestiture or what the effect of divestiture will be on
the output of new applications software. But even assuming that OS
competition develops and that the supply of applications software increases, divestiture's effect on innovation may be temporary and ambiguous.
The impact may be temporary because, even with compatibility
across platforms, a firm may gain a decisive lead in the market if the
costs of such compatibility are high and applications developers begin
to perceive the opportunity to write for an emerging market winner
and thereby avoid those costs. The dynamic would become selfreinforcing between the complementary applications and operating
systems products. So, it cannot be taken as given that simultaneous, as
compared with sequential, competition at the operating systems level
is a stable or optimal equilibrium. Yet that assumption is present in the
arguments favoring divestiture.
9 (cited in note 34).
See, for example, id (basing his conclusion that Microsoft harmed the innovative process on the assumption that "competitive markets, are, on balance, the best mechanism for guiding
technology down a path that benefits consumers").
347
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The dynamic impact may be ambiguous because the courtordered remedy will handicap one major player in the innovation
race: the Microsoft operating systems company itself. To the extent
that an "operating system" is an evolving product, the line-of-business
restrictions that prevent applications from being incorporated into
Microsoft's operating system would appear to put Microsoft at a disadvantage to other operating system producers. There may be in the
v-ew of some parties an appealing "rough justice" to that result given
the district court's findings. There is also an economic argument that,
to the extent Microsoft can still use its lead in the installed base to
disadvantage competitors, the gains from new operating systems
would offset any chilled innovation by Microsoft. But two counterpoints need further examination before the limits on operating system
innovation by Microsoft itself are discounted.
First, consumers may have to incur switching costs to move to a
new operating system that contains desired innovations. If consumers
could obtain the same innovation without the switching costs, they
would be better off. So, it must be more explicitly taken into account
that any limits on Microsoft's innovation will cost consumers, and only
then can the net benefits of entry by new operating systems be properly assessed. Second, the degree of competition might in fact be better over time if Microsoft were allowed to develop Windows or another operating system without concern for the operating systemapplications boundary. Freezing the scope of the dominant technology
might allow inferior firms to enter the market and gain an installed
base, just by virtue of being permitted to include more functionality in
their products. Should any such firm gain dominance as a result of Microsoft's line-of-business restriction, then it is unlikely that the cause
of innovation will have been served. Even if such a firm does not succeed, consumers will still have been deprived of one important source
of applications innovation. The benefits of the line-of-business restrictions might exceed the costs, but that claim must be carefully demonstrated, not merely assumed. It thus, again, bears consideration
whether conduct remedies might achieve many of the dynamic benefits of vertical divestiture without running some of the risks. The
tradeoffs may be hard to predict, but they cannot be assumed away if
a reasonable case is to be made for a welfare-maximizing remedy.
c) Administrative cost. Because the vertical divestiture does not
directly eliminate Microsoft's incentives to act anticompetitively, the
district court's remedy relies heavily on conduct requirements to reduce the operating system company's ability to follow those incentives. A second welfare-related observation about the district court's
remedy is thus that its administrative costs cannot be presumed to be
lower than the costs of administering a purely behavioral injunction.

2001]

Antitrust Divestiturein Network Industries

As the government's own witnesses and the supporting amici have all
made clear, the efficacy of the court-ordered remedy depends upon
numerous conduct provisions. The "interim" conduct remedies go to
the heart of the violations that the court found Microsoft to have
committed: they force the integrated company to stop its anticompetitive actions pending divestiture and prohibit the operating systems
company from resuming certain kinds of conduct to preserve its monopoly once divestiture is complete."9 With respect to limiting Microsoft's ability to act on monopolistic incentives, the court's remedy
would, for example, prevent the operating systems company from: (1)
directly tying its operating system product to its own Internet product;
(2) entering into exclusionary agreements that promote its own Internet browser product; and (3) attempting to monopolize the Internet
browser market. The very oversight and enforcement difficulties that a
purely behavioral injunction would entail are thus present to some
degree in the "structural" remedy ordered by the court. To the extent
the structural remedy was sold in part as being easier to administer
and less regulatory than a pure conduct remedy, the distinction may
be weak or nonexistent.
Indeed, the regulatory aspects of the court's vertical divestiture
order are critical to reaching an objective determination of whether
divestiture is comparatively appropriate in this case. To begin with,
numerous definitional issues will likely emerge as focal points for litigation. Although the product markets for operating systems, applications, and Internet services can generally be defined, it would be complex to define with specificity the category of products that each divested company could or could not produce and sell.O It would be
very difficult to find a principled basis for distinguishing application
software functions from functions that may properly be considered, or
incorporated into, an operating system. '"' Robert Litan has noted that
"over the last ten years, [Microsoft has] expanded [its] operating system over time to include more and more things that used to be called
applications so that if we split the company
' 3 2 in two at this point in time,
we would potentially freeze technology. 5
It is, therefore, reasonable to think that under this divestiture
proposal, the three companies would, like the Baby Bell companies in
349

34).

Shapiro Declaration at 17 (cited in note 115); Romer Declaration at

41 (cited in note

See Jonathan Zittrain, The Un-Microsoft Un-Remedy: Law Can Prevent the Problem
That It Can'tPatch Later,31 Conn L Rev 1361, 1371 (1999) (It would be "a painful and difficult
job [to identify] what is currently properly part of the operating system and what is a separate
application.").
351 Robert W. Hahn, The Costs of Regulating Microsoft, 21 Reg 62,67 (Summer 1998).
352 Bob Edwards, U.S. vs. Microsoft- Likely Outcomes, Interview with Robert Litan, NPR's
Morning Edition (Feb 19,1999) ("Interview with Robert Litan").
350
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connection with the AT&T consent decree, constantly be in the position of petitioning the court to determine whether they could pursue
the development of certain products or whether they could obtain a
waiver of the line-of-business restrictions to sell certain products. This
process would require the court continually to oversee the decree. Indeed, the amicus brief of Litan and others raises precisely this concern
in arguing that a more stringent divestiture than the one the court ordered is necessary. They argue that line-of-business restrictions would
have to be imposed on the operating systems company and that nondiscrimination requirements would be necessary for the applications
company. 3 Both of these remedies would entail continuous monitoring (not to mention the definitional questions raised above).
Because vertical divestiture neither eliminates anticompetitive
incentives nor makes it less costly to stop the firm from acting on
those incentives, it is not necessarily more effective than a conduct
remedy. To be sure, the element of direct vertical control that can exist
within a single corporation is absent, and the incentives of the applications company to cooperate with the operating systems company
might be different than under integration, but the theoretical advantage of structural relief over behavioral relief becomes much less obvious when it does not strike at the underlying incentives themselves
or do away with regulatory oversight: 4
In sum, then, the remedy ordered by the district court leaves
open several important questions. The record supporting the remedy
does not take into account the comparative costs and benefits of alternative structural and behavioral remedies sufficiently to know that
vertical divestiture is the best option. Moreover, within each category
of gains on which remedies should be compared-static, dynamic, and
administrative efficiency -there are important gaps in the analysis
that prevent a complete assessment of either the absolute or comparative benefits of vertical divestiture of Microsoft.

353 Litan Brief at 46-48 (cited in note 14).
354 For example, what Microsoft had once attempted to achieve through vertical integration
into the Internet browser market it could now attempt to achieve through vertical contracts with
other providers of Internet browsers. Microsoft could potentially reach agreements with the
companies owning Navigator and Internet Explorer, pursuant to which Microsoft would promise
such companies the types of marketing advantages that it had offered ISPs and others in exchange for their agreement to make their systems proprietary to the Windows operating system.
This solution would not prevent software writers from writing applications to run on top of the
browsers, nor would it prevent the evolution of server-based computing delivered through the
Internet. It might, however, preserve the market power that Microsoft possesses with respect to
PC operating systems.
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2. The amicus "complete divestiture" proposal.

The Litan et al amici filed a remedy proposal with the district
court that evinced concern that the government's vertical divestiture
proposal would neither eliminate Microsoft's anticompetitive incentives nor create competition in the operating systems market.55 We
will assume arguendo that the Litan amici are correct in their assertion that a fundamental goal of antitrust remedies should be to introduce competition where monopoly previously stood. 356 There are sev-

eral respects in which the Litan proposal needs further elaboration
and evidence before it can be deemed the welfare-maximizing remedy
choice. Litan and his colleagues clearly recognize that fact. They acknowledge that, while they believe their proposal to be the best one, a

careful process of evidence and review is necessary before that conclusion can be confirmed. 7 Below we address some questions that
their brief raises for a comparative welfare analysis of divestiture

alternatives, and we identify some of the specific evidentiary inquiries
that a court would have to pursue before adopting the amicus proposal.

The Litan proposal is that Microsoft should, first, divest vertically
in the manner ordered by the district court' The operating systems
company should then further divest horizontally into three identical,
competing firms.3" They call this remedy "full" divestiture. 3 This remedy would thus directly end the operating system monopoly and
thereby replace incentives to protect market power with incentives to

355 Litan Brief at 1 (cited in note 14).
356 We note only that the proposition is not self-evident, especially where network effects
and Schumpeterian dynamics may lead to competition for a market, and not merely for market
share. The goal of the court should certainly be to eliminate the anticompetitive behavior, but
how far the court should go to foster entry when a change in the monopolist's behavior does not
itself spark competition might be a different question. We agree that competition should be the
court's goal, but we also note that it will not necessarily be within the court's remedial purview.
357 Litan Brief at 52-53 (cited in note 14).
358 See id at 46.
359 See id at 49-66. Others have also made similar proposals. For example, Steven Salop,
Craig Romaine, and Robert Levinson have advocated such a multidimensional divestiture.
Robert J. Levinson, R. Craig Romaine, and Steven C. Salop, Draft, The Flawed Fragmentation
Critiqueof StructuralRemedies in the Microsoft Case 2 (Charles River Jan 2000), available online
at <http://www.crai.com> (visited Nov 21, 2000). Similarly, Thomas Lenard has proposed a vertical divestiture of applications combined with a horizontal divestiture of the operating systems
business. Nevertheless, his proposed hybrid remedy differs slightly from the one generally put
forward. He would let Microsoft bundle as many applications as it wanted with the operating
system before divestiture, so that competition would automatically occur among those applications upon division of the operating systems company into separate, competing firms. Thomas M.
Lenard, Creating Competition in the Market for Operating Systems: A Structural Remedy for Microsoft 27 (Progress & Freedom Foundation Jan 2000), available online at <http://www.pff.org/
remedies.htm> (visited Nov 21,2000).
360 Litan Brief at 45,49 (cited in note 14).
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compete for market share. This is an important distinction from the
vertical divestiture that the court ordered, and moreover may create a

greater difference between "full" divestiture and vertical divestiture
than the difference that exists between vertical divestiture and conduct remedies. But while the amicus proposal might resolve some of
the potential flaws with the court-ordered relief, it raises its own set of
concerns that must be addressed before the economic welfare effects
of "complete" divestiture can be assessed with sufficient confidence to
order such relief.
a) Static efficiency. The first question concerns the static gains to
consumers. On one hand, the horizontal competition that would result
from this type of break-up could lead to lower prices for the Windows
operating system. On the other hand, however, this remedy could fracture the Windows standard and dissipate the consumer-side network
externality. Although the new companies would all begin competing
with the same operating system, over time they would be free to develop different, competing versions that could eliminate the convenience that Microsoft has created with a single, standardized Windows
operating system. Robert Litan, for example, has conceded that "a lot
of consumers like the fact that there is only one effective operating

system right now," and "[t]hey don't want to have to go shop for software that may only work on one of the operating systems and not
both."3 .
If there are network effects and economies of scale in software
production, those forces might drive consumers and software writers
to embrace a single operating system -not three or more. The result
could be (1) a rush by the competitors to standardize or otherwise become compatible, (2) a battle for the market by competitors that results in the network's "tipping" towards one of the three firms, or (3)
product differentiation that fractures the network externality and
harms consumers. The situation is not hypothetical. Consider the trend
recently exhibited by the Linux operating system. Currently, there are
about fifteen English language versions of the Linux operating system
for an Intel-based PC. , Although each version is based on the same
freely available source code, the differences among versions are large
enough that there is no guarantee that a commercial application for
Linux will run on all of them 3 To ensure that developers will be able
to create applications for Linux that will install and execute on any of
the Linux operating system versions, a Linux Standard Base commit-

361
362
363

Interview with Robert Litan (cited in note 352).
Jason Levitt, Achilles' Heel: Linux Libraries,Information Wk *1 (Jan 24, 2000).
Id.
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tee has already been formed to define a standard set of guidelines and
application programming interfaces.'
Steven Salop, Craig Romaine, and Robert Levinson have criticized the thesis that the creation of multiple Windows OS companies
would fragment the Windows operating system." ' Given the enormous
installed base of the Windows operating system,6 they argue that
"[a]lthough the new Windows companies subsequently could choose
to drastically deviate from this standard and create highly incompatible products, they are unlikely to do so." They first argue that network effects give consumers and developers a strong interest in maintaining a unitary Windows standard.'w Because of switching costs,
"unless a new operating system is significantly superior to Windows, a
user would be unwilling to switch to it. 3 69 They posit that the three
competing Windows operating system companies would have incentives to remain compatible with each other because of the value that
consumers and developers place on compatibility.' ° Otherwise, they
argue, developers, sellers of computers, and consumers would punish a
company that deviated from the standard. 7 '
Furthermore, the authors propose that the costs of developing
applications that fit with the new Windows operating system products,
porting costs, would remain low for various reasons: (1) the operating
system products will be identical to start with,37" so porting costs would
not be an issue at the time of the breakup;. (2) each operating system
company would have strong incentives to be backwards compatible
with earlier versions of Windows products;. (3) each operating system
company faces incentives for long-term compatibility, and because the
standard APIs would not be rewritten, "only those few routines that
benefit from the use of [each new OS company's] proprietary extensions would be affected";... (4) each operating system would start from
the same common code base and a common hardware platform;376 and
(5) the OS companies and standard-setting bodies would have incen-
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Id.
Levinson, Romaine, and Salop, The Flawed FragmentationCritique at 1-7 (cited in note

359).
Id at
Id.
368 Id at
369 Id at
370 Id at
371 Id at
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373 Id at
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tives to coordinate their development efforts. ' They conclude that the
"fragmentation criticism actually amounts to an attack on any remedy
that causes operating system competition. It is competition, not the
structural remedy, that allegedly leads to fragmentationY. 8
Salop and his colleagues might be right, but there are important
considerations to the contrary. First, the concern about fragmentation
is not an attack on competition itself, particularly if competition is sequential rather than simultaneous. Indeed, the costs of fragmentation
and the network benefits from compatibility might be precisely what
make the standard form of competition less likely than Schumpeterian
competition in software markets. Simultaneous competition is great if
it endures and produces benefits that offset any possible fragmentation costs. It may also, as Salop and his colleagues contend, create
ways around the fragmentation problem. But it might not, especially if
one of the three Windows companies gains a significant market lead.
The concern about a court-ordered divestiture is that it could create
fragmentation costs without any offsetting benefits that endure long
enough to compensate consumers for the lost network externality.
Second, a common code basis is no guarantee that a standard will
not fragment. All it takes for fragmentation to become a concern (as it
has for Linux, Unix, or Java) is for each new OS company to make a
few scattered changes to the two million lines of code in Windows
2000. It is not necessarily the case that only "drastic" departures from
the Windows standard impose unacceptable costs. Rather, any risk
that a program has departed from the standard requires costly inquiries on the part of consumers and developers as to how far the departure has gone, and what its implications are9 A little bit of incompatibility can add up to drastic costs.
Third, formal standard-setting bodies are unlikely to be of much
help in formalizing the Windows standard. Such bodies are reluctant
to make any systems with a significant proprietary component into
standards. Java, for example, has not been adopted as an international
standard because key components of Java are copyrighted by Sun Midomain.38
crosystems-only about 30 percent of Java is in the public
377 Id at 20-21 ("Such supplementary cooperation may take the form of a formal standardsetting process, administered by either an impartial industry group or a computer industry group
consisting of interested applications, operating systems, and hardware producers. Such a group
may formally adopt existing improvements to the Windows standard as industry standard.").

378

Id at 3.

See, for example, Michael A. Cusumano and David B. Yoffie, What Netscape Learned
from Cross-Software Development, Committee of the ACM 72, 74-75 (Oct 1999) ("[T]ailoring
even small amounts of code to specific platforms can create a logistics nightmare, because the
different teams and code bases have to be synchronized.").
380 Ellis Booker, Licensees to Sun: Let Go of Java, or We Will Walk, Internet Wk *1 (Jan 10,
379
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Only if a system is in the public domain, like the "C" programming
language, will a standards body be willing to take it over.
What remains of the Salop argument is the theory that network
effects-the high value that everyone places on having one standardwill be powerful enough to prevent fragmentation. The history of operating systems, however, shows that every system controlled by more
than one company has struggled with fragmentation. Unix, which began as one version of code and which had, and still has, an enormous
installed base of users, fragmented into different versions in the late
1980s despite massive efforts to standardize.3 8' As already mentioned,
Linux faces worries about fragmentation, despite the strong incentives
that would seem to exist to avoid that result in order to foster applications development.' Java developers also worry about fragmentation,
their concerns heightened by Sun's decision to abandon its efforts to
work with official standards bodies to provide a Java standard; Sun
will continue to police Java compatibility itself through its copyrights,
despite opposition from other developers, including IBM, Hewlett
Packard, and Microsoft, which have threatened to move forward with
their own version. 3 There is at least some good evidence to suggest
that network effects might well not be enough to maintain the standard in the case of the Microsoft operating system.
The fragmentation suffered by Unix, Java, and Linux has not
been fatal, and those competitors have continued to be viable in the
market. Fragmentation reflects a trade-off between innovation and
standardization; there are benefits from fragmentation as well as increased costs. But there is a difference between letting that trade-off
be made in the marketplace and making it by court order or regulation. Windows is a dominant operating system today in part because it
offers consumers the benefits of opting out of the "fragmentation"
problem. Depriving the market of that alternative is not something to
be done without careful analysis of offsetting benefits.

381 See, for example, Tom Quinlan, AT&T Seeking Partnersin Unix Labs, InfoWorld 3 (Dec
24, 1990) ("In yet another effort to unite the various factions backing different versions of Unix,
AT&T is negotiating with Unix vendors to sell as much as 40 percent of its Unix Systems Laboratory, which controls the development and licensing of the Unix operating system."); Philip J.
Gill, Finally,a Binary UNIX PC Standard, Datamation 59, 60 (Dec 15, 1990) ("Lotus Development Corp. now supports Lotus 1-2-3 for three versions of UNIX."); Matthew May, Customers
Hunt the Missing Link, The Times (Nov 5, 1990) ("[R]idiculously, there are several different and
incompatible versions of Unix, reducing the effectiveness of the concept. The industry has
formed two camps: Unix International, headed by AT&T, and the Open Software Foundation,
dominated by IBM.").
382 See text accompanying notes 361-72.
383 Carol Sliwa, Sun Drops Java Standard Effort: Decision Spurs Mixed Reaction Among
Users, ComputerWorld 85 (Dec 13, 1999); Geoff Friesen, What's Brewing in Java's Future?,
JavaWorld at *1 (July 1999).
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A second concern raised by the Litan proposal involves productive efficiencies. Even if fragmentation does not deprive consumers of
interoperability, that interoperability might come at a cost. As Litan
has himself stated, horizontal division of the operating systems business might "slow down the development of application software because those applications guys are going to have to write three or four
versions [one for each] operating system."3' For example, in designing
a browser to work across different platforms, developers would have

to incur a number of different types of costs:
Netscape engineers found that doing cross-platform development
well requires minimizing several costs, or "penalties." One is the
additional time and human effort needed to create abstracted,
cross-platform code. A second involves tailoring at least some
code for different platforms which is almost always necessary.

And a third comes from testing and debugging, as engineers
spend extra time making sure features work properly on different platforms.3"
One way to avoid the problem of degraded interoperability would be

to allow competitors in the operating systems market to collaborate
on the promulgation of vendor-neutral standards, such as TCP/IP.

For example, all the new vertically integrated firms could agree on the
compatibility of the operating system and so compete on the basis of
one common standard.
Of course, the recommendation to allow collaborative standard

setting among competitors in the operating systems market would introduce its own set of antitrust questions: A substantial body of law

exists on the question of whether standard setting among horizontal
competitors enhances efficiency and benefits consumer welfare or instead facilitates collusion or the exclusion of entrants. 7 It would be
384 Interview with Litan (cited in note 352). The chief information officer of a web-based office supply company expressed this concern following the issuance of Judge Jackson's findings of
fact:

If all of a sudden I start losing the interaction between applications and operating systems,
I'm going to see an increase in support levels and an increase in complexity as we try to
keep them interoperating ....Once we do that, our costs are going up. The profitability of
the company could be affected.
Mitch Wagner, What's Next Microsoft -Judge's FindingsRaise InteroperabilityFears,Internet Wk
194 (Nov 15, 1999) (quoting Mark Resh, Standard Forms, Inc).
385 Cusumano and Yoffie, What Netscape Learned at 77 (cited in note 379) ("Several Netscape engineers estimated there was at least a 15 percent-20 percent human effort and time penalty in design and coding (excluding integration and system testing), based on the extra human
and computing resources needed to develop cross-platform code, rather than, say,just a Windows
or just a Unix version of the product.").
386 See Wagner, What's Next Microsoft,Internet Wk at 194 (cited in note 384).
387 See Lawrence A. Sullivan and Warren S. Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated
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wrong to assume that collaborative standard setting on subsequent
versions of the Windows operating system (or its successor) would be
out of reach of public or private antitrust litigation. Even if such standard settings were genuinely competitively neutral, the opportunity
for strategic, private antitrust litigation would exist.
b) Dynamic efficiency. There are also fundamental questions
about the effect on innovation and dynamic efficiency that could be
expected from the Litan amicus proposal of complete divestiture. If
the Windows standard stays coherent enough not to impose costs on
consumers, competition among the newly formed OS competitors will
arguably create static price benefits for consumers. But such cohesion
might well exacerbate rather than reduce the applications barrier to
entry for non-Windows operating systems. If applications providers
know that the biggest return will come from writing for Windows, and
that there is little price reduction in operating systems to be had from
entry by other (non-Windows) system producers (price reductions
that would increase demand for complementary applications), then it
is unclear that innovation outside the Windows platform will be
helped by complete divestiture. Put another way, if the remedy merely
replaces the Windows monopoly with a Windows oligopoly that sells
operating systems at lower prices, then the benefits for non-Windows
operating systems seem improbable. Depending on the costs of creating portability, then, the effect of the Litan amicus proposal on the applications barrier to entry is not certain to be positive.
If, on the other hand, the Windows standard fractures, then one of
two things may happen. As already discussed, consumers might suffer
a loss of network benefit, but they might receive a compensating
benefit in the form of innovation by new entrants into the operating
system and middleware markets. On the other hand, one Windows
company might gain a lead and reconstitute the very network monopoly that divestiture was designed to end. That result is not necessarily
bad, because the interim competition might lead to a much better and
less expensive product. But, at a minimum, the relationship between
fragmentation, standardization, and dynamic benefits warrants further
consideration before a complete divestiture remedy could be reasonably adopted in Microsoft.
c) Administrative costs. Finally, the administrative costs of the
Litan et al proposal are unlikely to be negligible. The amici note that
their remedy will entail "some minimum conduct restraints during the
near term."' These conduct restraints pertain to recombination
among the four companies created by full divestiture, nonHandbook § 5.4 at 218-23 (West 2000).
388 Litan Brief at 56 (cited in note 14).
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discrimination in licensing, limits on hiring employees from other
"WinCos," and cross-ownership among the four companies by top
management. Even if one assumes these conduct restraints can be
efficiently and effectively enforced, however, the complete divestiture
proposal also requires the very difficult initial task of dividing the
Windows company into comparable thirds. If this task were not well
accomplished, much of the remedy's force would be lost. On the other
hand, in an industry where, as the amici themselves argue," the important assets are "informational" and intellectual rather than tangible,
the lines along which a company should be horizontally divided are
more difficult to discern. Administering this initial division could entail protracted and heavy costs that should not be ignored in comparing remedies.
In sum, Litan et al propose an interesting remedy worthy of careful consideration. But, despite the detailed argument they present, and
the efforts they make to place "complete divestiture in comparative
perspective with alternative remedies," the amici nonetheless leave
out important considerations that must be addressed before the case
for their proposal is complete. Litan et al themselves recognize this
point. They describe their proposal as a "sketch"' 9' and make an observation with which we wholly agree: "only careful and thorough review
of this and the prominent alternative remedy proposals ...

can pro-

vide sufficient supporting detail to assure the court that this (or indeed any) remedy proposal is best suited to meet the major remedy
goals."'3n The district court did not engage in such a process, with the
result that neither the absolute nor comparative economic welfare effects of the remedy it adopted, or of any other remedy before the
court, has been sufficiently assessed.
V. THE AT&T DIVESTITURE AS A MODEL FOR MICROSOFT

Before Microsoft, the most recent use of antitrust law to restructure an American industry was the government's lawsuit against
AT&T that culminated in the 1982 settlement leading to the breakup
of the Bell System in 1984. Implicitly and explicitly, the Bell breakup
has been touted as the blueprint for Microsoft, so much so that pieces
resulting from the company's proposed divestiture have been dubbed
"Baby Bills" after the "Baby Bells. 393 Professors Litan, Noll, Nordhaus, and Scherer urged in their amicus brief:
389

Id.
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Id at 58.

391 Id at 52.
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Id at 52-53.
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See, for example, Editorial, Open Windows, LA Times B4 (Jan 11, 1999).
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To the extent that the Court ... sees a structural remedy as pre-

senting greater risks than a conduct decree, we believe that it can
learn from, and be comforted by, the extensive experience that
has been gained in other markets that have been deregulated
over the past two decades, or where structural antitrust relief has
been imposed (notably, in the case of the breakup of AT&T).,
They regard the AT&T divestiture as the primary cause of a host of
beneficial developments:
[C]ritics of the AT&T breakup have been proved wrong at virtually every turn. The breakup now is widely acknowledged to have
unleashed powerful forces of competition in long-distance telephone markets; to have induced policy makers to recognize (in
the Telecommunications Act of 1996) that not even local telephone service is subject to natural monopoly; and perhaps most
important, to have accelerated innovation in telecommunications,
especially in the rapid technical development and deployment of
fiber optic cable that has facilitated the rapid growth of the
Internet.9 '
Before the AT&T divestiture is casually taken to support similar
remedies in other cases and other industries, it is worth examining
more critically the arguments in the excerpt quoted above. We think
the above-quoted assessment is too sanguine and that courts should
be uneasy about using the AT&T divestiture as a model for formulating remedies in the Microsoft, or any other, case. Our point is not that
the MFJ's net effects were harmful or that the decree was in some way
a failure compared with the alternatives for relief in that case. The
substantial debate on those issues is outside the scope of this Article.
Rather, our point is that, even if the MFJ did produce net benefits, it
also entailed very high, unanticipated costs. The AT&T case shows not
only that the predictions of antitrust litigants and judges about the future of a technologically dynamic industry are often wrong, but also
that enforcing and interpreting a complex decree can be administratively costly and potentially harmful to consumer welfare. The prospect of such costs counsels more caution than comfort in adopting a
structural remedy, and requires that a compelling case be made for the
benefits that society can expect from such relief.
Litan Brief at 24 (cited in note 14).
Id at 25. For a similarly optimistic assessment of the relevance of the AT&T decree to
the proposed divestiture of Microsoft, see Joel Brinkley, Microsoft Cites AT& T to Fight Breakup,
NY Times C4 (May 15, 2000); Richard Gilbert, A Better Breakup Than AT&T's, NY Times A31
(May 10, 2000).
396 The MFJ was issued as a consent decree in United States v AT&T Co, 552 F Supp 131
(D DC 1982), affd as Marylandv United States, 460 US 1001 (1983).
394

395

The University of Chicago Law Review

[68:1

A. The Antitrust Suit
In 1974 the Department of Justice brought suit against AT&T7
arguing that AT&T had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by us-

ing its dominant position in telephone equipment and local exchange
service to monopolize the markets for long-distance telecommunications and telephone equipment. The government argued that AT&T
had systematically refused interconnection to its long-distance competitors, " had abused the regulatory process in protecting its monopoly,' and had engaged in predatory pricing in long-distance markets.,°
The Department of Justice was concerned that such predation could
continue because cross-subsidies could flow from the local telephone
monopolies to long-distance services.
The suit ended with a consent decree finalized in 1984. This decree, known as the Modification of Final Judgment ("MFJ"), 3' imposed both structural and behavioral constraints on AT&T. The prin-

cipal structural component was vertical divestiture on a massive scale.
Before divestiture, AT&T consisted of three main parts: (1) local exchange companies that provided about 80 percent of U.S. local telephone service; (2) AT&T Long Lines, providing almost all U.S. longdistance service; and (3) Western Electric, including Bell Laboratories,
which provided research and manufacturing of almost all of AT&T's
equipment.4 The MFJ required AT&T to divest itself of its local ex-

change operations, from which were created seven new regional Bell
operating companies ("RBOCs"). °5 These were Ameritech, Bell AtModification of Final Judgment, 552 F Supp at 139.
398 AT&T, 524 F Supp at 1353-54. See also Paul W. MacAvoy and Kenneth Robinson, Winning by Losing: The AT&T Settlement and Its Impact on Telecommunications,1 Yale J Reg 1, 1417 (1983).
399 AT&T,524 F Supp at 1356.
400 Id at 1356-57, 1364-65. For a harsh critique of the Department of Justice's theory of
pricing "without regard to cost" as predatory, see MacAvoy and Robinson, 1 Yale J Reg at 26-27
(cited in note 398) ("[P]ricing without regard to cost is a most peculiar standard to apply in an
industry that is required by regulation to deviate from cost-based pricing.").
401 See Modification of Final Judgment, 552 F Supp at 165, 188; United States v Western
Electric Co, 673 F Supp 525,531-32 (D DC 1987), affd 894 F2d 1387 (DC Cir 1990). See also Kellogg, Thorne, and Huber, Federal Telecommunications Law at §§ 4.4-4.5 (cited in note 111);
MacAvoy, The Failureof Antitrust at 16-19 (cited in note 221) (stating that although the government's case was weak, Judge Greene placed the burden of disproving the monopolization
charges on AT&T).
402 See Modification of Final Judgment, 552 F Supp at 131.
403 The settlement "modified" a 1956 consent decree into which the government had entered with AT&T. Id at 135-38. See also United States v Western Electric Co, 1956 Trade Cases
(CCH) 68,246 (D NY 1956) (original decree).
404 See, for example, Hausman and Sidak, 109 Yale L J at 427 (cited in note 219).
405 As there was to be no competition between the RBOCs, it theoretically did not matter
how many of them there were. The MFJ states that "nothing in this Modification of Final Judgment shall require or prohibit the consolidation of the ownership of the BOCs into any particular number of entities." Modification of Final Judgment § I(A)(4), 552 F Supp at 227. AT&T was
397
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lantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, Southwestern Bell, and US
West. To create the RBOCs, AT&T was required to transfer assets to
the RBOCs and give them "on a royalty-free basis, all existing patents and all patents issued for a period of five years following approval of the proposed decree,"' ' as well as other technical information.
The theory behind the divestiture was that AT&T could, absent
such a remedy, use revenues from monopoly local exchange service to
cross-subsidize activities in other markets.a The RBOCs, having been
divested from AT&T, were thus barred from entering the long-

distance service or information services markets,O and from manufacturing or selling telephone equipment."' The RBOCs were, moreover,
required to provide every long-distance carrier equal access to local

exchange networks."'
The decree contained several mechanisms for adjustment of its
provisions over time. One such mechanism was a triennial review of
the line-of-business restrictions on the RBOCs. 2 Because of a series
left to decide how many RBOCs there would be along the lines of administrative convenience,
noting that a single RBOC would be at greater risk of antitrust attack but that an RBOC needed
to be spread over several states to protect from state-level regulatory uncertainty. See Kellogg,
Thorne, and Huber, FederalTelecommunications Law at § 4.7.3 (cited in note 111).
406 Section 1(A)(1) of the decree required AT&T to transfer enough assets to the RBOCs
to allow them to operate. AT&T was not compensated for the transfers. Kellogg, Thorne, and
Huber, FederalTelecommunications Law at § 4.9.1 (cited in note 111).
407 Modification of Final Judgment, 552 F Supp at 177. Judge Greene ultimately ruled that
"all" patents included patents for services that the RBOCs were barred from entering. United
States v Western Electric Co, 569 F Supp 1057,1086 (D DC 1983).
408 To cross-subsidize means to set prices below average incremental cost. William J. Baumol and J. Gregory Sidak, Toward Competition in Local Telephony 62 (MIT & AEI 1994). The
Department of Justice's theory that local exchange service had been used to cross-subsidize
long-distance service was wrong. Regulators anxious to keep politically sensitive local telephone
services charges low had directed that cross-subsidies flow in the other direction, particularly
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. See Hausman and Sidak, 109 Yale L J at 428 n 23 (cited in note
219) ("In actuality, long distance service had long cross-subsidized local service at the direction
of regulators."); Temin and Weber, 8 U Fla J L & Pub Pol at 211-12 (cited in note 110)
("[M]assive subsidies had been flowing from long distance to local service.").
40 Information services were defined as "the offering of a capability for generating,... utilizing, or making available information which may be conveyed via telecommunications." Modification of Final Judgment § IV(J), 552 F Supp at 229. See also Kellogg, Thorne, and Huber, Federal Telecommunications Law at § 6.4 (cited in note 111). These services included data processing, electronic publishing, voice answering services, email, videotext, and electronic Yellow Pages.
The restriction was lifted in 1991. See United States v Western Electric Co, 767 F Supp 525, 529
(D DC 1991), affd 993 F2d 1572 (DC Cir 1993).
410 See Kellogg, Thorne, and Huber, Federal Telecommunications Law at § 6.5 (cited in note
111). Judge Greene added a provision that allowed the RBOCs to provide customer premises
equipment though not to other carriers. Modification of Final Judgment § VIII(A), 552 F Supp at
231.
411 Modification of Final Judgment, 552 F Supp at 227. See Kellogg, Thorne, and Huber,
FederalTelecommunicationsLaw at § 5 (cited in note 111).
412 Modification of Final Judgment, 552 F Supp at 195 ("The Department of Commerce has

The University of Chicago Law Review

[68:1

of appeals to the D.C. Circuit and subsequent remands to Judge
Greene's court, the first triennial review was still not completed in
1993, when the third review was due. The second triennial review
never took place."'
A second adjustment mechanism was the MFJ's waiver process
by which the RBOCs could request the court's permission to enter
new markets and be relieved of their line-of-business restrictions. Under Section VIII(C) of the decree, the RBOCs were entitled to have a
particular line-of-business restriction lifted if they could show that
"there [was] no substantial possibility" that an RBOC could use its
monopoly power to impede competition in the market that it proposed to enter. When a modification of the MFJ was uncontested,
Section VII of the decree governed, and the modification was to be
granted if it was found to be in the "public interest" (that is, consistent
with the Tunney Act) 45
B.

Costs and Benefits of the MFJ

The decree is often credited with furthering the growth of competition in long-distance services. Since 1984, residential rates have fallen
from around thirty-five or forty cents per minute to discounted prices
of five cents. Average prices for long-distance service have fallen at
least 50 percent between 1984 and the present. 416 In addition, competition among long-distance providers after divestiture led to rapid deployment of fiber optic cable that later formed the infrastructure capable of handling the explosion of data traffic sparked by the Internet.
While these benefits are substantial, we note two things. First, it is
likely that some of those benefits would have resulted notwithstanding the MFJ. Fiber deployment, for example, began prior to the MFJ.
Although it would likely have proceeded more slowly absent the decree's equal access rule that opened up long-distance markets, the "fiber revolution" was under way prior to the decision to break up the
Bell System. 41' For another example, the decline in long-distance prices
is at least partly attributable to regulatory decisions by the FCC relating to subsidy flows from long-distance to local service. The FCC "rebalanced" local and long-distance rates by creating a "subscriber line
charge" ("SLC") on consumers' local bills to replace subsidies taken
undertaken to report to the Court every three years concerning the continuing need for the restrictions imposed by the decree.").
413 See Hausman and Sidak, 109 Yale L J at 429 (cited in note 404).
414 Modification of Final Judgment, 552 F Supp at 195,225,231.
415 See United States v Western Electric Co, 900 F2d 283,305-07 (DC Cir 1990).
416 MacAvoy, The Failureof Antitrust at 77 (cited in note 221).
417 See Howard Shelanski, Competition and Deployment of New Technology in US Telecommunications,2000 U Chi Legal F 85,105-08.
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from long-distance revenues. The effect of the SLC was to raise the customer's monthly bill for exchange access and enable long-distance carriers to reduce rates accordingly.18' In addition, at least some of the
long-distance price change is attributable not to the AT&T divestiture
but to the FCC's decision to reduce access charges that long-distance
companies pay to local carriers. ' Indeed, the FCC imposed price caps
on the Bell operating companies in their sale of access to interexchange
carriers transporting interstate toll calls. The effect of that policy was to
force down over time the cost of the largest single input used by the interexchange carriers in the supply of interstate long-distance service.
That reduction in cost reduced long-distance prices, though not by as
great a percentage as costs fell. More generally, Robert Crandall has
argued that vertical divestiture was not a necessary condition for the
growth of competition, and notes that it therefore was rejected by
Canada in bringing competition to its own telephone service sector. '
Second, the MFJ had costs, even if one thinks those costs were
eventually offset. Consider first the administrative burdens of the decree; it is particularly important to consider the waiver process noted
above. In 1993, the average waiver request had been pending for
thirty-six months, although the Department of Justice opposed relief
in only 4 of the 266 requests. By 1994, the period had grown to 48.3
months, though 96 percent of all waiver requests that had been ruled
on had been approved by the court."'
Another category of costs involves inefficiencies of the line-ofbusiness restrictions on the RBOCs, which reduced competition in
long-distance telecommunications and in telecommunications equip42
ment manufacturing by excluding the RBOCs from those markets.
Jerry Hausman has shown empirically that consumer welfare fell by
billions of dollars per year because these restrictions delayed the introduction of new telecommunications services. For example, the price
of cellular long-distance service fell by about 25 percent when the
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MFJ's restrictions were finally removed.424 These costs must be taken
into account in assessing the MFJ's lessons for future cases.
Not all the benefits of the post-divestiture era can thus be tied to
the divestiture decree. And the decree must also be charged with some
costs, some of which are counterfactual and easy to overlook or dismiss. But even if the decree produced net benefits, and even if those
benefits could be tied to resolution of the government's antitrust case,
the correct comparison for remedial purposes is not between the postdivestiture era and the monopoly era, but between the postdivestiture era and what would have resulted under alternative remedies. That counterfactual analysis is hard to do, but it might well lead
to a very different assessment of whether the MFJ is a welcome or a
warning for similar relief in Microsoft.
VI. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S
APPROACH TO REMEDIES

After the drama of the Microsoft trial, two puzzling questions
linger concerning the remedial phase of the case. The first concerns
the mapping of the government's theory of liability into a theory of
remedies: Why did the government's ultimate request for permanent
injunctive relief bear no resemblance to its initial request for preliminary injunctive relief? The government requested in its motion for
preliminary injunction that Microsoft provide Netscape's web
browser, Navigator, mandatory access (at an unspecified price) to the
Windows platform.425 Yet the Department of Justice did not seek to enjoin preliminarily the other acts by Microsoft that eventually formed
the very foundation of the government's theory of the case.
Given the government's ultimate decision to propose divestiture
as the permanent injunctive remedy in the Microsoft case, why did the
government not pursue with greater clarity and vigor a preliminary injunctive remedy to stem the putative tide of consumer welfare losses
upon which the divestiture of Microsoft is predicated? Stated differently, why did the preliminary remedy sought by the government ultimately bear little relationship to its subsequent theory of the case?
Second, why did the government not seek a broader, comparative
inquiry at the remedies phase of the trial, or itself give more complete
public consideration to alternative resolutions? For example, why did
the government exclude the possibility of monetary remedies from its
424 Jerry Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommunications,
Brookings Papers on Econ Activity: Microeconomics 1, 13-24 (1997).
425 The government later dropped even this request for injunctive relief. As one of us noted
in 1999, this remedy would have raised serious constitutional questions under the First and Fifth
Amendments. See Lipsky and Sidak, 51 Stan L Rev at 1223-25, 1227-31, 1240-48 (cited in note

3).
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theory of the case? One possible explanation is the belief that Judge
Jackson lacked the authority to order damages (or a fine of equivalent
magnitude) in the government's civil case against Microsoft. Similarly,
one might argue, the availability of equitable remedies such as disgorgement and restitution is unclear in light of the fact that the government's cause of action is based on the civil provisions of the
Sherman Act or similar state antitrust statutes, and not general principles of equity.
This explanation, however, is not entirely satisfactory either as a
matter of law or of public policy. As a matter of antitrust law, courts
have observed that restitution might be an appropriate remedy in certain cases. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, for example, observed in 1999 that "a typical restitution or disgorgement
scenario might fit within the contours of § 16 [of the Clayton Act],
such as where plaintiffs seek to deprive antitrust violators of the benefits of their illegal conduct. 26 Moreover, although the government in
the Microsoft case did not expressly request a monetary remedy in its
prayer for relief, its complaint nonetheless did expressly pray the court
to "enter such additional relief as it may find just and proper., 4 " The
Supreme Court has likened the remedy of divestiture to the remedy of
restitution.2 It is not clear why "just and proper" relief of undefined
form should encompass divestiture but not restitution.
As a matter of policy, if, as nearly every observer maintains, the
Microsoft case is the most portentous antitrust case in several decades,
then an innovative use of a monetary remedy should have been actively considered rather than dismissed out of hand. The shortcomings
inherent in the various injunctive remedies proposed in the Microsoft
case counsel one to reconsider seriously the efficacy and feasibility of
monetary remedies. Such remedies are not limited to "damages,"
strictly speaking. To an economist, all monetary remedies look alike,
whether they are called damages, fines, restitution, disgorgement, or
something else. All of these monetized remedies are a way of posting
the "price" to the defendant (and other prospective parties) of committing the conduct in question. This view may be ascribed to the con-

426 Compare FTC v Mylan Laboratories Inc, 62 F Supp 2d 25, 40 (D DC 1999), with In re
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution Litigation,538 F2d 231,233-34 (9th Cir 1976) (Because Section
16 of the Clayton Act "limits the equitable remedy under its terms to those against 'threatened
loss or damage,' [Section 16] does not allow the claimed relief for past loss.").
427 DOJ Microsoft Complaint at 46 (cited in note 230).
428 Schine Chain Theatres,Inc v United States, 334 US 110, 128 (1948) ("To require divestiture of theatres unlawfully acquired is not to add to the penalties that Congress has provided in
the antitrust laws. Like restitution it merely deprives a defendant of the gains from his wrongful
conduct. It is an equitable remedy designed in the public interest to undo what could have been
prevented had the defendants not outdistanced the government in their unlawful project.").
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temporary law and economics movement, 29' but it also is found in the
writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes more than a century ago."
Clearly, it is not beyond the competence of courts and economists
to produce and weigh estimates of an appropriate monetary remedy
in the Microsoft case. Robert Hall has produced a novel theoretical
model calculating damages as a remedy in the Microsoft case.43, Reasonable minds might disagree over whether his model bears sufficient
relation to the actual facts of the Microsoft case to be a useful tool in
its current form. But even if it is not, Hall's damage model is a useful
starting point for an important analysis. As Philip Areeda noted years
ago in a frequently cited article, there exists the anomalous possibility
42
in antitrust cases of "antitrust violations without damage recoveries.
In an argument similar to Baxter's Axiom, Areeda argued that "an antitrust damage assessment cannot be divorced from thoughtful attention to the rationale for liability and the internal logic of the liability
holding."33 A monetary damage analysis would invite Judge Jackson
and the parties to focus on an attempt to quantify the harm to consumers that has been alleged to flow from Microsoft's conduct .
Damages are only an example of the truncated analysis that appears at the remedial stage of the Microsoft case. More generally, the
case presents both the need and opportunity for a careful examination
of remedies in network industries, especially industries with the particular cost and asset characteristics of the software industry. Indeed,
for products whose development costs are very high but whose production and distribution costs are negligible, and for firms whose principal assets are intellectual and informational rather than physical,
both the measures of antitrust liability and the effects of antitrust
remedies may differ from those that appear in more conventional
markets. There is thus a need for carefully considered antitrust precedent in the "new economy," and Microsoft would seem to be a case in
which the government would have wanted the court to create such
429
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precedent. Yet there was little effort by the government systematically
and publicly to weigh the various conduct and structural remedies
proposed by different parties and commentators. Without basis in a
careful, on-the-record assessment and comparison of alternative
remedies, the result in Microsoft will not only be of questionable virtue in the instant case, but also of little value for similar cases that
might arise in the future.
CONCLUSION

The landmark case against Microsoft is the U.S. government's most significant monopolization case since the breakup of the Bell System in
1982 and the first major antitrust case concerning the "New Economy"
created by the phenomenal growth of the Internet. In this Article, we
propose an economic welfare approach to evaluating remedial alternatives not only in Microsoft, but in all antitrust cases involving network industries and other dynamic markets. We show that even where
anticompetitive conduct has been found to occur, it does not follow
that a particular remedy for that conduct would yield a net increase in
economic welfare. To determine whether a remedy is likely to benefit
consumers and long-run economic welfare, the remedy must be shown
to produce a net increase in the sum of three kinds of efficiency: allocative, productive, and dynamic. To justify a specific remedy, it does
not suffice to show merely that the remedy would reduce prices in the
short run or create market opportunities for a particular group of
competitors. A case must instead be made that price declines will offset any production cost increases or losses in consumer-side network
externalities; that the net gain from such price reductions will not entail offsetting costs in the form of inefficiently reduced innovation
incentives; and that the remaining net gains cannot be achieved at a
lower cost through an alternative remedial plan.
When the foregoing framework is applied to the remedial proposals pending before the court in Microsoft, we find that important
gaps are revealed. There are important strengths, but potentially fatal
weaknesses, in the divestiture proposals offered by the government
and some amici curiae. Those proposals cannot be responsibly
adopted unless those weaknesses can be addressed and their potentially negative implications for economic welfare demonstrated to be
offset by other economic gains that flow uniquely from divestiture.

Fi-s-EL-1

